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For decades, sociologists have employed the concept of social 
norms to explain how society shapes individual behavior.1 In recent 
years, economists and rational choice theorists in philosophy and 
political science have started to use individual behavior to explain 
the origin and function of norms.2 For many in this group, the focus 
1. See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw (1976); EMILE DuRI<HEIM, THE 
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF REUGIOUS LIFE (Karen E. Fields trans., The Free Press 1995) 
(1965); TALCOTI PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1912); MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT 
Ennc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAUSM 27 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958); Judith Blake & 
Kingsley Davis, Norms, Values and Sanctions, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 456 
(Robert E.L. Faris ed., 1964); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary 
Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 161 (1960). For an early example of norms discussion in social 
psychology, see MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936). 
2. For examples within the field of economics, see GARY S. BECKER, AccoUNTING FOR 
TASTES 225-30 (1996); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF Rrmrrs, Co-OPERATION AND 
WELFARE (1986); George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment 
May Be One Consequence, 94 QJ. EcoN. 749 (1980); B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of 
Conformity, 102 J. Par.. ECON. 841 (1994); Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, An 
Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms, 150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL EcoN. 45 
(1994). For examples within philosophy, see EDNA ULLMANN·MARGAUT, TfIE EMERGENCE 
OF NoRMs (1977); Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 Ennes 
725 (1990). A recent collection of economic and philosophical writings is THE DYNAMICS OF 
NoRMs (Cristina Bicchieri et al. eds., 1997). For examples within political science, see 
DENNIS CHONG, CoLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CrVJL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991); RUSSELL 
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of study is the interaction of law and norms, of formal and informal 
rules. Exemplified by Robert Ellickson's Order Without Law, 3 this 
literature uses norms to develop more robust explanations of 
behavior and to predict more accurately the effect of legal rules. 
Norms turn out to matter in legal analysis for many reasons. 
Sometimes norms govern behavior irrespective of the legal rule, 
making the choice of a formal rule surprisingly unimportant.4 
Sometimes legal rules facilitate or impede the enforcement of a 
norm, and the selection of the formal rule matters in entirely new 
ways, the exact consequence depending on whether the formal rule 
strengthens or weakens a desirable or undesirable norm.5 Indeed, 
in some cases, new norms arise in the presence of different legal 
rules, making the relevant policy choice one between two or more 
law-norm combinations.6 
Roughly speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal 
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because 
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non­
legal sanctions, or both.7 Law-and-norms scholars view these 
informal rules as ubiquitous. Though relatively recent, the 
economics literature uses norms to explain an incredible variety of 
positive and normative issues: the informal resolution of property 
disputes among rancher neighbors in Shasta County, California,s 
the preference of the diamond industry for nonlegal means of 
contract enforcement,9 the stability of racial discrimination in 
competitive markets,10 the effectiveness of various anti-dueling 
HARDIN, ONE FOR Au.: THE Loorc OF GROUP CoNFUcr (1995); Robert Axelrod, An 
Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. Pot.. So. REv. 1095 (1986). In addition, 
sociologists occasionally use a rational choice perspective to address nonns. See, e.g., JAMES 
S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY chs. 10, 11, 30 (1990); Michael Hechter, The 
Attainment of Solidarity in Intentional Communities, 2 RATIONALITY & SoCY. 142 (1990). 
Political philosopher Jon Elster, on the other hand, uses rational choice concepts in many 
respects but defines norms as motivations that are not outcome oriented. See JoN ELSTER, 
THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 98-100 (1989). 
3. ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES 
(1991). Regarding other law and economics literature on nonns, see infra notes 19-38 and 
accompanying text. 
4. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 35, 40-43 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra note 42. 
7. Not everyone defines nonns in this way. Some count legal rules as nonns; others 
exclude not only legal rules but the fonnal rules of private organizations. See infra notes 54-
59 and accompanying text. . 
8. See ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 40-81. 
9. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
10. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1064-71 (1995). 
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statutes from the previous century and safe-sex education efforts 
from this one,U the reason people vote,12 the transitional 
difficulties in moving from a Marxist to a market economy,13 the 
general efficiency of the common law,14 and the operation of the 
elder share regime governing sumo wrestling in Japan.1s 
One reasonably might wonder from even this incomplete list if a 
single social science construct is actually capable of illuminating so 
many different behaviors and legal rules. Because law-and­
economics theorists use norms to address such different problems 
- diamond selling and dueling, sexual customs and voting -
perhaps they are using the term norms to mean different things.16 
And because these theorists offer norms to explain otherwise 
puzzling phenomena, there is the related risk, as Cass Sunstein 
warns, "that a reference to social norms will become a conclusory 
response to any apparently anomalous results."17 If norms explain 
too much, in other words, there is a danger they really explain 
nothing. 
I do not believe this risk has been realized, but there is a danger 
that it will be. In this article, I advocate the use of norms in 
economic analysis of law. Norms are a vitally useful tool for 
explaining behavior and predicting the effect of legal rules. 
11. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 968-
72, 1019-25 (1995); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 903 (1996) (using norms to explain changes in smoking behavior, recycling patterns, and 
gender roles in America). 
12. See Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135, 2136, 2138-64 
(1996). 
13. See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2055, 2062-63 (1996). 
14. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1690-94 (1996). 
15. See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). 
16. David Charny has already suggested as much: "[O]ne might question whether it is 
useful to use the same tenn ('nonns') for comprehensive and relatively complex regimes as 
for more infonnal and diffuse sanctioning systems. With the systems that Bernstein and 
Ramseyer describe, we are quite far from the bucolic expanses of Shasta County .... " David 
Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1841, 1845 (1996). Charny is contrasting Ellickson's discussion of norms in Shasta 
County, California, see ELUCKSON, supra note 3, with Lisa Bernstein's work on the business 
norms enforced by the National Grain and Feed Association, see Bernstein, supra note 9, and 
Mark Ramseyer's work on product liability norms enforced by Japan's Product Safety 
Council, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a 
Japanese Experiment, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1823 (1996). While Shasta County norms exist 
without "a centralized agency for formulating or enforcing rules," the nonns addressed by 
Bernstein and Ramseyer arise within a centralized '"state-like' agency." See Charny, supra, 
at 1845. Charny's comment identifies a crucial distinction, one that I discuss below. 
17. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 945. 
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Ellickson was right to have criticized law and economics in 1991 for 
having largely ignored informal means of social control,18 and much 
still remains to be done in applying economics to understanding the 
complex mix of legal and norm-based rules. But because norms are 
a relatively new subject for law and economics, there is as yet no 
consensus about certain basic theoretical propositions, including, 
most importantly, the meaning of norm. My goal is to remedy some 
fundamental ambiguities in the term norm - ambiguities that give 
this literature an unnecessarily ad hoc appearance and limit our 
understanding of the connections between law and norms: Toward 
this end, I offer a particular theory of the origin and growth of 
norms, and I derive some implications the theory has for how law 
can govern norms. 
Part I introduces this new law-and-norms literature, by which I 
mean the economic study of the interaction of formal (legal) and 
informal (norm-based) rules. I provide a provisional definition of 
norm and identify the puzzle of its origin. Part II offers a simple 
model. In the theory I propose, the initial force behind norm 
creation is the desire individuals have for respect or prestige, that is, 
for the relative esteem of others. Withholding esteem is, under 
certain conditions, a costless means of inflicting costs on others. 
These costs are often extremely small; their insignificance 
compared to material incentives is probably what explains the 
tendency of economic theories to ignore them altogether. But Part 
II demonstrates that dynamic forces can cause the weak desire for 
esteem to produce powerful norms, sometimes because individuals 
struggle to avoid deviance, sometimes because they compete to be 
heroic. Identifying the stages in this process permits some 
analytical clarity that is currently lacking, or so I argue in Part III, 
where I use these stages of norm development to resolve some 
troubling ambiguities in the literature over the meaning of norms. 
The esteem ·model offers a way to unite what may appear to be 
unrelated strands of the literature concerning internalized and non­
internalized norms, broadly and narrowly defined norms, and group 
and societal norms. Finally, in Part IV, I point out some of the 
model's immediate implications for the legal regulation of norms. 
Though norms can be either socially productive or unproductive, 
the esteem theory identifies new situations in which norms reduce 
18. Ellickson criticized both the extreme Jaw and society claim that norms determine 
behavior to the exclusion of law ("legal peripheralism") and the extreme law and economics 
claim that law determines behavior to the exclusion of norms ("legal centralism") and instead 
focused on which "controller" is more powerful in particular contexts. See ELLICKSON, supra 
note 3, at 137-55. 
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social welfare. The model also reveals how law can regulate norms: 
strengthening norms through the expressive function of law and 
impeding norms with legal protections of privacy. 
I. THE ECONOMICS OF NORMS AND NORM ORIGIN 
A. The New Economic Literature on Law & Norms 
In the 1980s, rational choice theorists in various disciplines be­
gan to study norms.19 Within law and economics,20 Janet Landa 
and Robert Cooter sought to explain why, in parts of Asia, ethnic 
minorities tended to dominate the middleman position in many in­
dustries.21 They concluded that these "ethnically homogenous mid­
dlemen groups" succeed in natipns without reliable legal 
enforcement of contracts because the groups' social connectedness 
give their members a unique means of (informally) sanctioning con­
tract breaches by other group members.22 About the same time, 
Robert Ellickson began investigating how ranchers. in Shasta 
County, California, settle property disputes. Ultimately, Ellickson 
concluded that these ranchers enforce informal norm-based rules 
for disputes involving cattle trespass and boundary fences and thus 
resolve certain conflicts without the legal regime.23 In several arti-
19. Norms appeared both to challenge the idea of rational choice and to explain puzzling 
amounts of cooperation and social order. See EI.STER, supra note 2; SUGDEN, supra note 2; 
Axelrod, supra note 2. For a recent summary of the economic literature, see Eric Posner, 
Efficient Norms, in 1 THE NEw PALGRA VE DICilONARY OF EcoNOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter 
Newman ed., forthcoming 1998). 
· 20. Steven Cheung may deserve credit for offering the first law and economics analysis of 
a norm. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. 
& EcoN. 11 (1973). A decade before rational choice theorists began studying norms, Cheung 
reported a custom governing beekeeping by apple orchard owners in rural Washington. Be­
cause some bees will fly off one orchard and pollinate trees on another orchard, each farmer 
has an incentive to keep fewer bees than is necessary for his orchard, with the expectation 
that bees from surrounding farms will make up the shortfall. To prevent the overall shortage 
of bees that would occur if everyone followed this strategy, an informally enforced custom 
requires orchard owners to keep a proportionate share of bees during the pollination period. 
See id. at 30. Another early example is Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These 
Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984). Long before this belated 
discovery of norms, law and society scholars discussed informal social sanctions and their 
relationship to legal rules. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Busi­
ness: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963). 
21. See Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of 
Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 15 (1984); Janet T. Landa, A 
Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to 
Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); see also JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETIIN1CITY, 
AND IDENTITY (1994); Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of Symbols, Clan 
Names, and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1983); Sumner J. La Croix, Homogenous Mid­
dleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity?, 5 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 211 (1989). 
22. See Cooter & Landa, supra note 21, at 21; Landa, supra note 21, at 355-57. 
23. See ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 40-81. On the other hand, where the conditions are 
not appropriate for norms, legal rules still govern the relevant conduct. See id. at 82-103 
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cles24 and in his book, Order Without Law, Ellickson generalizes 
these results, explaining how law and norms are alternative means 
of social control, each providing a mechanism for overcoming per­
vasive problems of collective action.2s 
Order Without Law created, or at least anticipated, a bur­
geoning new subfield of legal studies.26 Much of the economic 
work continues in contract law, which sometimes explicitly refer­
ences business norms. Lisa Bernstein, for example, studies how 
American merchants - from diamond sellers to grain distributors 
- deter contract breaches and resolve disputes without resort to 
the legal system.21 Robert Cooter proposes that courts enforce the 
(discussing disputes regarding highway .collisions involving livestock). Ellickson also re­
counts how whalers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries used nonns to resolve dis­
putes over the ownership of whales. See id. at 191-206; see also id. at 218-19 (regarding a 
similar discussion of Maine lobstermen, based on JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LoBSTER GANGS 
OF MAINE (1988)). 
24. See Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986); Robert Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and 
Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL Sruo. 67 (1987); Robert Ellickson, A 
Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. 
& ORO. 83 (1989). 
25. See ELUcKSON, supra note 3, at 123-36, 167-83. Collective action problems arise 
when there is a disparity between the individual behavior that maximizes the welfare of the 
group and the behavior that maximizes the welfare of an individual in the group. Given 
some activity, a "group has a collective action problem if it is better for all if some do it than 
if nobody does, but better for each not to do it." JoN EI.STER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE 
SoCIAL SCIENCES 126 (1989). Examples may include voting, driving within the speed limit, 
and conserving water in a time of scarcity. See RussELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 8-9, 
16-22 (1982); MANcuR OLSON, JR., THE Loorc OF COLLECTIVE AcnoN 5-22 (1965). 
26. The growing interest in norms is not limited to Jaw and economics. Recent work by a 
variety of legal scholars focuses on norms. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through 
Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REv. 169, 177-80 (1996); Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of 
the Law, 26 L. & SoCY. REv. 565 (1992); William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 
U. Iu.. L. REv. 545; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 453 (1997); Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: 
The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993). Some scholars use norms as a means of 
critiquing economic theories. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and 
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349 (1997) (using social norms to criticize economic theories of 
deterrence); Sunstein, supra note 11 (using norms to criticize the economic concept of a 
preference). 
27. In contrast to Landa's and Cooter's early work, which emphasized the importance of 
norms in underdeveloped legal systems, Bernstein finds that norms govern commercial be­
havior in the United States in industries where merchants sometimes shun the expensive 
judicial machinery for enforcing contracts. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant 
Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.1765 
(1996); Bernstein, supra note 9. Robert Scott had made this point in an earlier and influen­
tial article. See Robert Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 2005, 2040-42 (1987); see also Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for 
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL Sruo. 597, 613-15 (1990) (discussing norms of reciprocity 
and their implications for selecting optional default rules). Other commentators also discuss 
how norms govern commerical relationships. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in 
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373 (1990); Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute 
of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 
(1996); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL 
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otherwise underenforced norms of an industry by directly incorpo­
rating them into the legal rules governing contracts in that industry, 
at least where the structural circumstances make it likely the norm 
is efficient.28 
Outside the law of contracts, the literature continues to grow.w 
Theorists have explored the relevance of norms to various public 
law issues: whether weakened voting norms justify mandatory vot­
ing laws,30 whether norms of reciprocity explain why government 
must compensate for its takings,31 and whether the criminal prohi­
bition of blackmail is efficient.32 More generally, Lawrence Les-
STUD. 377 (1997); Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1993); Eric 
A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on 
Collective Action, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 133, 159-60 (1996). 
28. See Cooter, supra note 14. Cooter's proposal is in tension with the claim made by 
Bernstein that industrial groups may prefer to preserve the exclusivity of private dispute 
resolution mechanisms by forbidding lawsuits between members. See Bernstein, supra note 
27, at 1788 ("[R]ational transactors might deliberately leave aspects of their contracting rela­
tionship to be governed, in whole or in part, by extralegal commitments and sanctions."); 
Bernstein, supra note 9, at 124-27, 134 (describing diamond bourse rule against the litigation 
of disputes). Edward Rock and Michael Wachter similarly argue that courts should not at­
tempt to enforce the norm of American labor markets that employees may be discharged 
only "for cause," because they doubt that judges can gain the local knowledge necessary to 
enforce the norm competently. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforce­
ability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996); see also 
Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JurusPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 24-25 (Jody Kraus & Steven Walt eds., forthcoming 
1997) (arguing that trade customs take the form of general rules that require "judgment" and 
case-by-case "balancing" of interests by those in the trade rather than "bright-line rules" 
judges can discover and apply). 
29. Judge Richard Posner recently joined the fray. See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms 
and the Law: An Economic Approach, AM. EcoN. REV., May 1997, at 365. Ellickson contin­
ues to study informal control of land use through neighborhood or "street" norms. See Rob­
ert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, 
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); see also Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson 
on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day La­
borers, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1997) (criticizing Ellickson's proposal to define 
"chronic street nuisance" by reference to community norms). Informal regulation of land is 
of considerable interest to many nonlegal scholars. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, 
GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL REsOURCES (1994). 
30. See Hasen, supra note 12. Hasen's work, and many of those referred to in this sec­
tion, see infra notes 31-35, were part of a recent symposium in the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review. See Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996). 
31. See Pildes, supra note 13, at 2069-73. Saul Levmore also compares legal and norm­
based rules governing anonymous communication in society and concludes that law is unable 
to mirror the nuances of the norm-based rule. See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (1996) (suggesting that norms permit anonymity more frequently than 
law because only norms can enforce complex obligations of "intermediation" that ameliorate 
the harms of anonymity). 
32. See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2237, 2266-91 (1996). 
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sig33 and Cass -Sunstein34 have discussed government efforts to 
"manage" social norms. Sunstein uses norms to explain the "ex­
pressive" function of law: by "making a statement," law can 
strengthen the norms it embodies and weaken those it condemns. 
One might therefore justify government coercion as a means of im­
peding unwanted norms or facilitating desirable norms.3s Lessig 
emphasizes the need for the state to consider the "social meaning" 
of behavior it seeks to regulate. ·Law can influence behavior by 
changing the norms that determine the meaning ascribed to behav­
ior; often one cannot predict the effect of law, he claims, without 
considering this interpretive dimension.36 
The value of this scholarship must be measured within each area 
of law it addresses, but the literature does point strongly toward a 
particular research agenda: those who study law should study 
norms. Where norms govern individual behavior, one cannot cor­
rectly assess the effect of formal, state-enforced rules without un­
derstanding the informal rules also at work. In many ways, this 
point is very old: legal scholars have always paid some attention, 
33. See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REY. 2181 
(1996); Lessig, supra note 11. 
34. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REY. 2021 
(1996); Sunstein, supra note 11. 
35. As Sunstein explains: 
[L]aw might attempt to express a judgment about the underlying activity in such a way 
as to alter social norms . . • .  Through time, place, and manner restrictions or flat bans, for 
example, the law might attempt to portray behavior like smoking, using drugs, or engag­
ing in unsafe sex as a sign of individual weakness. 
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2034-35. Sunstein also uses norms to challenge the coherence of 
the economic concept of a preference. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 931-39. In contrast, my 
theory of norm origin begins with the economic idea of a preference, namely the preference 
for esteem. See infra text accompanying notes 78-83. 
36. See Lessig, supra note 11. Lessig claims that one way law changes social meaning is 
by "ambiguation," where law renders the meaning of an act less clear by providing an alter­
native meaning. See id. at 1010-12. For example, if almost no one wears a seat belt, then 
wearing a belt in another person's car means (signals) that one distrusts the driver's abilities; 
because people wish to avoid giving offense, this meaning decreases seat belt use. See id. at 
952. If the state mandates seat belt use, however, the meaning of this behavior becomes 
more ambiguous because the seat belt user may now be acting solely to comply with the law. 
By "ambiguating" the meaning, the law renders it less likely that wearing a seatbelt will give 
offense and decreases the costs of the behavior. See id. at 1011-12. 
Another technique is "tying," through which law may add meaning to one behavior by 
connecting it to another. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1009-10. Lessig uses Dan Kahan's 
discussion of criminal fines as an example. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanc­
tions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REY. 591 (1996). Kahan says that fines fail to express (ade­
quately) condemnation of the behavior being fined. See id. at 620. A fine also looks like a 
"price," and making one pay a price for an activity does not condemn the activity. See id. at 
621. Kahan recommends combining criminal fines with a small prison term or a "shaming" 
sanction, such as stigmatizing publicity. See id. at 649-52. Lessig concurs, claiming that "(b]y 
tying the fine to some other unambiguously condemnatory punishment, one reduces on the 
margin the ambiguity in fining . . . .  " Lessig, supra note 33, at 2188. 
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sometimes enormous attention, to social or business customs, con­
ventions, mores, and the like.37 But the new law and norms litera­
ture re-states and sharpens the point. Norms matter to legal 
analysis because (1) sometimes norms control individual behavior 
to the exclusion of law, (2) sometimes norms and law together influ­
ence behavior, and (3) sometimes norms and law influence each 
other.38 
Consider each possibility. First, a norm may govern behavior so 
tightly that the choice between (plausible) legal rules is irrelevant. 
Ellickson, for example, discovered that different property regimes 
in Shasta County had no effect on the way neighbors resolved cer­
tain disputes because the same norm governed regardless of the 
legal rule.39 In these situations, any effort expended to refine the 
legal rule is simply wasted. Second, norms frequently matter be­
cause the legal and norm-based rules each independently influence 
behavior. Law and norms frequently reinforce each other by obli­
gating the same behavior - both, for example, obligate tax-
37. An obvious example is Karl Llewellyn's effort to model article 2 of the Uniform Com­
mercial Code on business norms. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 27, at 1768 n.6 (listing 
sources addressing Llewellyn's efforts to incorporate norms into the law). Tort rules also 
incorporate community norms. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the TJ. Hooper: 
The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL Sruo. 3, 4 (1992); Robert 
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 
77 CAL. L REv. 957, 974-78 (1989) (arguing that the privacy tort enforces community norms 
of "civility"). 
Criminal law scholars often have discussed the social norms or values legal rules enforce, 
not just in the context of enforcing morality, see, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF MORALS (1965), but also in explaining fundamental doctrinal elements such as mens rea, 
see, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANcnON 121-31 (1968); 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 479-82. Conversely, various scholars observe the use of 
criminal law to change norms. For example, Brian Simpson suggests that the 602 A.D. laws 
of the English King Ethelbert, the "earliest set of written laws of any Germanic people in 
Europe," were an attempt to displace the "feud," the customary duty one had to avenge the 
death of a family member. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Laws of Ethelbert, in LEGAL THEORY 
AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 1, 2, 12-13 (1987) ("What the laws of 
Ethelbert were concerned to introduce into society was a new idea - that it was not wrong 
to take money instead of blood."); cf. HARDIN, supra note 2, at 91-100 (discussing how the 
prohibition of dueling contributed to the demise of the norms of honor and revenge that 
obligated aristocrats to duel); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW 
(1984) (discussing how the state used the case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens to expand the 
norm against killing by nullifying the custom allowing cannibalism by those lost at sea). 
38. Thus, norms are irrelevant only in the fourth possible case, when the legal rule gov­
erns individual behavior exclusively, because there is no preexisting norm governing such 
behavior, no norm that arises as a consequence of the legal rule, and-no norm influencing 
what legal rule is adopted. 
39. See ELucKSON, supra note 3, at 40-64. 
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paying40 and forbid theft41 - and sometimes undermine each other 
by obligating inconsistent behavior - as where law obligates one to 
disclose the illegal activities of colleagues but the collegial norm ob­
ligates silence.42 When laws and norms obligate different but con­
sistent behaviors, the interaction can be quite interesting and 
complex.43 
40. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory 
of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. EcoN. & ORO. 390, 401-02 (1994) (re­
viewing studies on tax compliance). 
41. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JoHN M. DARLEY, Jl/STICE, LIABILITY & BLAME 16, 65, 
191 (1995). But see THOMAS GABOR, 'EVERYBODY DOES IT!' CRIME BY THE PUBLIC 73-97 
(1994) (discussing the frequency of and rationalizations for, amateur theft such as insurance 
fraud, employee pilfering, tax evasion, shoplifting, and "hotel linen lifting"). 
42. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAw: PoLICE AND THE 
ExcESsIVE UsE OF FORCE 108-12 (1993) (describing the code of silence among police officers 
that prevents one from "informing" on the misconduct of another); Report of the Mallen 
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption in New York City, in ANATOMY 
OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SucCESs 53-58 (1994) (finding a pervasive "code of silence" that is 
strongest in "crime-ridden precincts where officers most depend upon each other for their 
safety each day"); Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 
IND. LJ. 528 (1976) (describing doctors' unwillingness to testify against other doctors); Carl 
R. Robinson, Why the Conspiracy of Silence Won't Die, MED. EcoN., Feb. 20, 1984, at 180 
(same); cf. West, supra note 15, at 166 (discussing the secrecy maintained by the Japan Sumo 
Association). 
Another obvious example is violence, where law forbids an assault required by norms of 
honor. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 2, at 91-100; RICHARD E. NISBETT & Dov COHEN, 
CuLTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 13-22, 92-93 (1996); 
Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100 ETHICS 862 (1990) (discussing norms of honor supporting 
the practice of dueling and the blood feud). 
43. For example, assume that a law obligates individuals to appear for jury duty when 
called and a norm prevents lying. Without the law, a person wishing to avoid serving would 
refuse to appear; without the norm, a person who appeared could avoid serving by telling 
undetectable lies during voir dire about her inability to be impartial. The law and the norm 
thus achieve a result together - inducing jury service - that neither could produce in 
isolation. 
As another example, consider the combination of common law larceny, which prohibits 
the taking of another's property only when accompanied by the intent to permanently de­
prive the owner thereof, see MoDEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 cmt. 6 (1980), with a norm among 
many neighbors and co-workers not to take property of another without permission, even 
temporarily. Because neighbors and coworkers might be the only people who could convince 
a jury they took someone's property with the intent to return it, and because these individu­
als are the ones subject to the norm, the combination of the legal and norm-based rule may 
provide reasonable security of personal property even though each rule alone seems inade­
quate. The criminal rule permits temporary taking, while the norm may simply be too weak 
to prevent lucrative permanent taking even by neighbors. Of course, the criminal rule could 
be - and in some jurisdictions has been - expanded so that the legal prohibition, including 
the tort of conversion that already applies to temporary taking, would by itself deter tempo­
rary taking. But if one wishes to conserve criminal law only for those wrongs for which 
punishment is strictly necessary, then norms may help explain why the common law of lar­
ceny did not ban temporary taking. 
For a third example, see McAdams, supra note 32, at 2266-91 (defending the prohibition 
of blackmail based on its interactive effect with privacy norms). 
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Perhaps of greatest interest, the law can influence the norm.44 
Some theorists advocate using law intentionally to govern or shape 
norms. Cooter, for example, advocates "decentralizing law" by in­
corporating business norms directly into contract rules governing 
the industry in which the norm arises.45 Various scholars claim that 
legally restricting public smoking may strengthen an antismoking 
norm,46 that Title V II impedes enforcement of undesirable norms 
of race discrimination,47 and that bans on dueling worked to end 
norms obligating the duel.48 In general, if legal rules sometimes 
change or create norms, one cannot adequately compare an existing 
legal rule with its alternatives without considering how a change in 
the legal rule may affect the relevant norms. 
The literature also identifies the danger that law may uninten­
tionally change norms. Some express concern that courts will un­
dermine the very norms they seek to enforce, given that judges lack 
the local knowledge to understand the norm properly.49 More 
often, the effect on norms arises from the state's attempt to regulate 
something else. Eric Posner, for example, suggests that legal rules 
often have indirect and unintended effects on the power that groups 
have over their members, which in turn affects the power of such 
groups to enforce their norms.50 Other scholars make similar 
claims.51 
44. This third category also includes the influence of norms on the production of legal 
rules. I will focus on the effect noted in the text, but of course judicial norms affect the 
production of legal opinions, and lobbying-legislative norms affect the production of statutes. 
See, e.g., Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic 
Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736 (1993); Posner, supra note 29, at 365. 
45. Cooter limits his proposition to situations in which the norm passes a "structural" test 
for efficiency. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1694. 
46. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2033-36. 
47. See McAdams, supra note 10, at 1074-82. 
48. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 968-72. 
49. See Bernstein, supra note 27, at 1796-1807 (asserting that grain merchants may prefer 
that courts enforce formal rules rather than attempt to ascertain and enforce the norms of the 
grain merchants); Pildes, supra note 13, at 2073-76 (noting that inherent differences in group 
and state enforcement of a rule often suggest that state enforcement of the norm would be 
counterproductive); Rock & Wachter, supra note 28, at 1932-40 (arguing courts could not 
enforce norm of "for-cause" firing). 
50. See Posner. supra note 27, at 147-48. 
51. Richard Pildes warns of the unintended destruction of social capital through law. See 
Pildes, supra note 13. He suggests, for example, that modern urban planning created build­
ings that destroyed the conditions for "street" norms vital to urban welfare. See id. at 2067-
69 (relying on JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN Crrms (1961)). 
Jacobs's and Pildes's argument is that urban planning produced buildings that intentionally 
avoided attracting people to the streets, ignoring the fact that populated streets were an es­
sential condition for norms regulating street behavior. 
I have argued previously that the criminal prohibition of blackmail unintentionally facili­
tates the ability of close-knit groups to sanction violators in the public manner necessary to 
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In sum, formal and informal rules form a complex web of incen­
tives that influence behavior; a new economics literature has begun 
to view norms as central to the study of law. 
B. The Meaning of "Norms" in the New Literature 
In other disciplines, considerable effort has gone into defining 
exactly what constitutes a norm.52 The economic literature contin­
ues to struggle over the issue.53 Although my use of the term will 
become clearer as I develop a theory of how such influences arise, I 
state here a few preliminary points concerning definition. 
To begin, the economic literature distinguishes norms from legal 
rules.54 Although law may affect the strength of norm enforcement, 
norms are enforced by some means other than legal sanctions. If 
recycling were a norm, for example, we would not mean that - or 
at least not merely mean that - the state punishes the failure to 
recycle but rather that the obligation to recycle is enforced by a 
nongovernmental sanction - as when individuals internalize the 
duty and feel guilt from failing to recycle or when individuals pri­
vately punish those who do not recycle. 
Second, I follow the literature that views norms as obligations. 
Robert Cooter excludes, for example, the statistical notion of a 
norm as merely a central tendency of behavior. Many regularities 
exist - even intentionally - without being obligatory.ss As 
Cooter puts it: "[M]en take off their hats when they enter a furnace 
room or a church. Taking off your hat to escape the heat is differ­
ent from taking off your hat to satisfy an obligation. The former is 
[merely] a regularity and the latter is a norm."56 
further norm internalization, and to generate the norm criticism necessary to "repeal" dys­
functional norms. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2243-64; see also Wendy J. Gordon, 
Norms of Communication and Commodification, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2321, 2329-34 (1996) 
(critiquing these claims). 
52. See, e.g., EI.STER, supra note 2, at 97-151; Blake & Davis, supra note 1. 
53. See Posner, supra note 19 (summarizing several recent theories). 
54. But see Jones, supra note 26, at 546 {defining norms to include "all rules and stan­
dards, without regard to their origins or means of enforcement"). 
55. Individuals may intentionally adhere to a regularity for reasons other than its being an 
obligation. For example, those who wish to hitchhike hold up their hand with the thumb 
extended not because the failure to do so is sanctioned by guilt or condemnation, but because 
they will otherwise fail to communicate to motorists their desire for a ride. People with 
imperfect information often follow the majority behavior, not from fear of sanctions, but 
because they assume the majority is less likely to be mistaken. In both examples, following 
the regularity is prudent; deviating from it carries risks, though not the risk of sanction. 
Hence, the intentional regularity or "convention" is not an obligation and not, in my use of 
the term, a norm. Elster makes this distinction. See EI.STER, supra note 2, at 101-02. 
56. Cooter, supra note 14, at 1656 {footnote omitted). Tue removal of a hat in a furnace 
room is not a duty the individual owes to other members of the community. Tue regularity is 
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Third, nonlegal obligations may be created and enforced in a 
centralized or decentralized manner. Centralized private organiza­
tions, such as a diamond bourse, enforce relatively formal, usually 
written, rules,57 while groups and entire societies often enforce 
highly informal rules, such as the property norms ranchers follow in 
Shasta County.58 The distinction is important because some theo­
rists prefer to use the term norms to refer only to decentralized 
rules and regard organizational rules as a set of obligations falling 
between centralized law and decentralized norms.59 However the 
terminological matter is resolved, this article focuses on informal, 
decentralized obligations. Such obligations describe virtually all the 
norms arising at a societal level60 and within informal groups,61 and 
some of the norms arising informally within highly structured 
groups.62 These are also the norms for which the meaning is most 
obscure - a function of their informality - and for which a theory 
of origin is therefore likely to have the greatest payoff.63 
merely the result of a common disposition to feel uncomfortably hot wearing a hat in a fur­
nace room. But church members regard hat-removal as a duty that men owe to the church. 
One who violates an obligation is sanctioned for that reason by human agency - the violator 
either receives an internal self-sanction, such as guilt, or others punish the violation. 
57. See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 119-32. 
58. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 40-81. 
59. Ellickson divides social control into first-party (involving one's personal ethics), sec­
ond-party (involving self-help by an aggrieved party), and third-party control. See id. at 130-
31. He then notes three sources of third-party control: governments provide legal rules, 
organizations provide organizational rules, and "social forces" provide norm-based rules. See 
id. at 131. In this taxonomy, organizational rules therefore are not "norms." See id. This 
distinction has not, however, generally been observed, a point that David Charny has re­
cently criticized. See supra note 16. 
As long as the distinction between formal and informal norms is observed, I would prefer 
to use norms to refer to any nonstate obligation. The whole literature has in common the 
claim that legal analysis should reflect the existence of nonlegal obligations. A single term is 
useful for making this point: "Remember norms" is easier than "Remember norms and also 
organizational rules." 
60. For example, social norms defining gender roles, obligating voting, and proscribing 
rudeness are enforced informally. 
61. For example, the Shasta County ranchers Ellickson studied are a close-knit group 
without a formal structure. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 52-64. Neighbors are often 
groups in this sense, as are students at a particular high school, workers in a firm, city dwell­
ers who share a religious faith, and professors of a given discipline. 
62. Bernstein, for example, notes that some trading rules within formal organizations re­
main informal. See Bernstein, supra note 27, at 1775 n.32, 1777-78 n.43; see also Craswell, 
supra note 28, at 25-26. 
63. Informal norms are, in a sense, more fundamental. Once an organization arises, the 
origin of its rules is explained simply by the formal processes of rule creation within the 
organization - perhaps aided by borrowing from public choice analysis of governmental 
rulemaking, see Charny, supra note 16, at 1848. The difficult question is how the organization 
originated. My model of the origin of decentralized norms may bear on this question, in that 
the processes creating informal norms within groups may, over time, produce a centralized 
structure to the group which can then promulgate formal rules. Further, if one thinks of 
organizational rules as a hybrid of centralized law and decentralized norms, the initial ques-
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C. The Puzzle of Norm Origin and Its Relevance for Law 
Despite the fact that norms govern behavior throughout society, 
the origin of norms is, for economists, something of a puzzle. 'fypi­
cally, the new literature simply sets the issue aside. The decision to 
concentrate on the operation of extant norms is certainly defensi­
ble: we gain much by empirical studies of particular norms.64 
Nonetheless, I believe it is fruitful for legal theory to focus on the 
more elemental question: How do norms initially arise? 
For economics, this question poses some difficulty. If one takes 
for granted that individuals enforce norms, it is easy to see why they 
persist. A norm exists as long as the sanctions imposed on violators 
create an expected cost for noncompliance that exceeds the ex­
pected cost of compliance. But if sanctioning is costly, as most anal­
yses assume, the puzzle is to explain why individuals will ever begin 
to sanction violators or why threats of sanctions are ever credible.65 
It is not sufficient to answer that individuals enforce the norm be­
cause they perceive that it benefits the group. Even when the norm 
benefits the group, a second-order collective action problem66 re­
mains: if others enforce the norm, the individual can gain the 
norm's benefits without bearing enforcement costs; if others do not 
enforce the norm, the individual's solo enforcement efforts are 
wasted. The individual gains only in the rare case where her contri­
bution to enforcement by. itself will "make or break" the norm. 67 
tion is how to explain the origin and function of the two pure cases; one can then explain the 
hybrid case in terms of these cases. 
64. The fact of a norm's existence is entirely sufficient to establish many propositions 
important to legal analysis. Moreover, had the early work on norms not been rigorously 
empirical, many rational choice scholars might have found the idea of norm-based behavior 
easy to dismiss as theoretically improbable or insignificant. Fmally, any theory of origin must 
ultimately be tested against empirical data concerning particular norms. 
65. Sanctioning is not necessary if threats to sanction are credible. But given the collec­
tive action problem described in the paragraph, it is not clear why anyone should take such 
threats seriously. 
66. Regarding collective action generally, see HARDIN, supra note 25; OtsoN, supra note 
25. 
67. More precisely, the individual will bear the costs of enforcement only when (1) she 
perceives that her decision to sanction a violator would, given other events, create a norm 
and her failure to sanction would prevent the norm, and (2) her benefit from having the norm 
would exceed her cost from enforcing it. Given uncertainty, one might instead say that the 
individual perceives the gain from enforcing the norm to be the probability of being the 
"make or break" actor multiplied by the gain she receives from having the norm. Outside of 
very small groups, the probability of being the "make or break" actor is very low. See Et.­
STER, supra note 2, at 44. 
One could try to answer this analysis by asserting that there are secondary norms obligat­
ing enforcement of primary norms. But this merely pushes the second-order collective action 
problem back to a third level, begging the question of why anyone would bear the costs to 
sanction those who failed to sanction primary norm violators. See id. 
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Otherwise, the individual is better off not bearing enforcement 
costs.68 
To illustrate, imagine a behavior with negative externalities -
that is, effects that impose nonconsensual costs on others.69 Litter­
ing, for example, imposes costs on those who encounter the litter in 
any way they r�gard as unpleasant. Suppose that the total gains 
derived from a given act of littering are worth twenty-five cents -
the value the litterer places on not holding the garbage until she 
finds a receptacle for it - and the total average costs are one dol­
lar, based on a one-cent cost incurred by the litterer and each of, on 
average, ninety-nine others who encounter the litter. Even though 
littering is socially costly, it is common because a litterer gains all 
the benefits but incurs only a fraction of the costs. One might ex­
pect a no-littering norm in this context: given the costs the behav­
ior imposes on everyone, the group would benefit if it spent the 
costs necessary to sanction litterers effectively.10 But the dynamic 
that causes the littering problem is likely to prevent a solution. The 
most any one individual will spend to deter an act of littering is one 
cent, which is quite probably not sufficient by itself to raise the ex­
pected costs of littering above twenty-five cents.71 Thus, a norm 
68. The problem is not solved by positing universal altruism. If everyone were highly 
altruistic, there would be no collective action problems recognized as such. Anyone who has 
observed traffic gridlock, littering, or water shortages should admit that selfishness is suffi­
ciently strong to cause such problems. The question is, given that selfish individuals often fail 
to generate nonns, how is it that they sometimes do? 
One answer is that there are varying degrees of altruism in individuals and varying distri­
butions of individuals among groups, so that one group, but not another, may produce a 
norm requiring a certain level of sacrifice, and one group may produce some nonns but not 
others that require even more sacrifice. This solution would resolve the puzzle but without 
explaining much of what we observe about nonns. For example, if nonns depended entirely 
on altruism, we would not observe strong norms within criminal groups nor guilt among 
those who have internalized a norm they intellectually understand is no longer beneficial to 
the group. Nor does an altruism model yield much new insight into norms - for example, it 
does not predict the existence of Uimecessary and inefficient norms, nor the expressive value 
of law, each of which is explained in Part IV. 
69. This is precisely where James Coleman expects norms to arise, given other conditions 
that he identifies. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 251 ("[T]he genesis of a norm is based in 
externalities of an action which cannot be overcome by simple transactions that would put 
control of the action in the hands of those experiencing the externalities."). 
70. Because the group loses 75 cents from each act of littering, the group would benefit if 
it could deter an act of littering for anything less than 75 cents. This seems highly probable, 
given that the litterer gains only 25 cents. 
71. I say only "quite probably" because there is no necessary connection between the 
costs borne by the one who imposes a sanction and the costs borne by the one receiving the 
sanction. As others have noted, the former cost is often less than the latter, as where a 
vandal bears little cost to inflict substantial damage to an automobile. See HARDIN, supra 
note 2, at 52-53. Sanctioning is made more effective by this potential multiplier effect, which, 
in theory, could support a norm even in the textual example. For example, if the 1¢ cost 
borne by the sanctioner inflicted a 24¢ loss on the litterer, then this 24¢ loss, combined with 
the 1¢ loss the litterer already bears, would offset any benefit from the act. For costly sane-
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can arise only if many individuals sanction litterers. But when an 
effective sanction requires the action of many individuals, each one 
reasons that her sanctioning decision will neither make nor break 
the norm, so she is better off not bearing sanctioning costs. The 
second-order collective action problem persists. 
This is the puzzle that any rational choice theory of norm origin 
must solve. I do not suggest that the puzzle has, up to now, re­
mained unsolvable. Various theorists have made considerable pro­
gress in explaining the formation of norms;n in all likelihood, there 
is no single appropriate theory, but different explanations appropri­
ate to different norms.73 Thus, after I present my "esteem" theory 
of norm origin, I explain how it may be synthesized with Robert 
Cooter's theory of norm "intemalization."74 I then demonstrate 
the usefulness of the esteem theory, so conceived, in two ways. Part 
III contends that the esteem theory of norm formation can resolve 
troubling ambiguities over the meaning of the term norm and pro­
vide a basis for unifying the growing body of literature on the sub­
ject. Second, as explained above, arguably the most important 
relationship between law and norms is the ability of law to shape 
norms. Yet if we do not know how norms first arise, it would seem 
implausible to think we could predict how legal rules might change 
a particular norm. Part IV contends that an esteem theory of norm 
origin is useful to understand both when norm shaping is desirable 
and how it can be achieved. 
tions, I doubt the real world multipliers are often so great, especially because many cases 
where the multiples would be greatest - for example, vandalism and physical assaults - are 
themselves subject to criminal and tort sanctions which reduce the multiplier. Finally, when 
the multiplier effect is sufficiently great, there still may remain a holdout problem: Sanction­
ing now generates positive returns, but the returns are even greater for those who do not 
sanction but who enjoy the benefits of someone else sanctioning the litterer. 
In the end, it may still be possible for norms to arise from costly sanctioning aided by a 
multiplier effect. My thesis, however, is not that the esteem theory of norm origin is strictly 
necessary to explain any norm, but that the esteem model solves the origin puzzle in a way 
that explains more of what we observe about norms. 
72. Within law and economics, the first is Robert Cooter. See Robert D. Cooter, Law 
and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & SoCY. 50 (1995) [hereinafter Cooter, Unified Theory]; 
Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decen­
tralized Law, 14 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN. 215 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter, Structural Adjudica­
tion]; Cooter, supra note 14. I discuss his theory infra section III.A, contrasting and 
synthesizing it with my own. See also BECKER, supra note 2 (presenting an internalization 
theory); Kraus, supra note 27 (presenting an evolutionary theory); Eric Posner, Symbols, 
Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998) 
(presenting a signaling model of norms). See generally Posner, supra note 19 (reviewing ex­
isting economic theories of origin). 
73. See Posner, supra note 19, at 5. 
74. See infra section III.A. 
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This Part presents the "esteem" theory of norms. Section II.A 
presents the initial conditions under which the desire for esteem 
creates a norm. People can solve the second-order collective action 
problem because, at the earliest level, they can costlessly punish 
norm violators by withholding from them the esteem they seek. If 
many people agree that a behavior deserves disapproval, if there is 
an inherent risk the behavior will be detected, and if this agreement 
and risk are well-known, then the pattern of disapproval itself cre­
ates costs to the behavior. When sufficiently large, these costs pro­
duce a norm against the behavior.75 Though esteem forces may be 
weak, Section II.B notes several reasons why the resulting norms 
may be strong: conformity is self-reinforcing because the esteem 
sanction for deviance increases as conformity increases, individuals 
compete for "hero" status by leading the group to more demanding 
norms, and esteem competition can produce secondary norms re­
quiring material enforcement of primary norms. I organize the dis­
cussion temporally, emphasizing the developmental stages of a 
norm. 
A. An Esteem Theory of Norm Origin 
My thesis is that norms arise because people seek the esteem of 
others.76 In this section, I describe what I mean by the preference 
for esteem and explain the conditions under which this preference 
will produce a norm. 
1. The Preference for Esteem 
Suppose people seek esteem: the good opinion or respect of 
others. Assume, in other words, that an individual's utility depends 
in part on the opinion that she perceives others to hold of her.77 In 
75. As I explain infra text accompanying notes 119-23, the same analysis applies to ex­
plain how approval of behavior produces a norm obligating that behavior. 
76. I made this claim briefly in a previous article, see McAdams, supra note 10, at 1028, 
though without any detail concerning the conditions necessary for norms to arise or for es­
teem sanctions to develop into material sanctions. Since that time I discovered an earlier 
publication by philosopher Philip Pettit making the same point. See Pettit, supra note 2, at 
739-40 (claiming that people value approval and that disapproval is a costless means of sanc­
tioning that can produce norms). Pettit's article is part of a 1990 ETHICS symposium. See 
Symposium on Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100 ETHICS 725 (1990). My model relies 
on his approach, though I rely on a "relative" component to esteem seeking to explain vari­
ous developmental stages of a norm: how esteem competition can increase the standard 
required by the norm, produce secondary enforcement norms, and leverage purely esteem 
sanctions into material sanctions. 
77. It is obvious that people sometimes seek the good opinion of others as a means to an 
end. Achieving a material end - for example, making a sale or getting a pay raise - often 
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prior articles, I· have reviewed social science :findings and anecdotal 
evidence supporting this claim. This evidence shows that people 
pay for status goods to signal their wealth or "good taste,"78 that 
people incur material costs to cooperate in situations where their 
only reward is the respect and admiration of their peers,79 and that 
individuals conform their behavior or judgment to the unanimous 
view of those around them in order to avoid the disesteem accorded 
"deviants."Bo Here, I will not review further evidence but merely 
assume that individuals value esteem.81 The norms literature pro­
vides substantial evidence that norms influence behavior and, if the 
esteem theory usefully explains norms, this will be justification 
enough for the assumption.sz Indeed, though I believe people 
sometimes value esteem quite highly, for the purpose of explaining 
norms it is sufficient to assume that people place only a small value 
on the opinion of others.s3 
requires first obtaining the good opinion of the person who has the power to confer the 
material end. But my assumption is that individuals also value esteem as an end. 
78. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 38-44, 48 (1992); see 
also id. at 31-37 (reviewing social psychology evidence supporting theories of social compari­
son and relative deprivation); id. at 44-48 (reviewing economic data supporting relative in­
come theories of savings, wages, and risk-taking). 
79. See McAdams, supra note 10, at 1009-19 (reviewing evidence of cooperation in exper­
imental prisoner's dilemmas and real world collective action problems). 
80. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2250 nn.40-41 (describing findings of conformity ex­
periments); see also Kahan, supra note 26, at 352, 353-56 (reviewing social psychology evi­
dence of "social influence" - that is, the fact "that individuals tend to conform their conduct 
to that of other individuals"). 
81. This assumption is intentionally rec;luctive and possibly unrealistic in that it collapses 
many plausible distinctions between the kinds of esteem individuals seek. For example, I 
assume throughout this article that an individual will care more about certain kinds of opin­
ions than others - for example, that one cares more about what others think of her intellect 
than integrity, or vice versa - and will care about the opinions of certain people more than 
others - that is, one cares more about her friend's opinion of her than a stranger's opinion 
of her. But my assumption is that there is a single preference for esteem and that these 
different sources of esteem are substitutes for one another. This simplifying assumption 
could be discarded in favor of a mqre complex view of esteem, but I do not believe it would 
affect the main conclusions of this article. 
82. One might object on sociobiological grounds that humans, as animals, would not in­
dependently value nonmaterial ends. To the contrary, however, the material and reproduc­
tive rewards for being of high status are sufficiently great that it is perfectly consistent with 
evolutionary theory that animals would instinctually seek status as an end in itself, rather 
than rely on complex calculations to determine exactly how much status seeking will maxi­
mize reproduction. See, e.g., Amy Wax, Against Nature - On Robert Wright's The Moral 
Animal, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 307, 318-22 (1996); see also FRANS DE WAAL, GooD NATURED: 
THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMANS AND 011-IER ANIMALS 92 (1996) ("Respect 
for rules and norms can develop only when the opinions and reactions of others matter."). 
83. I place less weight than Pettit on the magnitude of the desire for esteem. See Pettit, 
supra note 2, at 745 (assuming "that people are moved in great part, though not exclusively, 
by a concern that others not think badly of them and, if possible, that they think well of 
them." (emphasis added)). As I claim in the next paragraph, people desire relative esteem, 
and as I explain infra section II.B.l, competition for relative esteem can produce powerful 
norms even if the desire for esteem is not strong. 
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A crucial feature of esteem seeking is that individuals care how 
they are evaluated in comparison to others. This relative element 
can arise because the preference for esteem is inherently relative; 
that is, because the taste itself is relative - for example, "I want to 
be thought of as the best." But even if the desire for: esteem were a 
conventional, absolute preference - for example, "I want to be 
thought of as principled" - a person will care how others evaluate 
her in comparison to others if esteem is scarce. In other words, if A 
wishes B to "think well" of her but B, for whatever reason, only 
grants such esteem to a few individuals, A will have to compete 
with others for B's esteem. For example, assuming that no one is 
completely principled, being thought of as "principled" actually 
means being relatively principled, as compared with some average. 
In either event, one frequently gains prestige or admiration only by. 
being somehow better than most. One often avoids dishonor or 
embarrassment only by being at least as good as some, and possibly 
as good as the average.84 
The remainder of thiS Part demonstrates how the esteem­
seeking assumption is useful in explaining norms origin. The essen­
tial point is that denying esteem is a costless means of punishing 
norm violators.85 But several conditions are still necessary for 
norms to emerge. 
84. Thus, an individual's utility is a function of this relative esteem (e), and the material 
goods (g) she trades off with esteem: U; = f(g;, e;). 
85. Other norm theorists note the obvious fact that disapproval is used as a norm sanc­
tion. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 2, at 1096, 1105-06; Jones, supra note 26, at 566-67 ("[T]he 
individual's concern about her standing among her peers is the means by which the group's 
norms are enforced."). But except for Pettit, supra note 2, at 733, they do not claim that 
esteem is costless and therefore the source of norm origin. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 2, at 
133 (arguing that expressing disapproval "requires energy and attention that might be used 
for other purposes" and that "[o]ne may alienate or provoke the target individual, at some 
cost or risk to oneselr'). I respond below to this point by noting circumstances where expres­
sion is costless and where esteem judgments are inferred without expression. See infra sec­
tion II.B.2. 
One may object that esteeming others, even without expression, is costly because it inter­
feres with one's self-esteem. If individuals care how they rate in comparison to others, which 
is my claim, approving others might mean less room for approving oneself. Perhaps one 
maximizes utility by disapproving everyone but oneself. To state these points is nearly suffi­
cient to refute them, but I raise them to point out the special effect of esteem: unlike mate­
rial wealth, there is no benefit to "hording" all of one's approval. As an empirical matter, I 
deny that an individual who grants all human beings the same disapproval enjoys greater 
utility than one who especially approves certain others. Up to some point, individuals do not 
lose and may even gain utility by finding others worthy of their approval. There may be a 
limit to how much esteem one can "hand out" without starting to suffer diminished self­
approval, but there is some positive level of approval that is costless to provide. See McAd­
ams, supra note 10, at 1024-26. That will suffice, I argue below, to produce norms. 
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2. The Conditions for Esteem-Based Norms 
Under the right conditions, the desire for esteem produces a 
norm. For some behavior X in some population of individuals, a 
norm may arise if (1) there is a consensus about the positive or 
negative esteem worthiness of engaging in X (that is, either most 
individuals in the relevant population grant, or most withhold, es­
teem from those who engage in X);86 (2) there is some risk that 
others will detect whether one engages in X;87 and (3) the existence 
of this consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the rel­
evant population.88 When these conditions exist, the desire for es­
teem necessarily creates costs of or benefits from engaging in X If 
the consensus is that X deserves esteem, a norm will arise if the 
esteem benefits exceed, for most people, the costs of engaging in X 
Conversely, if the consensus condemns X, a norm will arise if, for 
most people, the esteem costs exceed the benefits of engaging in X 
Consider each condition in greater detail. 
Consensus. The first condition is a consensus within the popula­
tion about the esteem worthiness of certain behavior. Let me first 
emphasize that I am not assuming my conclusion. The existence of 
a consensus does not mean that the norm already exists. Instead, I 
assume that - independent of and prior to any norm - individuals 
have some evaluative opinions about others; they are not utterly 
indifferent to all traits and behaviors. All that is necessary is that 
people are opinionated, some of their opinions are directed at the 
behavior of others, and sometimes most members of a population 
share the same opinion. Indeed, it is not strictly necessary that the 
consensus include a majority. For example, suppose a large minor­
ity of the population strongly disapproves certain behavior and the 
majority is indifferent. Without an offsetting set of people who ap­
prove the behavior, there would be a net cost to violating the mi­
nority view, assuming the other norm conditions exist. All that is 
required is that the majority of those who hold an opinion share the 
same opinion.s9 
86. I modify this assumption below, where I suggest that something less than a majority 
consensus can also p�oduce an esteem nonn. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
f!Jl. This condition includes the case where the risk of detection is zero, but only because 
the individual engaging in X bears positive costs of concealment. 
88. This condition can be relaxed to include the case where the consensus is not publi­
cized but the cost of communicating one's esteem or disesteem after X occurs is zero. 
89. With a more complex model, even a majority of those who hold an opinion would not 
be necessary. Individuals value differently the esteem of different people and approve and 
disapprove with differing levels of intensity. Thus, the net cost of a behavior depends not 
only on the number of people who approve or disapprove it, but how much the actor values 
the esteem of these people and how intensely they react to the conduct. In theory, a truly 
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Consider how easily a consensus may arise. Even if evaluative 
beliefs about behavior or traits were randomly distributed, there 
would be some occasions where most individuals held the same be­
lief about a particular behavior. But there are at least three forces 
that sometimes cause individuals to converge on a common belief 
about a behavior. Philip Pettit suggests the first mechanism, which 
I label "selfish esteem allocation." He says that individuals typi­
cally "approve[ ] of nearly everyone who benefits him in some re­
spect through performing a collectively beneficial action and 
disapprove[ ] of nearly everyone who harms him through perform­
ing a collectively nonbeneficial action."9° In other words, because 
granting esteem is costless, an individual may as well grant esteem 
in ways that reinforce behaviors that benefit the individual and pun­
ish those that harm him. A homeowner esteems neighbors who 
maintain their house and yard and thereby raise area property val­
ues and disapproves those who operate loud machinery at night and 
thereby disturb her sleep. When everyone, or a substantial major­
ity, perceives that a behavior generates positive or negative exter­
nalities, selfish esteem allocation produces a consensus. Thus, 
because all homeowners perceive the benefit they receive from be-
4tg surrounded by well-kept houses, the neighborhood consensus 
favors house and yard maintenance. Because most homeowners 
find loud nighttime noise disruptive, the consensus condemns such 
behavior.91 
minority view might produce a norm. For example, 20% of a group or society might produce 
a norm against a behavior, despite the fact that 60% approve the behavior and the remainder 
are indifferent, if the 20% made more intense esteem judgments than the 60% or if most 
individuals care more about gaining the approval of the members of the 20% than the ap­
proval of members of the 60%. I explore the matter further infra text accompanying notes 
109-10, 165-76. 
90. Pettit, supra note 2, at 744. 
91. One may raise the following objection: People perceive the actions of others as being 
harmful or not, in part, based on norms. If so, perceptions determined by norms cannot 
explain how norms arise. For example, an individual may enjoy the look of roses. But if the 
local norm says that a homeowner gets to plant on her property whatever flowers she wants, 
A may not perceive herself as being "harmed" by her neighbor's decision to plant poppies. 
At the same time, she may perceive herself aggrieved by her neighbor's decision to display 
lawn ornaments because the norm forbids them - that is, the consensus is that they are 
gaudy. The argument suggests that a consensus based on perceived self-interest cannot arise 
before, and thereby explain, a norm. 
The problem, however, is not with the esteem theory. The general problem for any the­
ory of origin is that we live in a world so thoroughly pervaded by norms that it is difficult to 
even imagine a normless world in which the theory can then explain how the first norms 
arise. All the interesting real world examples involve new norms arising against the back­
ground of existing norms. Thus, the esteem theory may be viewed in two ways. First, in a 
hypothetical normless world, norms would arise under the conditions I identify. Even if 
some subtle forms of harm would not be recognized as such without norms defining rights 
and responsibilities, it is likely that an individual would perceive that some behaviors -
physical violence against her, the involuntary taking of food she has gathered, and so on -
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Second, group discussion may produce (and publicize) a consen­
sus. This process may simply be selfish esteem allocation at the col­
lective level, if some individuals convince enough others of the fact 
that a behavior benefits or harms the members of the group. It may 
be more complex, as when some members of a group that already 
shares a morality or aesthetic convince enough others that a specific 
behavior is required or prohibited by the common ethic. Individu­
als may "convince" others because they provide new information or 
argument that effectively changes beliefs about such matters, or be­
cause the others, fearing loss of esteem, feel pressure to conform to 
what is apparently the dominant view.92 Whether described as gos­
sip,93 "voice,"94 or signaling,9s individuals thus influence each other 
in the creation of consensus. 
A final process that creates consensus is exit. Once selfish es­
teem allocation produces some minimal consensus within a group, 
individuals who wish to act contrary to the consensus may leave the 
group, possibly to join groups of like-minded individuals. This 
mechanism only applies to groups one can readily leave - not, for 
example, a prison or, for most people, the very large group that 
constitutes a society. For smaller groups, however, exit may be pos­
sible, albeit costly, and can cause such groups to become quite ho­
mogenous, as people sort themselves according to shared beliefs, 
values, and commitments.96 
harm her. Second, in the real world, given a rich baseline of nonns that may have arisen by 
esteem or other processes, new nonns arise when the conditions I identify exist. Even if 
preexisting nonns influence the perception of a new hann, the esteem theory explains how 
this perception produces a new nonn. As to this latter point, see infra text accompanying 
notes 150-61. 
92. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 352-56; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2250 nn.40-41. 
93. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 32, at 2244, 2256-58 (discussing the role of gossip in 
the fonnation of norms); Barbara Yngvesson, The Reasonable Man and the Unreasonable 
Gossip: On the Flexibility of (Legal) Concepts and the Elasticity of (Legal) Time, in CRoss­
EXAMINATIONS: EssAYS IN MEMORY OF MAx GLUCKMAN 133, 153-54 (P.H. Gulliver ed., 
1978). 
94. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LoYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE 
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970) (describing "voice" as an alternative means 
to "exit" by which individuals influence finns); McAdams, supra note 32, at 2258 (discussing 
"voice" as means by which individuals in a group affect its nonns). 
95. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 14, at 1666. The means of producing a consensus are 
highly relevant to predicting whether nonns are likely to be efficient. Selfish esteem alloca­
tion, with or without discussion, may appear to produce efficient nonns because it will ap­
prove behaviors with positive externalities and disapprove behaviors with negative 
externalities. But given infonnational and strategic problems, the process can produce ineffi­
cient nonns. See infra section IV.C. 
96. Exit is therefore relevant to predicting whether nonns are likely to be efficient. One 
might think individuals are more likely to exit groups with norms that retard group welfare. 
Thus, groups with norms that benefit the group would gain in size while groups with ineffi-
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Inherent Risk of Detection. The second condition is an inherent 
risk that anyone who engages in the behavior at issue will be de­
tected. I say "inherent" to emphasize that this risk exists without 
anyone bearing a cost to create the risk of discovery, at least not for 
the purpose of creating or enforcing a norm. One may object that 
there will always be costs, at least opportunity costs, to gaining such 
information;97 if so, one cannot costlessly sanction another because 
one must first invest in determining who merits disesteem. But a 
norm may still arise without anyone bearing a cost to enforce it if 
the necessary information is acquired as a byproduct of some other 
activity. Because this is often the case, there is frequently no margi­
nal cost to using such information for esteem judgments. 
In the course of pursuing various interests, we often accidentally 
acquire information about others, especially about their more pub­
lic behavior.98 Without making any effort to do so, an individual 
may observe one neighbor throwing litter on the sidewalk and an­
other raising money door-to-door for charity, one coworker or­
ganizing office car pools and another crossing a picket line.99 
Moreover, independent of any norm, an individual will sometimes 
intentionally invest in detecting the behavior of those who harm her 
interests. For obvious reasons, an employer will invest in determin­
ing which employee is stealing from the firm. Similarly, an apart­
ment dweller will seek to discover the source of disturbingly loud 
music if she believes it is sufficiently likely that she can cause the 
stereo owner to lower the volume by threats or bribes. In general, 
when an individual suffers from another's behavior that she may be 
able to change, she has a reason to invest in detecting it. Accidental 
or not, once she acquires the information, an individual can then 
costlessly withhold esteem from one whose conduct she 
disapproves. 
cient norms would shrink. But the evolutionary process is complex and may still produce 
inefficient norms. See infra section IV .C. 
97. As Avery Katz observes, norms "embody and convey information" - information 
about what behavior is obligatory and what punishment is appropriate for contrary behavior. 
See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1745, 1749 (1996). 
Norm enforcement also requires information about who has violated the norm. See id. But 
because "information is a classic public good," inevitably enjoyed by those who have not 
contributed to its creation, there are inadequate incentives for optimal investment in creating 
or distributing such information. See id. 
98. See Pettit, supra note 2, at 739, 743-44 ("[P]eople do not have to identify violators 
intentionally; they just have to be around in sufficient numbers to make it likely that violators 
will be noticed."). 
99. Similarly, an employer may monitor employees for productivity and discover sub­
stance abuse or audit expense accounts and discover coworkers having an adulterous affair. 
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In some circumstances, detection by an individual will affect the 
esteem judgment of only that individual. But when individuals 
share a consensus, some of them will enjoy passing on information 
about violations of the consensus. The conversation we call "gos­
sip" is often experienced as a benefit, not a cost, 100 and it usually 
consists of information about how others have deviated from ordi­
nary behavior. As long as there is a sufficient supply of "gossips" 
within the relevant population, the risk that another will discover 
one's deviant behavior creates an almost equal risk that a great 
many individuals will learn of that discovery. In sum, when individ­
uals can detect violations of the consensus only by making invest­
ments for that purpose, esteem concerns will not produce a norm; 
but for various behaviors, (marginal) monitoring costs are zero. 
Publicity. The third condition is that the first two conditions -
consensus and risk of detection - are well known within the rele­
vant population.101 If an individual is ignorant of the consensus, or 
incorrectly believes there is no risk of detection, then she could act 
contrary to the consensus without, to her knowledge, risking any 
disapproval. If most people were ignorant, then the consensus 
could not produce a norm. Quite possibly, mass ignorance is not an 
equilibrium, because if individuals express their disapproval (or ap­
proval), it will soon become clear what the consensus is, as well as 
the fact that the behavior (or its absence) is detectable. But where 
a consensus exists against a behavior, expression of disapproval is 
not inevitable. Where there is doubt about what the consensus is, 
there are esteem risks to expressing what may turn out to be a mi-
100. The esteem theory helps to explain the benefit. Of course, people who collect infor­
mation through gossip will sometimes be able to trade that information for something they 
value. But also, because individuals seek relative esteem, the spread of discrediting informa­
tion serves another end: lowering the esteem of others makes one look better by compari­
son. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2279 (describing gossip as a means of acquiring relative 
position for oneself or one's family); id. at 2244 & n.20 (noting that gossip is pervasive in 
many societies). 
101. The best example of a consensus being well known is where its existence is "common 
knowledge" within the group, so that there is not only a consensus about X but also a consen­
sus that this consensus exists, a consensus that the consensus about the consensus exists, and 
so forth, infinitely. See, e.g., ERIC RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUC­
TION TO GAME THEORY 44 (2d ed. 1994). Common knowledge is not, however, necessary for 
norms to arise. If A believes (1) that the majority of individuals disapprove littering, and (2) 
that there is a risk that littering will be detected, then she will perceive a cost to littering even 
if no one else is aware the consensus exists. Common knowledge may intensify the norm, 
however, in what might be termed the "you-know-better" effect: if it is common knowledge 
that most people disapprove of littering, then the disapproval when A is detected littering is 
greater because A's decision to litter, contrary to a known consensus, signals A's disregard 
for the opinion of those in the majority. Such disregard is insulting; members of the majority 
will likely disapprove of A more intensely when they know she previously knew of their 
opinion (and knew they knew, and so on). 
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nority opinion.102 These costs may prevent the communication nec­
essary to publicize the consensus and produce a norm.103 
Indeed, the sensitivity of norms to information scarcity yields 
some interesting implications explored below. The risks of speak­
ing out against an apparent consensus and the possibility that the 
true consensus is unknown or misunderstood are quite relevant to 
explaining rapid norm change, rules protecting dissent, and the ex­
pressive function of law. But for now, note only that the publicity 
condition is attainable. First, communication of approval is rarely 
costly and is often pleasurable. Thus, people are not likely to re­
main ignorant of a consensus favoring conduct. Second, some be­
havior is so socially destructive - random violence, for example -
that most people may just assume that disapproval is virtually uni­
versal.104 Third, when there is doubt about what opinions other 
participants in a conversation hold because they have ilot revealed 
their views by words or deeds, communicating one's views may 
carry as much chance of approval as disapproval. If expressing 
one's opinions generates utility merely because people like conver­
sation - and surely some do - then the expected benefits from 
speaking out will often be positive.105 Fourth, there are gossip strat­
egies that sometimes work to eliminate the risks of expression. By 
beginning with literally nonevaluative statements or questions, 106 
perhaps with cryptic tones or facial expressions, an individual can 
imply evaluations without committing to them. Or one can provi­
sionally and equivocally criticize behavior merely by withholding 
statements of approval, while praising contrasting behavior. Each 
participant thereby "tests the waters" and gains inf9rmation about 
102. See TIMUR KuRAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PuBuc LIES (1995); Eric A. Posner, Law, 
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1716-17 (1996). On the other 
hand, once the consensus is well known, expressions of disapproval are not necessary. 
103. This problem is particularly acute when the risk of disapprovil deters people from 
expressing criticism of existing nonns, which is unfortunate when the norm is inefficient. See 
Lessig, supra note 11, at 997-99; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2259 ("Be,cause the probability 
that any one member's criticism will change the norm is very low, public criticism of norms is 
a public good apt to be undersupplied."); Posner, supra note 102, at 1718 ("For fear that 
others will incorrectly sanction the person who makes the first move, everyone has an incen­
tive not to act."). 
104. Even if others say nothing, "[w]e know what [others] know of us and, ascribing simi­
lar standards to them, we know whether they are likely to think well or badly . . . .  " Pettit, 
supra note 2, at 740. 
105. In other words, if the risk of gaining approval from stating one's views equals, or is 
almost as great as, the risk of losing approval, then the positive utility from the act of expres­
sion will tip the balance in favor of expressing one's views. 
106. For example: "Did you hear that A was asked to leave the party because he brought 
a male date?" The statement could express disapproval of A or disapproval of the ones who 
asked A to leave (or neither). 
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what others probably believe before stating a position.1°7 In the 
end, the publicity condition will not always exist, but the barriers 
are neither necessary nor probable.108 
The Esteem Norm. If individuals desire esteem, and if these 
three conditions exist, it necessarily follows that one who violates a 
consensus incurs a cost. If the consensus is that behavior X is com­
mendable and the absence of X is deplorable, and the consensus is 
well known, then A will deduce that others will think less of her if 
they detect her failure to do X. The esteem cost is the probability 
that a violation of the consensus will be detected multiplied by the 
value of the esteem that would then be lost. A norm arises when, 
for most individuals in the population, this esteem cost exceeds the 
cost of following the consensus. Thus, if most group members pre­
fer bearing the cost of doing X to the esteem cost of failing to do X, 
most members will do X. Under these circumstances, we can say 
there is an esteem-based norm obligating individuals to do X. 
Note how the desire for esteem makes it possible, though not 
inevitable, that the group will solve the second-order collective ac­
tion problem identified above. The barrier to norm formation 
arises from the assumption that any sanction must be costly to im­
pose. If one can costlessly impose a small loss on others by with­
holding esteem, or costlessly impose a small gain by granting 
esteem, there is no incentive to free ride. One may as well allocate 
esteem selfishly to discourage behavior from which one suffers, like 
littering, or encourage behavior from which one benefits, like re­
cycling. There is no guarantee that this esteem allocation will pro­
duce a norm; the outcome also depends on the exact value 
individuals place on esteem, the strength of the consensus, the pub-
107. Those studying lynch mobs and wildcat strikes, for example, have noted that the 
early stages consist of very subtle, noncommittal signals between group members of their 
intentions. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 754-56 (1965) (describing the "mill­
ing" phase of a lynch mob); RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY 82-85 (1988) 
(describing the hesitant beginnings of a wildcat strike). See generally CHONG, supra note 2, at 
103-40 (discussing how individuals in such groups use noncommittal signals to solve their 
coordination problems). Thus, gossip at least sometimes can produce the publicized consen­
sus necessary to esteem-based norms. For a more general discussion of gossip and norms, see 
McAdams, supra note 32. 
108. Consider two more reasons. First, one gains some information about the opinions of 
others simply from observing their conduct - for example, that an individual does not litter 
and picks up others' litter probably means they disapprove of littering, and that a person 
always wears clothes in public makes it more likely that she thinks that being nude in public 
is inappropriate or does not have an opinion on the matter. Minimal information may be 
enough to make the expected benefits of expressing one's opinion exceed the expected costs. 
Second, rebuking a person of whom one disapproves may be pleasurable except for the repri­
sal or disapproval one receives in return, but that cost may be avoided by censuring anony­
moilsly or by gossiping in such a way as to prevent the target from holding one accountable 
as the source of the gossip. 
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licity of these latter two facts, and the cost of complying with the 
consensus - for example, by recycling or not littering. 
To illustrate, recall the facts of the littering hypothetica1.109 A 
no-littering norm would arise, for example, if the average litterer 
values the esteem lost from each neighbor at five cents, she believes 
she will lose esteem from twenty neighbors if her littering is de­
tected, and the probability of such detection is twenty-five percent. 
At this point, the expected cost of littering is twenty-five cents, 
equal to the expected benefit. Note that the neighbors who disap­
prove of littering need not be a majority. As long as there are no 
neighbors who approve littering, we can ignore what fraction of the 
neighborhood population the twenty represent. My use of littering 
as an example, and the numbers I have arbitrarily assigned - a few 
cents for esteem, a few more as the private i:eturn for littering -
may suggest that esteem can produce only the weakest of norms, 
curtailing only the most trivial of behaviors. In the section that fol­
lows, I explain how esteem competition can leverage a weak con­
cern for esteem into powerful norms. For now, however, the 
example demonstrates the power of aggregation: even a meager 
concern for esteem can affect behavior, when multiplied by a large 
number of people whose esteem is contingent on that behavior.110 
B. The Power of Esteem Sanctions 
To summarize the model thus far: The key feature of esteem is 
that individuals do not always bear a cost by granting different 
levels of esteem to others. Because the cost is often zero, esteem 
sanctions are not necessarily subject to the second-order collective 
action problem that makes the explanation of norms difficult. An 
individual maximizes her utility neither by hording all her esteem 
nor by granting equal esteem to everyone. 
In this section I elaborate the model by identifying certain 
mechanisms that magnify the power of esteem sanctions. All of 
these arise from the fact that esteem is a relative good. First, I ex­
plain the feedback effect. People competing to be "well thought of' 
compared to others discover that the cost of their noncompliance 
109. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
110. For simplicity, the example assumes that the litterer values the esteem of each neigh­
bor equally. Obviously, people value the esteem of some individuals more than others. See 
infra notes 174-76. Also, even if A does not distinguish between neighbors per se, there 
might be a declining marginal return to esteem, so that A incurs more marginal disutility 
from the first disapproving neighbor than from the twentieth. These complications do not 
affect the example, however, as long as the total loss incurred from all the neighbors' disap­
proval is one dollar. 
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- the status loss from deviance - increases as compliance in­
creases. The status gain from compliance also decreases as compli­
ance increases, but individuals can achieve or maintain high - or 
"hero" - status by leading the way to new and higher levels of 
norm compliance. Second, I explain how esteem sanctioning can 
produce material sanctioning. When people disapprove of those 
who approve norm violators, they produce secondary norms obli­
gating enforcement of primary norms by disapproving primary 
norm violators. The pursuit of "hero" status and the feedback ef­
fect generally can cause individuals to incur costs inflicting material 
sanctions on norm violators. In the end, competition for relative 
esteem can transform a weak behavioral standard into a very de­
manding one. 
1. Esteem Competition and the Feedback Effect: Compliance 
Raises the Costs of Noncompliance 
Consider first how esteem, by itself, can produce an increasingly 
powerful norm. Because the desire for esteem is relative, competi­
tion for esteem can progressively raise the standard the norm im­
poses. I first consider the simple case where a norm arises after 
there is already a behavioral regularity consistent with the consen­
sus. I then address the "hero" who creates a norm with no prior 
regularity. 
a. Norms from Regularities: Competition to Avoid Deviance. · A 
behavioral regularity often exists without a norm. For example, 
most people in a community may refrain from smoking tobacco or 
wearing fur before there arises any consensus disapproving these 
behaviors. Once a consensus is known, however, it creates new 
costs to these behaviors. At this point, esteem competition can pro­
duce a strong norm. 
Because esteem is relative, the intensity of disesteem directed at 
those who engage in a disapproved behavior is partly a function of 
the total number of people who are thought to engage in that be­
havior. If twenty percent of the population is thought to violate the 
initial norm against smoking or fur, then violating that norm will 
place one in the bottom quintile of the group with respect to that 
criterion of esteem.111 But if only two percent are believed to be 
smokers or fur wearers, then one falls to the bottom two percent for 
111. If following norm X were the only criterion, then the violation would by itself place 
one in the bottom quintile; if there are multiple criteria, then the effect is more complicated. 
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that criteria.112 Other things being equal, the latter represents a 
greater esteem cost than the former; the more deviant the violation, 
the more it appalls group sentiment.113 
Thus, because individuals value esteem relatively, the more a 
behavior negatively distinguishes them from others, the more costly 
it is.114 The result is that one individual's decision to refrain from 
engaging in X has the extemality of raising the price that others 
must then pay for engaging in that behavior. I call this extemality 
112. This assumes people have a generally accurate idea of how much X occurs. That 
would be the case if the activity were public or produced publicly observable negative exter­
nalities, as does littering or overconsumption of resources in times of scarcity. 
113. Huang and Wu make a similar point in the context of corruption norms: "[T]he 
more prevalent corruption is, the less intense is the remorse suffered from corrupt behavior; 
and conversely, the less corruption there is, the more regret from violating a social norm not 
to be corrupt." Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 393. But there is an important difference in 
the feedback effects we are discussing. Huang and Wu assume that individuals already have 
internalized a norm against the behavior - corruption - and their model then explains only 
how the degree of remorse depends on the perceived number of violators. My claim is that 
the initial norm can arise prior to internalization merely from the risk of disapproval and that 
the intensity of disapproval any individual feels will depend on the perceived number of 
violators. This distinction reveals an ambiguity in Huang and Wu's model. They cannot 
mean that an individual feels remorse for engaging in any behavior in which most people do 
not engage - for example, sky diving. They most likely mean that individuals feel more 
remorse for behavior that is disapproved when less people engage in the behavior. Yet, even 
without remorse, this disapproval may produce a norm. Indeed, I argue below that esteem 
norms sometimes must precede internalization. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43. 
114. Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that individuals are more likely to comply 
with laws when they believe others comply. Huang and Wu review studies finding this effect 
in tax compliance: an individual's willingness to comply depends on whether he thinks others 
pay their taxes. See Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 401-02. Another study sought to mea­
sure social disapproval as one component of criminal deterrence by asking subjects whether 
they had committed certain categories of crime - including littering, illegal gambling, theft, 
drunk driving, and battery - and how many of the five adults they knew best had committed 
such crimes. See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disap­
proval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY 
325, 330 (1980). The study found that the subject's perception of the certainty and severity of 
punishment and the immorality of the conduct each affected compliance, but not as much as 
the perception that peers did not commit the offense. See id. at 331, 334. 
More generally, considerable evidence supports the importance of peer disapproval to 
deterrence. See Donna M. Bishop, Legal and Extralegal Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel 
Analysis, 22 CR!MINoLOGY 403 (1984); Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Infor­
mal Sanctions, in PouCY IMPLEMENTATION 69 (John Brigham & Don W. Brown eds., 1980); 
Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkings, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Criti­
cal Review, 20 L. & SoCY. REv. 545, 565-66 (1986). But see Harold G. Grasmick et al., 
Reduction in Drunk Driving as a Response to Increased Threats of Shame, Embarrassment, 
and Legal Sanctions, 31 CR!MINOLOGY 41 (1993) (finding that internalized norms enforced by 
guilt or remorse explain the decline in drunk driving but that the threat of social disapproval 
does not). At one point in his well-known study, Tom Tyler appears to minimize the impor­
tance of peer disapproval as compared to moral commitments or certainty of punishment. 
See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 44 (1990). But, as 1)'ler reports, his data 
shows that peer disapproval significantly affects "self-reported behavioral compliance with 
the law." Id. at 45 (reporting correlations "for morality, r = .42; for peer disapproval, r = .34; 
for certainty of punishment, r = .28"); see also id. at 63-64; 238-39 n.2. 
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the feedback effect of norm compliance.115 For example, if the ini­
tial discovery of a consensus against X produces an expected es­
teem cost of one dollar for engaging in X, that will cause individuals 
who value the activity less than one dollar to cease doing X or to 
exit the group. But once that subset drops out, compliance rises 
and the disesteem for engaging in X is concentrated on fewer indi­
viduals; because fewer smoke or wear fur, one is now more (nega­
tively) distinguished by smoking or fur wearing. The expected 
esteem cost necessarily rises above one dollar, and there may be an 
additional subset of individuals who no longer value X sufficiently 
to bear the esteem costs of doing it. Each subset that ceases the 
disapproved behavior raises the costs of that behavior for those 
who remain. 
This process can produce the discontinuous effect Thomas 
Schelling calls "tipping."116 Suppose an initial equilibrium in which 
twenty percent of a population wears fur despite disapproval by 
many of the remaining eighty percent. This means that those in the 
twenty percent receive enough pleasure from fur to outweigh the 
resulting censure. But if fur consumption for any reason falls below 
twenty percent - because, for example, the price of fur storage 
rises or the consensus gains greater publicity - the disesteem costs 
would rise. For a simple example, imagine that for all fur wearers, 
the disesteem costs would exceed their consumer surplus once the 
consumption rate fell to fifteen percent. Thus, while small increases 
in the cost of fur usually produce only small decreases in consump­
tion, a cost increase that reduces consumption from sixteen percent 
to (initially) fifteen percent would have a dramatic effect. Once the 
fifteen percent tipping point is reached, the more concentrated dis­
approval cost now deters all remaining consumption.117 The feed­
back effect can also produce such discontinuous results in the 
opposite direction: small increases in norm violations may cause 
per-person disesteem costs to fall sufficiently to produce a dramatic 
rise in norm violations. Thus, the feedback effect can rapidly 
strengthen or weaken a norm.118 But the former consequence is 
115. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 352-61 (discussing this effect in the context of criminal 
deterrence). 
116. See THOMAS c. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHA VIOR 92-94, 98-99 
(1978). 
117. A more complex but realistic case would follow the stages described above, in which 
only a few consumers at a time cease wearing fur, in each case causing the per-person dises­
teem costs to rise and prompting another round of norm compliance. 
118. This point is important in explaining the fragility of norms. See infra section IV.A. 
It is also the point emphasized by Kahan with respect to criminal deterrence: an increase in 
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most relevant here: even if the concern for esteem is weak, once it 
begins to drive behavior, it can produce a powerful norm. 
· The same is true where the norm favors a behavior. Again, im­
agine there is a behavioral regularity prior to there being a norm. 
For example, many neighbors may have "well-groomed" yards to 
satisfy their selfish aesthetic preferences prior to the emergence of a 
neighborhood norm obligating yard care. Or many alumni may do­
nate to their alma mater out of altruism before a norm arises obli­
gating such conduct. Once the neighbors or alumni discover the 
consensus exists favoring such behavior, those who contribute more 
than average (time to yard care or money to their school) gain es­
teem and those who contribute less than average lose esteem. Eve­
ryone can now produce esteem benefits - gaining approval or 
avoiding disapproval - by contributing more. The new incentives 
will raise the average contribution. The feedback effect is that one 
person's new norm compliance raises the average and lowers every­
one else's relativ� position. One individual's contribution thus pro­
vides an incentive for others to contribute. Obviously, the 
contributions do not rise infinitely, but they stop only when no one 
can gaiil by additional contributions, when the opportunity costs of 
one's time or money exceed any esteem return. 
b. Regularities from Norms: Competition to Be Heroic. In the 
previous examples, many people already behave in conformity with 
the consensus before the norm arises. But esteem competition can 
also produce a norm without a preexisting regularity. Suppose that 
there is a newly expressed, idealistic consensus in favor of some 
behavior that no one has yet been willing to undertake, because, 
while it benefits the group, it is costly for the individual. For exam­
ple, assume that no one is yet willing to bear the costs of recycling, 
but discussion has produced a societal consensus that recycling ben­
efits future generations and is therefore commendable.119 Alterna­
tively, suppose that recent events cause neighbors to recognize the 
need for a neighborhood crime watch patrol or to organize park 
maintenance work, though initially no one offers to contribute. 
Thus, individuals recognize that certain behavior is worthy of es­
teem before anyone engages in the behavior. 
The esteem theory can explain how norms arise in this setting. 
The first few members to bear the cost of the idealized behavior X 
crime lowers the effect of informal sanctioning, thus producing a further increase in crime. 
See Kahan, supra note 26, at 361. 
119. Perhaps the members of society think it will contribute to the welfare of future gen­
erations or that it shows respect for the deity that created the earth. 
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may capture the status of "hero."120 The few who act in conformity 
with the publicly expressed consensus each may earn very high 
esteem. Of course, "first movers" take the risk that no one will 
follow. If very few individuals contribute labor to patrol the neigh­
borhood or to recycle, the joint return may be negligible, and the 
sacrifice by these individuals may seem senseless and naive. Foolish 
idealism is often not esteemed. But part of the reason first movers 
gain esteem when others do follow their lead is the understanding 
that they risked losing esteem if others did not.121 
Others will follow the lead of first movers if the esteem benefits 
outweigh the material costs of undertaking the idealized behavior. 
Admittedly, the esteem return falls as it becomes more common; 
ordinary behavior cannot be heroic. But despite this decline, the 
esteem benefits may exceed the costs. The benefits of being, for 
example, one of the ten percent or twenty-five percent who patrol 
the neighborhood or recycle, while not as great as the initial hero 
status, may nonetheless be larger for some individuals than the 
value of the labor sacrificed. More important, an individual's deci­
sion to engage in X has the externality of raising the price others 
must now pay for refusing to engage in that behavior. In other 
words, when everyone refused to undertake X, the esteem loss from 
that decision was zero. But where some engage in the idealized 
activity, those who do not are negatively distinguished and now 
bear some loss of esteem. 
The combination of these two forces may produce a norm. To 
demonstrate, consider a highly stylized recycling scenario. Imagine 
that A, B, and C initially esteem each other equally and no one 
recycles. Through discussion, they discover that they share a con­
sensus that recycling is an activity worthy of esteem. Assume that 
recycling costs three dollars per person per time period, and that 
each values the esteem ranks per time period as follows:122 
120. See W1LUAM J. GoooE, THE CELEBRATION OF HEROES: PRESTIGE As A SOCIAL 
CoNTROL SYSTEM 344-45 (1978). 
121. See CHONG, supra note 2, at 125-30 (discussing this problem in context of the civil 
rights movement, where leaders risked appearing foolish but those who motivated mass ac­
tion won respect). 
122. That the esteem return is zero when all recycle would follow if the entire society 
consists of A, B, and C. In that case, recycling earns no relative esteem. On the other hand, 
if A, B, and C are merely three members of a social group whose members care particularly 
about the esteem of each other - for example, a group of friends - then they might esteem 
each other more highly relative to their esteem for the rest of society if all recycled than if none 
recycled. Also, others in society might esteem them more for all recycling. In either case, if 
the expected return when all recycle becomes positive, then the outcome predicted in the 
text, universal recycling, becomes even more likely. 
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Esteem from being the only recycler: +$4 
Esteem from being one of two recyclers: +$2 
Esteem when all or none recycle: $0 
Esteem from being one of two non-recyclers: -$2 
Esteem from being the only non-recycler: -$4 
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The structure of these incentives will cause all three individuals 
to recycle, even though that outcome costs each three dollars and 
ultimately produces for each no status gain. In game-theoretic 
terms, recycling is dominant because it is the best move for each 
individual no matter what move the others make. Consider A's de­
cision. If both B and C recycle in the next time period, A is better 
off recycling for three dollars and avoiding the four-dollar loss of 
being the least esteemed. If neither B nor C recycle, A is better off 
recycling and gaining the four-dollar benefit of being the most es­
teemed. If only one of the others recycles, A is better off recycling, 
which provides a four-dollar benefit by moving her from an esteem 
position she values at minus two dollars to an esteem position she 
values at plus two dollars. Because the same logic applies to the 
decisions of B and C, all three will recycle. 
Thus, even though an individual cannot gain relative status by 
engaging in the same behavior as everyone else, the desire for rela­
tive status can lead everyone in a group to feel obligated to engage 
in a behavior. Indeed, if recycling were not thought to be desirable, 
the individuals would benefit from a state-enforced contract with 
each other to refrain from recycling. Then they could circumvent 
what might be viewed as an unfortunate "prisoner's dilemma," 
avoid the three-dollar cost of recycling, and wind up in the same 
(equal) esteem position they are in when everyone recycles. But 
the norm arose because there was a consensus that recycling was 
worthy of esteem. If recycling is esteemed because individuals gen­
erally believe it produces net benefits to the group despite net costs 
to recyclers, then they will welcome the dynamic created by esteem 
competition because it solves the collective action problem that 
otherwise prevented recycling.123 
123. That they welcome it, however, does not mean that the level of recycling produced 
by esteem competition is efficient. To the contrary, the three-dollar contribution produced in 
this example could still be less or more than the optimal amount. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Altru­
ism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 567, 589 
(noting that status competition may cause gratuitous contributions to public goods that are 
higher or lower than the optimal amount); see also discussion infra section IV.C. 
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The crucial point for norms theory is that esteem competition 
can cause a norm to arise without a preexisting behavioral regular­
ity, or more accurately, when the regularity is precisely the opposite 
of the norm ultimately produced. 
2. Material Enforcement of Esteem-Based Norms 
Though esteem norms initially arise because third parties can 
costlessly sanction one who acts contrary to the consensus, esteem 
can also explain why third parties sometimes do bear costs to en­
force norms. The initial step is that a primary norm, an obligation 
to do or not do X, may produce a subsidiary enforcement norm. A 
secondary norm arises when individuals lower their opinion of 
those who fail to censure primary norm violators. Once that occurs, 
the dynamic described in the previous subsection then can cause 
individuals to bear material costs to comply with secondary en­
forcement norms. In other words, esteem can cause people to bear 
costs to inflict material costs on norm violators. 
a. The Emergence of Secondary Enforcement Norms. Assume 
A violates a norm. At first, B may continue to have and express 
esteem for A for various reasons, including that B does not share in 
the consensus. But when individuals genuinely believe A has acted 
badly, they will usually think badly of anyone who expressly con­
dones A's violation or who continues to think as highly of A as she 
did before A's norm violation. Where most people disapprove of 
racism or abortion, for example, they are likely to also disapprove 
of those who fail ever to condemn such things.124 The primary con­
sensus that behavior X merits disapproval is therefore likely to lead 
to a secondary consensus that those who expressly approve, or fail 
to disapprove, of the perpetrators of X merit disapproval. One rea­
son is selfish norm production: if the first approval patterns arise 
because behavior X harms the society or group, the secondary ap­
proval patterns arise because failing to enforce the norm by con­
demning violators also harms the society or group. The voice or 
exit that produced the primary consensus could produce the secon­
dary consensus as well. 
The secondary consensus - that condoning norm violations de­
serves disapproval - will become a secondary enforcement norm if 
124. Obviously, there are counterexamples: People may accept that an individual does 
not express disapproval of a family member; most people may even approve of such familial 
loyalty. But the general point remains: Absent such an exception, where arguably other 
norms have come into play, the general tendency is to disapprove those who approve of norm 
violators. 
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the other conditions of norm creation exist: (1) that ,there is some 
risk that one's condoning of norm violators will be discovered with­
out others bearing monitoring costs, and (2) that this risk and the 
secondary consensus are sufficiently well known. The existence of 
the secondary consensus will often be easily inferred from the exist­
ence of the primary consensus. 
One might raise the following objection: It is easy to conceal 
from third parties the fact that one still esteems a norm violator. 
What is not easy, however, is to pretend publicly to disapprove of A 
without actually harming A. Third parties may employ the familiar 
political strategy of calling for an individual to "take a stand," pub­
licly asking B if she agrees with the consensus and disapproves A's 
violation. Asking such questions makes it costly to avoid condemn­
ing the violator. A refusal to answer is taken to mean the individual 
condones the violation. There are countless examples where this 
occurs - where individuals ask others to make statements, adopt 
resolutions, sign petitions, and participate in other symbolic actions, 
in order to prove that they do not condone someone else's con­
duct.125 Even if the responders only feign disapproval, they still 
convey disapproval and create a secondary enforcement norm -
that is, the fear of disapproval obligates individuals to condemn the 
violation of a primary norm. 
b. From Esteem Sanctions to Material Sanctions. For some 
norms, individuals incur material costs to inflict a material sanction 
125. In many cases, one set of individuals calls upon another set to criticize or disavow a 
third group that the first considers to be racist. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, America Online 
Rapped for Allowing Pro-Klan Site, THE BosroN GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1997, at Al, A14 (reporting 
that the Anti-Defamation League criticized America Online for allowing one of its subscrib­
ers to create a Ku Klux Klan site); David A. Paterson, White Outrage, Black Suspicion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at E17 (discussing white demands that blacks condemn Louis Far­
rakhan for racism and noting that "[f]or generations, whites have called on black leaders to 
denounce other blacks' offensive or radical ideas"); Editorial, Undo Damage in the 4th, AT­
LANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 17, 1996 (calling on the incumbent congresswoman to "repudiate[ ]" 
her father and end his role in her campaign because he called her opponent "a racist Jew" 
and reporting that the opponent criticized the incumbent for her refusal to vote for a con­
gressional resolution condemning an aide to Louis Farrakhan). 
Consider also the responses to a 1995 National Rifle Association's (NRA) fundraising 
letter that referred to agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as "jack­
booted thugs." Life-long NRA member George Bush resigned his membership in protest, 
see Whose Thugs, Whose Jack-Boots?, EcoNOMIST, May 20, 1995, at 27, thereby preempting 
any possible criticism for appearing to join or condone the statement. The NRA eventually 
apologized. See id. at 28. President Clinton responded by stating that the NRA should prove 
the sincerity of its apology by giving the money raised by the letter to the family survivors of 
slain peace officers. See Martin Kasindorf, Truly Sorry? Clinton to NRA: Donate Your 'Ill­
Gotten' Funding, NEWSDAY, May 20, 1995, at A07. This tactic illustrates the difficulty of 
disavowing one's own actions: Because "talk is cheap," third parties may not believe self­
serving statements unless they are made convincing by costly action. See infra text accompa­
nying notes 126-27. 
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on norm violators. Boycotts, for example, require individuals to 
forgo advantageous transactions with the boycott target. Here is 
where the secondary collective action problem seems most pro­
nounced. Even if one concedes my argument up to this point, one 
might object that esteem is a trivial matter compared to such mate­
rial enforcement. But esteem explains these sanctions. Material 
sanctions are merely the logical culmination of the prior two stages 
of norm development: just as competition for relative esteem may 
increase the material cost that members are willing to bear to com­
ply with a primary norm, esteem competition may increase the cost 
that members are willing to assume to comply with the secondary 
obligation to enforce the primary norm. 
As a simple example, consider a norm involving dichotomous 
behavior - for example, a norm forbidding divorce, litigation 
against a group member, or marriage to someone outside the group. 
When a publicized consensus first arises, a group member can gain 
heightened esteem by publicly bearing greater-than-average costs 
to comply with the consensus. But once virtually everyone com­
plies, compliance is necessary merely to avoid disesteem. Also, a 
group member loses esteem not only by violating the norm, but to a 
lesser extent, by failing to disapprove of others who violate the 
norm. 
At this point, a member can gain elevated esteem by publicly 
incurring greater-than-average costs to express disapproval of norm 
violators. If average costs are zero, because initially the only sanc­
tion is disesteem, one may earn high esteem by conspicuously un­
dertaking some material costs to sanction a norm violator. As 
before, the first mover - the first to shoulder a material burden to 
sanction a violator - may gain a "hero" status. Competition for 
esteem then may induce others to incur material costs to sanction 
norm violators or to exit the group. In either case, esteem competi­
tion may increase the average expenditure on norm enforcement, 
potentially to the point where members must incur some material 
costs enforcing norms merely to maintain an average level of 
esteem. 
To illustrate how esteem sanctions can be leveraged into mate­
rial sanctions, consider the following example: A trades with five 
individuals - the Bs - and all Bs interact socially with A, with one 
another, and with another large group of people - the Cs. When 
A violates the norm, all the Bs and Cs know they must condemn A 
in order to avoid social disapproval. Each individual can discharge 
her obligation to enforce the norm by expressing disapproval of A. 
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But by virtue of their trading relationship, the Bs have a special 
opportunity. To gain "hero" status, one of the five Bs might take 
the added step of reducing her trades .with A, to .the material detri­
ment of both A and the B. The first move in this direction may 
sacrifice only a trivial, symbolic amount.126 But a tiny reduction in 
trade may be sufficient when others refuse to make any material 
sacrifice. The point is that an individual may "purchase" substantial 
status for being the only one to bear a tangible, if initially minus­
cule, cost to enforce the norm.121 
Once the move to material sanctions is made - once esteem is 
leveraged to produce nonesteem punishments - the same competi­
tive dynamics described above in the recycling example can ratchet 
up the level of material sanctions.128 After one B sanctions A by a 
minor and temporary reduction in trade, the competition for es­
teem may cause all the Bs to make the same reduction in trade. If 
the initial reduction in trade is trivial, one of the Bs may attempt to 
recapture the first-mover hero status by reducing trade more than 
the others. Indeed, even though the Cs lack a trading relationship 
with A, they may join in the esteem competition by looking for 
other means of sanctioning A materially, such as boycotting Bs who 
fail to boycott A. As above, the outcome of this process depends 
on a number of variables, including the value each individual places 
on esteem and the other opportunities that she has for producing 
esteem. But esteem is itself capable of explaining the imposition of 
nonesteem sanctions including substantial material sanctions. 
126. To make this transition to material sanctions even smoother, imagine that the first 
time it happens, the material cost to the trader B is nonexistent because she was already 
planning to reduce trade with A for other reasons known only to her. But because the Cs 
and other Bs believe - and reward with esteem - B's false claim that she reduced trade to 
punish A for her norm violation, the effect is the same. The next time the violation occurs, 
the same reaction will be expected. 
127. For example, in the Jim Crow South, social norms obligating whites to subordinate 
blacks in various ways were enforced by threats of economic sanctions against whites who 
violated these norms. See JoHN DOLLARD, CAslE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN ToWN 48-49 
(3d ed. reprint with new introduction, The University of Wisconsin Press 1988) (1937); AR­
TIIUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 20, 244-46 (1933). The above analysis suggests 
that the material boycotts were in tum enforced by threats of social sanctions - that is, 
ostracism and shaming. See, e.g., DoLLARD, supra at 46-48, 349-50, 354 (1937). See generally 
McAdams, supra note 10, at 1039-42, 1046-48, 1050-51 (discussing racial norms applicable to 
whites in the Jim Crow South). 
128. Note also that once the norm arises, this analysis can explain why individuals might 
bear costs to acquire information for the purpose of detecting norm violations. 
376 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:338 
III. USING THE ESTEEM MODEL TO CLARIFY AND UNIFY THE 
NEW NORMS LITERATURE 
Notwithstanding the considerable attention to law and norms, 
indeed, partly because of so much recent and diverse writing, the 
economics literature remains ambiguous. Explicitly or implicitly, 
theorists employ different concepts of what norms are and how they 
arise. As noted in Part I, norms are defined in much of the litera­
ture as informal, nonlegal obligations, sometimes with the addition 
of organizational rules. Yet the term remains obscure in at least 
three ways: norm is used to refer to nonlegal obligations (1) en­
forced by different kinds of sanctions, (2) described at different 
levels of generality, and (3) arising in different kinds of populations. 
In this Part, I address each issue. I suggest that the esteem theory 
can provide some valuable clarification, uniting what might seem to 
be unrelated strands of the new literature. First, I demonstrate that 
esteem processes can lead to norm internalization. In so doing, I 
contrast and reconcile the esteem theory with the alternative inter­
nalization model of norm origin. Second, the distinction between 
esteem-enforced and internalized norms reveals a relationship be­
tween norms that arise at different levels of generality: narrow 
esteem-based norms often implement or give meaning to broad in­
ternalized norms. The theory thus reconciles the norms literature 
with Lawrence Lessig's insistence on the importance of social 
meaning. Third, because the conditions for esteem-based norms 
can arise among small groups or an entire society, the esteem the­
ory explains both group and societal norms and predicts certain dif­
ferences between them. 
A. Contrasting and Reconciling Esteem Processes with 
Internalization of Norms 
Previously, I alluded to the possibility of several economic reso­
lutions of the puzzle of norm origin. One alternative explanation is 
internalization. Internalization theories posit that an individual ac­
quires a preference for conformity to a behavioral standard and suf­
fers some psychological cost - guilt is an appropriate term - when 
she fails to conform, whether or not others are aware of her viola­
tion.129 Robert Cooter's internalization theory is the first explana-
129. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 2, at 225 ("Norms are those common values of a group 
which influence an individual's behavior through being internalized as preferences."); see 
also ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WmnN REASON 152-61 (1988); Robert C. Ellickson, 
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and 
Economics, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 23, 45-46 (1989); Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 392-96. 
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tion of norm origin in the law and economics literature.130 This 
kind of explanation appears to be in tension with those - like the 
esteem model - that emphasize external enforcement sanctions.131 
In this section, I contrast Cooter's model with the esteem model, 
point out how esteem can explain many norms internalization can­
not explain, and then present a way of uniting the two theories into 
a common framework. 
According to Cooter, "a social norm is ineffective in a commu­
nity and does not exist unless people internalize it."132 The crucial 
question for any internalization theory is how this process - a form 
of preference change - occurs. The question is difficult. In partic­
ular, if preference change is too common, it makes economic analy­
sis of preference satisfaction quite difficult.133 Cooter's answer 
avoids the problem by predicting internalization only under restric­
tive circumstances. He says a "unanimous endorsement" of certain 
conduct "will convince some members of the community to inter­
nalize the obligation, and to inculcate it in the young."134 
The internalization thesis is probably also the most common explanation of norm origin 
outside of economics. See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra note 1; Mark Granovetter, Economic Ac­
tion and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985). 
130. See Cooter, supra note 14; Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72. Ellickson 
speculates about norm origin but does not offer an account. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 
237-38 (suggesting that "[p]erhaps . . .  a few virtuous leaders" are willing to selflessly bear 
costs to enforce norms); Ellickson, supra note 129, at 45-46 (briefly discussing norm internal­
ization). Huang and Wu discuss "remorse" as the internal cost individuals bear for violating 
norms, but they do not attempt to explain the initial internalization process by which one 
becomes potentially remorseful. See Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 404 ("[W]e did not 
study the origin of emotions or norms."). For more recent theories, see Kraus, supra note 27 
(presenting an evolutionary theory); Posner, supra note 19 (reviewing economic theories of 
norms); Posner, supra note 72 (presenting a signaling theory). I do not review all these alter­
native theories. Rather, I argue for the esteem theory on the grounds provided in Parts III 
and IV, infra. 
131. I am not the first to emphasize reputational sanctions as the crucial means of norm 
enforcement. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 914-21. Sunstein also takes note of inter­
nal enforcement, particularly to enforce social roles. See id. at 922. But his extended discus­
sion of norm change makes clear that he relies on external enforcement in a way Cooter does 
not. See id. at 921 (observing that norms "tax and subsidize" behavior with reputational 
effects). In the end, however, Sunstein explicitly avoids offering a theory of norm origin. See 
id. at 915 n.38. 
132. Cooter, supra note 14, at 1665. 
133. Economists generally assume stable preferences. See generally BECKER, supra note 
2, at 3-4; George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, AM. EcoN. 
REV., March 1977, at 76, 76. One of the few exceptions prior to Cooter is Kenneth G. Dau­
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 1. In general, Cooter advocates a more complex economic description of individu­
als, replacing the "thin self' with a "thick self." See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra 
note 72, at 221-22; see also Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and 
Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 149 (1991). 
134. Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224. 
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When will 'af. group signal unanimous agreement on anything? 
Cooter says unanimous expression will occur when group members 
face a collective action problem in which there is, for everyone, one 
optimal signal.135 Regarding lying, for example, no one will advo­
cate that everyone be permitted to lie, nor would anyone planning 
to lie advocate an exception for herself for fear of revealing and 
thereby defeating her strategy. Thus, there is likely to be a univer­
sally expressed consensus against lying and a no-lying norm will be 
internalized.136 Not only do individuals who internalize an obliga­
tion automatically incur a cost if they violate the norm, whether or 
not others detect their violation, but Cooter says that those who 
internalize the norm are willing to bear small costs to enforce it 
against others.137 
I agree that internalization has a role to play in norm enforce­
ment and I welcome Cooter's efforts to bring the challenging sub­
ject of preference change into law and economics. But I believe 
internalization is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain many 
norms. 
First, internalization is not necessary to explain norms. I think 
Cooter is wrong when he says that a social norm "does not exist" 
absent internalization.138 As prior sections demonstrate, external 
sanctions - initially, the simple denial of esteem - can generate 
norms.139 
135. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1666; Cooter, Unified Social Theory, supra note 72, at 
64. 
136. Cooter's example is not lying but rather an "agency game" in which the player who 
moves first - the principal - can invest or not invest, and the party who moves second -
the agent - can then cooperate or appropriate (steal). See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1657-77. 
Once the principal invests, the agent is best off appropriating the investment. See id. at 1658. 
Foreseeing this result, the principal will not invest and both parties forgo an economic trade 
that could serve to their mutual benefit. See id. But if the game is repeated, Cooter observes 
that the equilibrium result may be a stable level of cooperation and defection. See id. at 
1660. At this point Cooter introduces norms: 
[E]very agent has an incentive to provide signals that induce principals to invest. Every 
agent will signal 'cooperation,' regardless of whether his real strategy is cooperation or 
appropriation. Consequently, a consensus will arise in the community about how agents 
ought to act. Such a consensus will convince some members of the community to inter­
nalize the norm and to ingrain it in the young. Thus a new norm will emerge in the 
community. 
Cooter, supra note 14, at 1666; see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex 
Economy, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 443, 448-49 (1994) (discussing an agency game that has a "pure 
signaling equilibrium" • . .  in which "everyone has an incentive to signal the same strategy" 
(emphasis added)). 
137. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1668. 
138. Id. at 1665; see also BECKER, supra note 2, at 225 (defining norms as "those common 
values of a group which influence an individual's behavior through being internalized as 
preferences"). 
139. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that my model explains norms by positing 
only one internalized desire - the preference for esteem - rather than claiming that an 
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Second, internalization is not sufficient to explain the many 
norms that arise without a unanimous consensus.140 Some norms, 
for example, apply to and burden only one subset of the population 
in which they arise, often for the benefit of a subset to which they 
do not apply. Thus, norms obligate women to change their surname 
on marriage, care for children, and tolerate physical abuse. Norms 
against public smoking constrain smokers to the benefit of non­
smokers and norms obligating heterosexuality, while technically ap­
plying to everyone, restrict the freedom of homosexuals only. None 
of these matters could plausibly have commanded a unanimous 
consensus before the norm existed; the many who would be better 
off without the norm would have said so.141 Nor can a prior unani­
mous agreement explain all norms that do apply equally to every­
one in a population. Societal norms at least weakly condemn overt 
individual must internalize a preference for each behavior a norm requires. In this sense, the 
model makes the conventional, though not inevitable, economic assumption that preferences 
are exogenous to the model (of norms) under discussion. Given a preference for esteem, 
under certain circumstances, norms will arise, including powerful norms enforced by material 
sanctions. 
140. Cooter appears to concede this much at one point where he limits his theory of 
norms to "business norms" arising within "business communit[ies]." See Cooter, Structural 
Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224; cf. id. ("[M]any acts are private in the sense that they do 
not affect others. The regulation of private acts by social norms is extensive in some kinds of 
communities, especially churches."). In another article, Cooter states: "My theory predicts 
that community norms will emerge when signaling and public goods converge, whereas diver­
gence between them will yield a stew of public opinion." Cooter, supra note 14, at 1676. This 
appears to state a general point that something like a unanimous expression of consensus is 
necessary for norms, but in the next sentence he limits the prediction to "business norms." 
See id. at 1676. 
141. For these norms, women, smokers, and homosexuals would not just be better off 
from being able to free ride off the enforcement efforts of others, but would be better off if 
no one enforced the norm. After the norm exists, there may be costs to criticizing it, see infra 
text accompanying note 192, but before the norm arises, there would be no such costs. 
Indeed, Cooter expresses puzzlement specifically about gender norms. See Cooter, supra 
note 14, at 1685. He says that he suspects that where discriminatory norms arise, "the injur­
ers must have power over the means of representation," enabling the "dominant group to 
frame the public debate by which norms evolve." Id. But he does not explain the impor­
tance of "representation" and "public debate," which are not explicitly a part of his internal­
ization theory. See id. (stating that "[!]imitations of space" prevent his developing the point 
more fully). 
Elsewhere, Cooter states that "domination" of one group by another "typically requires 
support from internalized social norms, rather than being based upon pure power. For exam­
ple, the domination of women by men probably requires most men and some women to 
believe in the rightness of patriarchy." Cooter, Unified Social Theory, supra note 72, at 65. 
Cooter's point seems right to me, ,but internalization still does not explain how the norms 
defining gender roles first arose, given that half the population had no reason to signal their 
approval. Indeed, Cooter makes another claim that exacerbates this deficiency. Analogizing 
men and other dominant groups to cartels, Cooter says that such norms tend to be unstable 
ab:;ent legal enforcement "The signaling equilibrium loses its purity when someone gains an 
advantage by signalling defection from the norm. Once [this occurs], the norm may decay 
and the cartel may unwind." Id. If the signalling equilibrium is so delicate, then the ability to 
produce internalized norms with a nontrivial number of dissenters seems doomed. The ori­
gin of these dominance norms requires some other explanation. 
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race discrimination, consumption of pornography, and use of mari­
juana; yet there have always been some who conspicuously de­
fended these things. Their d�ssent did not prevent a norm from 
arising. 
The esteem model can explain the origin of these norms. As 
stated above, nothing like unanimity is necessary; a simple consen­
sus may be sufficient.142 Indeed, in Part IV, I suggest that one dan­
ger every society faces is a number of "unnecessary" norms by 
which one group constrains the freedom of another.143 
Although I believe internalization is neither necessary for norms 
nor sufficient to explain certain norms, internalization of norms ob­
viously occurs and sometimes provides the only explanation for be­
havior. Thus, I believe we should recognize both processes in the 
creation and enforcement of norms. We might use shame to desig­
nate the disesteem an individual receives from those who believe 
she has violated a norm, regardless of whether she has actually vio­
lated the norm, and guilt to designate the psychological discomfort 
a violation causes one who has internalized the norm, regardless of 
whether others think she has violated the norm.144 
But rather than think of esteem competition and internalization 
as each creating a separate sphere of norms, I propose synthesizing 
the theories as follows: Imagine a process in which esteem fre­
quently produces the norm and internalization operates as a later 
reinforcing mechanism.145 In Cooter's model, norms are internal-
142. Indeed, as I explain supra note 89 and accompanying text, under some circumstances 
even a minority of the population could produce a norm. 
143. Also, in Part IV, I suggest that esteem theories can better explain why norm criti­
cism can produce rapid change in norms, what Sunstein calls "norm cascades." See Sunstein, 
supra note 11, at 912. 
144. The distinction I make between esteem concerns and internalization follows a dis­
tinction recognized by some sociologists and social psychologists who study deterrence. At 
least since Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology, 26 
AM. Soc. .REv. 183 (1961), researchers measuring deterrence have distinguished between 
internalized moral commitments and social disapproval as sources of deterrence - with the 
threat of legal punishments providing a third source of deterrence. See also TYLER, supra 
note 114, at 44-45, 57 & 238-39 n.2, 63-64 (noting a three-part distinction in the source of 
legal compliance among moral commitment to law, peer disapproval, and fear of legal pun­
ishment); Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 468 (noting nonlegal sanctions include the 
fear of disapproval by one's social group and internalized moral standards). On the other 
hand, emotion theorists have described and distinguished "guilt" and "shame" in much richer 
terms than I do here. See, e.g., June Price Tangney, Recent Advances in the Empirical Study 
of Shame and Guilt, 38 AM. BEHA v. SCIENTisr 1132 (1995). 
145. Note that internalization is plausible only if many people already act in accordance 
with the expressed consensus. The contrary case is one of widespread hypocrisy, where eve­
ryone advocates a course of action they do not follow, or everyone says they disapprove of 
certain conduct in which they continue to engage. I doubt that anyone would internalize a 
consensus no one follows. But the "hero" status available in such circumstances means that 
esteem competition can produce norms, despite the absence of a preexisting regularity. See 
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ized because there is a "pure signalling equilibrium'1 when everyone 
agrees on what is the appropriate behavior.146 For reasons stated in 
Part II, this consensus, as well as a nonunanimous consensus, can 
cause the immediate emergence of esteem-based norms, without or 
before the additional step of internalization. While internalization 
takes time,147 there will be an esteem cost to acting contrary to a 
consensus as soon as it, and the inherent risk of detection, becomes 
well-known. If, for most people, the cost is higher than the benefit 
of acting against the consensus, a norm will quickly emerge. This 
ordering - shame before guilt - conforms with those psychologi­
cal theories that imagine that shaming and disapproval - external 
sanctions - are precisely what produce internalization.148 
Thus, though I emphasize the importance of esteem, let me reit­
erate that, by norm I mean a decentralized behavioral standard that 
individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow, for the 
esteem reasons described above, or because the obligation is inter­
nalized, or both.149 Without internalization, one obeys the norm to 
avoid external sanctions made possible by the desire for esteem, 
though the sanctions may in fact include material punishments. Af­
ter internalization, there is yet another cost to violating a norm: 
guilt. The individual feels psychological discomfort whether or not 
others detect her violation. Internalization can occur as the first 
step in norm production, but I suggest that it frequently follows the 
creation of the norm by esteem processes. 
supra text accompanying notes 119-23. Thus, where selfish strategies in evolutionary equilib­
rium would otherwise fail to produce a regularity in accord with the consensus, esteem com­
petition can create the regularity, which, over time, is internalized. 
146. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 71, at 224. 
147. An individual does not change preferences overnight. Indeed, Cooter imagines that 
much norm internalization occurs in childhood, so the process might take a considerable 
number of years and, for new norms, might require a generation to complete. See Cooter, 
supra note 14, at 1661-62. 
148. See JoHN BRAITiiWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 75-78 (1989) 
("[S]haming and repentance build consciences which internally deter criminal behavior even 
in the absence of any shaming associated with an offense."); JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE 
OF THE CmLD 145-49 (1984) (discussing how violations of standards result in emotional ex­
periences that may create internal standards within the child); Robinson & Darley, supra 
note 26, at 469 ("Children are trained by a powerful socialization process into internalizing 
the beliefs represented in the social norms of the culture to which they belong."). 
149. For clarity of discussion, one should specify whether or not a significant proportion 
of individuals have internalized the norm at issue. 
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B. Explaining Norm Generality and Social Meaning: Concrete 
Esteem Norms Implement Abstract Internalized Norms 
Another ambiguity in the literature is the proper level of gener­
ality to use in defining a norm. Is a norm appropriately described in 
narrow behavioral terms - "In public places, clean up after your 
dog" - or more abstractly - "Don't litter" - or even more ab­
stractly .- "Be a good neighbor"? Is the right description that 
"friends should be loyal" - a general one - or that a person is 
obligated to perform specific acts: to listen attentively to a friend's 
troubles, to water her plants when she is away, to drive her home 
when she is intoxicated, and so on? Theorists employ arbitrarily 
different levels of generality, sometimes describing norms narrowly 
and sometimes broadly, without acknowledging the definitional 
choices being made.1so 
Sometimes - perhaps most of the time - broad norms are sim­
ply collections of narrow norms. Thus, there is no ambiguity; the 
relationship is simply one of set to subset. Within the broad cate­
gory of neighbor norms is a subcategory of no-littering norms, one 
of which is "clean up after your dog." When this is true, little is lost 
by ignoring the broad norm and focusing only on the norm that 
most directly governs behavior. In this section, however, I argue 
that the relationship between narrow and broad norms can be more 
150. Narrowly described nonns include, for example, the obligation to pay a certain pro­
portion of boundary fence costs, see ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 65-81, to refrain from suing 
other members of the industrial group, see Bernstein, supra note 9, at 148-51, or to clean up 
after one's dog, see Cooter, supra note 14, at 1675; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 955-59. 
Broadly described nonns include, for example, the duty to "do one's share," see McAdams, 
supra note 32, at 2252-53, to treat others with a reciprocal fairness, see Pildes, supra note 13, 
at 2063-64, and to follow one's role as a neighbor, friend, or wife, see Sunstein, supra note 11, 
at 921-22. 
To illustrate the definitional choice more clearly, consider the custom in the Jim Crow 
South by which whites refused to address blacks by their last names or with the titles - Mr., 
Miss, Mrs. - they used for each other and that blacks used for whites. See McAdams, supra 
note 10, at 1040-41 nn.142, 146. How should this nonn be described? One could narrowly 
define the nonn as requiring exactly this behavior - an obligation to call blacks by their first 
names - or one could describe the behavior as part of a broader nonn - a duty of "good" 
white southerners to contribute to racial hierarchy. In some sense, both descriptions are cor­
rect, but the two descriptions exist at different levels of generality, and ambiguity is created 
by using the tenn "nonn" without distinguishing between these levels. In this section, I pro­
pose that narrow "concrete" nonns often implement broad "abstract" nonns. The broader 
nonn defines the social meaning of the behavior the narrow nonn requires. Thus, in the Jim 
Crow South, there was an abstract nonn among whites to contribute to racial hierarchy and a 
set of concrete nonns implementing this end, including the obligation to call blacks by their 
first name. As I explain in the text, it is important to use both the broad and narrow descrip­
tions, and to identify their relationship, when the broad nonn is internalized but the narrow 
nonn is not. 
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complicated and that it is sometimes important to consider broad 
and narrow norms in combination.1s1 
My thesis is that an abstract norm can be internalized while the 
concrete behavioral norms implementing the abstract norm are not 
internalized. Where this occurs, one cannot understand or predict 
behavior subject to norms without considering both the concrete 
and abstract norms and the relation between them. Narrow, con­
crete norms based solely on esteem - which are not internalized -
often define the meaning of a specific behavior by defining that be­
havior as complying with or violating an internalized abstract norm. 
Thus, an antilittering norm may work because a consensus arises 
that littering violates the internalized norm to be a "good neigh­
bor"; after the littering norm is internalized, a clean-up-after-your­
dog norm may arise because of a consensus that to do otherwise is 
littering. If this is right, the distinction matters because the esteem 
norm, enforced by external sanctions, could determine compliance 
with an internalized norm, enforced by guilt. 
The point here is one of timing: If internalization occurs at all, it 
is likely to occur first at the abstract level and only later at a con­
crete level. The more abstract the norm, the more likely it is that it 
embodies the kind of sentiment - like be "a loyal friend" or "a 
good neighbor" - that commands immediate unanimous agree­
ment. Such unanimity, Cooter claims, produces internalization.152 
Moreover, the norms that persist iong enough to be internalized 
will be those that are least sensitive to changes in the conditions 
that create norms - the least sensitive, for example, to changes in 
what others perceive is in their interest to esteem. Old and stable 
norms will tend to be abstract because the more concrete the norm 
is, the more likely it will change as conditions change. Reciprocal 
obligations like "do one's share" and fundamental social-role duties 
like "be a good neighbor" can survive from generation to genera­
tion, from place to place. Specific behaviors that define doing one's 
share or that constitute being a good neighbor change more read­
ily.153 Thus, a person may feel obligated to perform a certain act 
151. Indeed, the problem of norm generality underlies Lessig's complaint about the eco­
nomic literature on norms: that understanding norms requires the consideration of "social 
meaning." See Lessig, supra note 33, at 2182-84. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37. 
153. When neighbors enjoy large private yards and public spaces, for example, the failure 
to clean up after one's dog may hardly register. In an urban area with crowded sidewalk 
space and infrequent public cleanings, the same failure quickly becomes a reason for denying 
esteem. 
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because a concrete, esteem-based norm defines the act as necessary 
to comply with an abstract internalized norm.154 
If an esteem norm defines what counts as a violation of the ab­
stract norm, an individual will feel guilt when she violates the norm, 
but only so long as the esteem-based norm defines her conduct as a 
violation of the abstract norm. Tipping provides an example. As­
sume an American leaves a bartender a tip in the United States 
because a norm requires such behavior and she would feel guilt 
otherwise. Yet, quite possibly, she feels no guilt for failing to tip a 
bartender when visiting Australia, a country where such tipping is 
not customary. In the United States, the tipping norm implements 
an abstract norm against stealing, but because the American has not 
internalized the concrete obligation, she has a clean conscience 
when leaving no tip in a country where no one expects her to -
that is, where the concrete norms implementing the no-stealing 
norm do not include an obligation to tip bartenders.155 The pecu­
liar feature of this abstract-concrete norm combination is that the 
individual feels guilt if she violates a concrete norm she has not 
internalized. But she feels guilt only to the extent that her violation 
of the concrete norm operates as a violation of the abstract norm.156 
If this hybrid of internalized abstract norm and noninternalized 
concrete norm is possible, one must study and describe norms using 
both levels of generality. I believe the combination is common. 
Many people internalize obligations like "do one's share" or "be 
respectful of others," but not the specific behaviors necessary to 
fulfill those obligations. Social roles often exist in this manner: in-
154. In other words, when people internalize a norm like "be a good neighbor," the obli­
gation is too vague to compel any particular behavior. One feels an obligation to do some­
thing to prove one is a "good neighbor" and will feel guilt otherwise, but the specific action 
one must take is not internalized. An esteem-based norm then supplies the means of proving 
oneself to comply with the abstract norm. 
155. Lessig would say that in the United States, but not in Australia, failing to tip in this 
context "means" one is stealing. See Lessig, supra note 11. 
156. Religious dietary norms provide another example. Assume that prior to 1962, when 
Vatican II abandoned the requirement that Catholics abstain from meat consumption on 
Fridays, three Catholics, A, B, and C, generally followed this Catholic norm. A, however, ate 
meat on Fridays and violated other obligations whenever she was confident her violation 
would not be detected by other Catholics; she suffered no guilt because she had not internal­
ized Catholic norms. B and C abstained from eating meat even when they knew their con­
sumption would not be detected and felt guilt on a few occasions when they violated the edict 
by accident. But immediately after Vatican II, B began eating meat on Fridays while C (my 
mother-in-law) did not; indeed, C still felt guilt if she accidentally violated this repealed rule. 
C had internalized the abstract obligation to be a "good Catholic" and the concrete obliga­
tion to abstain from meat on Fridays. B, on the other hand, had internalized the general duty 
to be a good Catholic but not the concrete duty regarding meat consumption. She felt guilt 
only when, prior to Vatican II, most Catholics believed that good Catholics did not engage in 
this concrete behavior. 
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dividuals internalize societal norms such as "be a loyal friend," "be 
a good wife," or "be a man," and occupational norms, setting the 
standard of a "fair judge," "good union man," or "cutting edge art­
ist."157 It is possible to internalize some specific behavioral stan­
dards associated with these higher level obligations. But frequently 
the norms that implement the abstract norms are not internalized. 
The "loyal friend" defends the right of his friend to drink, even 
when driving, and feels guilt if he does not, until the esteem-based 
norm changes to "friends don't let friends drive drunk."158 
Thus, while guilt arises only from violating an obligation one has 
internalized, when the obligation is vaguely defined, what counts as 
a violation may depend on what others think is a violation. The 
result is that esteem-based norms matter even more; though esteem 
is an external sanction, esteem-based expectations can invoke inter­
nal sanctions. Moreover, while an internalized duty cannot change 
overnight, there can be sudden changes in when people feel guilt 
for a particular behavior. As I explain below, these abstract­
concrete norm combinations are useful to explain norm change and 
the role of law in norm change. 
This approach to describing norms facilitates a synthesis of the 
esteem theory with Lawrence Lessig's discussion of social mean­
ing.159 Lessig observes that the costs and benefits of an act depend 
in part on its social meaning. The passenger who buckles her 
seatbelt bears a cost in a society in which her act signals an insulting 
mistrust of the driver, but no such cost and perhaps a benefit where 
her act signals good judgment. The person who drives while intoxi­
cated bears a cost in a society in which his act signals social irre­
sponsibility, but no cost and perhaps a benefit where his act signals 
a fun-loving attitude. In each case, what an act "signals" depends 
on the norms that define the a�t's social meaning. Lessig has criti­
cized the existing norms literature for failing to account for the sig­
nificance of social meaning.160 
In the esteem theory, social meaning refers to the relationship 
between a specific behavioral norm and the abstract internalized 
157. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 921-25. 
158. For simplicity, all of my examples have assumed that there are only two levels of 
generality - concrete or abstract. It is more likely that there is a continuum. The "don't 
litter" norm is a good example. It implements the abstract norm "be a good neighbor," but it 
is also somewhat abstract itself, leaving open the question of exactly what constitutes litter­
ing. Thus, a more concrete norm, "clean up after your dog," gives additional meaning to the 
"don't litter" norm. 
159. See Lessig, supra note 11; Lessig, supra note 33. 
160. See Lessig, supra note 33. 
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norm it implements. The social meaning of an abstract norm is de­
fined by the set of specific behavioral norms one is obligated to 
follow to be considered in compliance with the abstract norm. 
Thus, in some neighborhoods, failing to clean up after one's dog has 
no particular meaning; in others, the omission "means" one is a bad 
neighbor. In some neighborhoods, asking lots of questions shows a 
friendly interest and means one is a good neighbor; in other neigh­
borhoods, asking unnecessary questions is nosy and means that one 
is a poor neighbor. In general, esteem-enforced concrete norms 
provide meaning to internalized abstract norms.161 
C. A Unified Theory of Group and Societal Norms 
The norms literature is divided between those who discuss 
group norms - mostly private law scholars162 - and those who 
discuss societal norms - mostly public law scholars.163 Sometimes 
theorists speak of "norms" without clearly identifying the kind of 
population in which the norms arise. But even when they do iden­
tify the population, it is not clear from the literature how group 
norms and societal norms164 are related: if generalizations can be 
made about both or if they are essentially distinct phenomena. In­
deed, many group norms are exactly contrary to societal norms -
Christian Scientist norms, for example, oppose the use of medical 
161. Sometimes concrete norms affect the meaning of a behavior merely by determining 
its frequency. For example, where there is no norm obligating seat belt use and very few 
people "buckle up, " such conduct will inevitably signal the passenger's unusually high fear of 
the situation including a mistrust of the driver. But where the average passenger follows a 
norm requiring seat belt use, drivers will make no such inference. Indeed, the average driver 
will also wear a seat belt. 
162. The property norms Ellickson found in Shasta County, for example, govern what he 
describes as a "close-knit " group. See ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 181; see also Bernstein, 
supra note 9, at 119-21; Cooter, supra note 14, at 1646; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2241-42. 
163. Sunstein discusses norms defining various "social roles, " such as that of waiter, wife, 
or friend. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 921-22 (listing also the roles of doctor, employee, 
law school dean, colleague, and student). He says these roles are "accompanied by a remark­
ably complex network of appropriate norms. " Id. at 921. One could conceivably read Sun­
stein as envisioning only group norms because he recognizes that "subcultures " have their 
own norms. See id. at 918-20. But his primary level of analysis clearly remains a norm that 
arises at the societal level. He observes, for example, that rapid norm changes ("cascades ") 
occurred with "the election of Ronald Reagan, the use of the term 'liberal' as one of oppro­
brium, the rise of the feminist movement, and the current assault on affirmative action." Id. 
at 912. These are obviously broad social changes, not merely changes within a close-knit 
group. 
164. I say "societal " norm rather than "social " because I think the term "social norm" is 
already widely used to refer to any kind of informal norm, including group norms. In other 
words, many distinguish social norms from legal norms. I suggest that we clearly subdivide 
social norms into group norms - including the formal norms of organizations - and societal 
norms. 
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technology that society obligates parents to use for their children,165 
"skinheads" express a code of racial supremacy rejected by Ameri­
can society,166 and some police forces enforce a "code of silence" to 
conceal their members' wrongdoing from society's legal sanc­
tions.167 For some groups, this connection is intentional; the group 
obligates conduct because it violates a societal norm.16s Teenage 
norms, for example, often obligate rejection of the societal norms of 
adults.169 Can a single theory explain both societal norms and also 
such contrary group norms? 
The esteem theory can explain norms arising within groups and 
societies, even where the group and societal norms stand in opposi­
tion to each other. If both norm types arise from the same 
processes, the esteem theory unifies the public and private law liter­
ature on norms, showing that they share more than a common ter­
minology. Recall that the conditions necessary for esteem-based 
norms are: (1) a consensus about the esteem-worthiness of engag­
ing in X, (2) an inherent risk that others will detect whether one 
engages in X, and (3) that the existence of the first two conditions is 
well known within the population.170 The first point is that there is 
no necessary barrier to these conditions arising within an entire so-
165. See CATiiERINE L. ALBANESE, AMERICA: REumoNs AND REuomN £37 (2d ed. 
1992); Nathan A. Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, 309 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1641 (1983). 
166. See Michael Janofsky, Skinhead Violence Is Worldwide and Growing, a Report Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at Al (citing ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE SKINHEAD INTER­
NATIONAL: A WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF NEW-NAZI SKINHEADS (1995)). 
167. See supra note 42. These norms are enforced primarily by esteem processes. Skol­
nick and Fyfe characterize the police code of silence as merely "an extreme version of a 
phenomenon that exists in all human groups": 
[W]e know of no other cases [other than one where the authors actually reject the pur­
ported link between informing and being shot] in which police have punished those who 
betrayed the code of silence with anything as extreme as a shooting. Instead, the code 
• . .  typically is enforced by the threat of shunning, by fear that informing will lead to 
exposure of one's own derelictions, and by fear that colleagues' assistance may be with­
held in emergencies. 
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 42, at 110, 112. The latter two punishments are merely to 
withhold from the informer the benefits of other group norms - those who inform on a "rat" 
or fail to aid a "rat" will not be punished for violating norms prohibiting informing and 
obligating assistance. See Rick Bragg, Blue Wall of Silence: Graft Shielded Behind Old Code, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at Bl (describing the use of ostracism to enforce the code of 
silence). 
168. As Sunstein says, "some people like to incur the disapproval that follows norm viola­
tion, and hence some people like to 'flout convention' by rejecting prevailing norms by, for 
example, smoking, playing loud music in public, or wearing unusual clothes." Sunstein, supra 
note 11, at 918. 
169. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 257-58 (discussing teen dress codes as a means 
of differentiating and declaring subgroup identity both to other members and to 
nonmembers). 
170. See supra text ac:Companying notes 86-110. 
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ciety, so that the same theory explains group and societal norms. 
Second, a different consensus can arise in a society and in the 
groups within the society, so that different populations can have dif­
ferent and conflicting norms. The norm conditions identify why 
group norms are often so much stronger than societal norms that 
the group can openly defy social norms and withstand and possibly 
enjoy the resulting disapproval. 
None of the norm conditions are as likely for a society as a 
closely knit or even loosely knit group, but all may occur. A major­
ity of individuals in an entire society may come to regard certain 
behavior as praiseworthy or blameworthy. If nothing else, selfish 
esteem allocation may cause most people to disapprove behaviors 
with obvious external costs - such as cutting in line or failing to 
wait one's turn - and to approve behaviors with obvious external 
benefits - such as pausing to hold open a door one has just passed 
through for the person walking immediately behind. Additionally, 
some behaviors are sufficiently public, such as the examples just 
given, that the risk of detection is quite high. Finally, the prior two 
conditions will sometimes be well known throughout a society. 
When the external costs are obvious and the behavior is public, 
people may simply and correctly assume the conduct is generally 
disapproved. In less obvious cases, formal education or mass media 
may publicize the consensus against a behavior. Thus, the esteem 
processes identified above can produce a societal as well as a group 
norm. 
Of the three conditions, the third - publicity - presents the 
most significant potential barrier to a societal norm creation. When 
the existence of the consensus or the risk of detection is less than 
obvious, even a strong consensus may never produce a norm. In 
particular, those who do not share the consensus may doubt its 
existence and thereby remain uninfluenced by the risk of societal 
disapproval. In Part IV, I claim that this potential publicity barrier 
is crucial to understanding the "expressive" function of law: the 
esteem model implies that legislation creates and strengthens socie­
tal norms by publicizing a social consensus.171 
Esteem can also explain the stability of group norms that con­
flict with societal norms. That conflict arises is no surprise: all that 
is required is that a group consist predominantly of people who op­
pose the societal consensus. Random forces could produce this re-
171. See infra text accompanying notes 206-27. Conversely, I also suggest that privacy 
rights may be viewed as a means of preventing or weakening societal norms. See infra text 
accompanying notes 285-96. 
' 
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sult. More obviously, individuals who share an unconventional 
view or a generally unconventional outlook may seek one another's 
company. The question then is not why group and societal norms 
ever conflict, but how - if societal norms have any force - groups 
can openly and persistently flout such norms. 
The simple answer is that group norms are frequently much 
stronger than societal norms. People "like" to violate societal 
norms when their group norms obligate such violations and when 
they gain more from the group than they lose from society. The 
esteem model identifies why one frequently gains more from fol­
lowing group norms than societal norms. For several reasons, 
groups usually have stronger norms than societies. First, groups 
tend to be more homogenous than society and therefore tend to 
enjoy a stronger consensus.172 Ninety percent of society might con­
demn racism or cocaine consumption, but a small group may be 
composed entirely of members of the contrary ten percent. Second, 
any consensus that exists will be easier to publicize within a small 
group than a large one.173 Third, the interaction that defines group 
members but not strangers raises the likelihood that a group mem­
ber will detect - without bearing costs for purposes of monitoring 
- whether another member has violated a consensus. 
Finally, even.when all three conditions exist, a norm arises only 
if the value of esteem is sufficiently great in comparison to the costs 
of complying with the consensus. Societal norms exploit the advan­
tage of aggregation: a small concern for each stranger's opinion 
multiplied by a large number of strangers who may detect a viola­
tion. But groups obviously enjoy the advantage that their members 
value the esteem of fellow members more highly than that of stran­
gers. On average, the smaller the group, the more intensely esteem 
is valued. There are many reasons for this obvious fact, but con­
sider just two. First, other things equal, an individual cares more 
about well-informed opinions than less-informed opinions. The 
more that one individual knows about another, the harder it is for 
the latter to discount the opinion of the former as possibly mis-
172. Like·minded people often form groups on the basis of shared views. Conversely, 
dissension causes exit from a small group more easily than exit from an entire society. Even 
if random forces produce the evaluative beliefs of group members, small groups will exhibit 
more deviation than larger groups. 
173. Very small groups can gather in one place and discuss an issue. Even for larger 
groups, gossip may be sufficient to permit each member to learn the common view of a 
particular behavior. The more interaction between members, the closer-knit the group, and 
the more opportunity for gossip. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2244 n.21, 2288 n.133. 
390 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:338 
taken.114 By definition, members of an individual's group have 
more information about the individual than do strangers, and thus 
the esteem of group members tends to matter a great deal more. 
Second, other things equal, the more an individual esteems another, 
the more she values the opinion the other holds of her.17s Because 
people generally seek to interact with those they esteem, and often 
form groups because of common interests, an individual will value 
her group members' esteem more than the esteem of strangers.176 
Thus, the relative advantages that small, close-knit groups enjoy 
in enforcing norms make it possible for them to enforce norms that 
run contrary to the norms of society. Given the differences, groups 
should succeed more often than societies in enforcing their norms 
with material sanctions; societal norms will frequently reach equi­
librium without material sanctions and enforcement will consist of a 
relatively weak esteem loss. The focus on esteem, however, pro­
vides a unified theory of group and societal norms, even where the 
norms exist in conflict. 
* * * 
By explaining how norms first arise, the esteem model clarifies 
the meaning and function of norms. The model unifies what ap­
pears to be disparate scholarship on group and societal norms, il­
luminates the relationship between concrete and abstract norms, 
and integrates the separate notions of internal and external sanc­
tions. If the model succeeds, the primary gain should be to future 
174. For two people A and B, let vN8 be the value that A places on B's opinion of A and 
let r81A be the relative rank that B accords to A. A's utility from B's esteem of A is a function 
of the product of these variables, vNB(rBIAl· The text points out that vNn is likely to vary 
directly with the amount of information A believes that B has about A. 
175. In the terminology of the preceding note, vNB is likely to vary directly with vwA· 
176. More generally, even though individuals seek high esteem in comparison to others, 
esteem is frequently a positive-sum and not zero-sum good. In other words, the total utility 
derived from esteem in society is not fixed; individuals can often produce more esteem utility 
for themselves than they take away from others. For example, individuals who value A's 
opinion highly will invest more to gain her approval than those who value A's opinion less. 
Those who invest less will lose relative standing in A's judgment, but they will not care as 
much about the decrease as those who gained standing. As a second example, individuals 
who expect A to rank them highly, or who know that she already does, will interact more 
with A so that she will know them better and they will place greater value on her opinion of 
them - given the assumptions stated supra note 174 and accompanying text. Raising the 
value one places on A's opinion benefits these individuals without affecting the esteem A 
grants other individuals or the value they place on her opinion. Social groups exploit both 
mechanisms for creating esteem: individuals seek to join groups with those they expect will 
grant them high esteem, and group interaction causes members to value the esteem of fellow 
members more highly, Thus, social groups might be analogized to firms for the production of 
esteem, a power that allows them to enforce powerful norms. For a description of when 
esteem competition is zero-sum, see McAdams, supra note 78, at 48-59. 
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research on particular law and norm interactions. There are, how­
ever, some immediate implications for law. 
IV. REGULATING NORMS 
Those who study law should study norms; one reason for this is 
that an important function of law is to shape or regulate norms. 
Understanding norm origin should provide insight into both how 
and why law might perform this function. Much of the new norms 
literature discusses how law might change norms, yet without a the­
ory of origin - of the conditions that produce norms - it seems 
unlikely one could predict the effect of legal change on a given 
norm. Moreover, any justification for changing a norm is likely to 
be at least somewhat controversial. A theory of origin should help 
identify the conditions under which dysfunctional norms are likely 
to arise, conditions which may signal the need for legal 
intervention. 
This Part addresses these matters in the following order. Sec­
tion IV.A applies the esteem theory of origin to the general issue of 
norm change and in particular seeks to explain how criticism can 
produce norm change. Given this understanding, section IV.B ex­
plains in some detail how the state may strengthen norms through 
what is conventionally known as the "expressive" function of law. 
Because of inherent difficulties in publicizing a consensus across an 
entire society, the theory predicts the importance of symbolic legis­
lation. The final two sections explore the "dark side" of norms. 
Section IV.C explains why esteem competition will produce previ­
ously unappreciated forms of norm inefficiency: unnecessary and 
"zealous" norms. Section IV.D suggests how law can impede such 
undesirable norms by protecting privacy. 
A. The Esteem Model and Norm Change 
Not so long ago in the United States, people smoked cigarettes 
virtually anywhere and disposed of their ashes and butts on the 
floors of public buildings.177 Public mores condemned unmarried 
cohabitation, women expected and received the titles "Miss" and 
"Mrs." according to their marital status,11s and, at . least in the 
177. See William P. Nelson, Risk Talk, Rights Talk and the Social Production of Second­
hand Smoke 12 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("From the end of the [Second 
World] war through the early 1970s, American public space was undeniably smoking 
space."). 
178. In 1973, eighty-two percent of women and sixty-eight percent of men expressed a 
preference for these titles over the title "Ms." 6 The Roper Center for Public Opinion Re­
search, People, Opinions & Polls: American Popular Culture, Pun. PERSP., Aug./Sept. 1995, at 
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South, custom demanded that whites call blacks by their first names 
and accord them no titles of respect.179 Today public opinion 
largely tolerates unmarried cohabitation, 180 restricts smoking and 
cigarette litter, and condemns those who overtly discriminate on the 
basis of race, 181 and many young women expect and receive the title 
"Ms." whether married or not.182 Such changes are common­
place.183 That norms can rise and fall in such a relatively short 
timespan is quite important to legal theory. At the least, legal anal­
ysis is more complex if one cannot assume the permanence of the 
background norms that influence individual behavior in combina­
tion with, or to the exclusion of, law. At most, legal innovation 
contributes - intentionally or not - to norm change. 
The question is, once a norm has evolved to the point where 
there are secondary enforcement norms obligating individuals to 
enforce the primary norm, how does a group or society ever aban­
don the norm for a new behavioral standard? In this section I ar­
gue that sudden norm shifts are predicted by the esteem model of 
norms. I discuss two agents of change: fluctuations in enforcement 
costs and norm criticism. 
37, 41 (1995) [hereinafter Roper Center]. Similarly, at one time, married women invariably 
took their husband's surname. See Esther Suarez, A Woman's Freedom to Choose Her Sur­
name: ls It Really a Matter of Choice?, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 233, 234 (1997) (reporting 
that Lucy Stone in 1855 was the first American woman to keep her name after marriage and 
that courts frequently refused to recognize such efforts). 
179. In other words, whites did not use titles such as "Mr.," "Mrs.," or "Reverend." See 
JoHN Dou.ARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN ToWN 181, 187, 346 (3d ed. 1957); NEIL 
R. McMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 23-24 
(1989). 
180. See IRVING J. SLOAN, LIVING TOGETHER: UNMARRIEDS AND THE LAW at v-vi (1980) 
(reporting "increased social acceptance"); Matthew J. Smith, The Wages of Living in Sin: 
Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 1055, 1057-58 
(1992) (noting sharp increase in numbers of unmarried cohabitants between 1960 and 1989). 
181. See Lawrence Bobo, Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary 
Racial Attitudes, in ELIMINATING RACISM 85, 88 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 
1988) ("A substantial majority of white Americans in 1942 approved of the blatantly discrim­
inatory proposition that 'white people should have the first chance at any kind of job,' 
whereas in 1972 nearly 100% of whites in a national survey rejected that statement."). See 
generally HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATI1TUDES IN AMERICA 71-138 {1985) (dis­
cussing trends in white racial attitudes between 1942 and 1983). 
182. By 1993, the percentage of women preferring the terms "Mrs." and "Miss" fell to 
52%, down from 82% 20 years earlier. The percentage for men fell from 68% to 46%. See 
Roper Center, supra note 178, at 41. Similarly, the number of women keeping their surname 
after marriage is rising. See Karen S. Peterson, Married Moniker is a Matter of Choice, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 28, 1990, at SD; Suzanne Schlosberg, Commitments in the Name of Love, L.A. 
TIMES, May 22, 1995, at E3. 
183. These large-scale social changes are matched by equally significant shifts within 
smaller groups such as neighborhoods, churches, and industrial organizations, not to mention 
entirely new collections such as internet newsgroups. 
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1. Changes In Enforcement Costs 
If a norm is internalized by virtually everyone in the group or 
society, the possibility for rapid change is quite limited.184 Cooter 
explains how sudden change can occur if many have internalized 
the norm but a large minority or small majority have not; all that is 
necessary is an abrupt change in the costs of enforcing the norm.185 
Where esteem competition produces a secondary enforcement 
norm with material sanctions, the same fluctuation can explain 
abandonment of such norms. Indeed, enforcement costs matter 
more directly to norms when all of the costs of violation are, for 
everyone, entirely external. If enforcement costs rise above the 
value of the esteem one loses by refusing to enforce the primary 
norm, the secondary enforcement norm will unravel. There may 
still be a weak primary norm if everyone knows they will be less 
esteemed for behaving contrary to the norm; but the norm may be 
dramatically weaker. 
For example, a community may enforce a norm against abor­
tion. For many in the community, the norm is internalized. But 
assume that external enforcement is still necessary because some 
women have not internalized the norm and others who have inter­
nalized it would get an abortion - despite the attendant guilt -
under certain circumstances that may arise.186 To deter these 
women, the community informally monitors who visits a local fam­
ily planning clinic and sanctions those suspected of abortion. The 
external sanctions work and the abortion rate is nearly zero. 
Now suppose the availability of a new drug like RU-486 allows 
women to obtain abortions with visits to their regular doctor rather 
than a clinic, which in tum, raises substantially the cost of detecting 
184. Where guilt afflicts everyone, there may be virtually no need for external sanctions, 
and thus changes in the level of external sanctions will not produce any immediate change in 
behavior. If a norm originally arose as a result of external sanctions, and over the genera­
tions the norm is internalized by virtually everyone, it is possible that a sharp rise in enforce­
ment costs would eventually eliminate the norm. This might happen because the few who 
had not internalized the norm now find they can violate it with impunity. Their impunity 
may gradually lower the psychological commitment others feel for the norm. But because 
internalization takes time, such an unraveling would also take considerable time. 
185. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1669-75. In Cooter's model, an individual who has 
internalized a norm is willing to bear small, but only small, costs to enforce it against those 
who have not internalized the norm. Thus, if a norm is internalized when enforcement costs 
are low, external shocks may raise the cost of enforcement above the point some people are 
willing to bear. They will cease enforcing the norm. With fewer enforcing the norm, the per­
person costs of enforcement rise again, possibly causing more individuals to drop out of en­
forcement efforts. A rapid and significant change in enforcement costs could then produce a 
rapid abandonment of the norm. 
186. The fact that people have internalized a norm does not mean they never violate it, 
but only that they bear an internal cost when they do. 
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an abortion.187 The expected loss of esteem would fall, potentially 
to the point where it no longer deterred anyone from seeking a pill­
induced abortion. If the community generally coin.es to believe that 
many unidentified women have used a pill to secure an abortion, 
the disesteem given to women who are known to have aborted a 
pregnancy (because they go to an abortion clinic) will then be 
spread over a larger group. The feedback effect of decreased com­
pliance will lower even the esteem sanction for women whose abor­
tions become publicly known. The group's anti-abortion norm 
might entirely unraveJ.188 
2. Norm Criticism 
Criticism seems to play an important role in norm change. Sun­
stein, for example, observes the existence of sudden and dramatic 
norm changes - "cascades" - brought about by "norm entrepre­
neurs," opinion leaders who explicitly aim to shape norms. He cites 
as examples the sudden "use of the term 'liberal' as one of oppro­
brium," the abrupt abandonment of affirmative action, and "the 
rise of the feminist movement. "18? If norms were enforced only by 
those who have internalized them, as Cooter claims, criticism of 
norms should not have this effect. Those who accept a norm to the 
point where violating it makes them feel guilt are not likely to be 
receptive to norm criticism. Even if they were, the change should 
187. As used to induce an abortion, RU486 consists of "three 200 mg. tablets of mifepris­
tone . . .  followed two days later by an injection or suppository of progesterone," the combi­
nation of which causes "the lining of the uterus to dissolve, resulting in an aborting 
menstruation." Adele Clarke & Theresa Mantini, The Many Faces of RU486: Tales of Situ­
ated Knowledges and Technological Contestations, 18 SCI. TECH. & HuM. VALUES 42, 46 
(1993). I say "suppose" RU486 raises the cost of detecting abortions because there are many 
uncertainties about the actual effect of the drug. First, as currently contemplated, the use of 
RU486 requires as many medical visits as a surgical abortion. See id. at 46-47. Thus, any 
privacy advantage would have to come from the fact that visiting a doctor's office instead of a 
clinic provides far more ambiguous evidence of one's purpose. Second, RU486 is "claimed to 
be safe for abortion only if used up to about the eighth week of pregnancy." Id. at 46. Thus, 
in the United States, about half of current abortions could be performed by RU486. See M. 
Klitsch, Antiprogestins and the Abortion Controversy: A Progress Report, 23 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 275, 277 (1991). Notwithstanding these limitations, antiabortion groups appear to 
fear RU486, in part, for its ability to make abortions more private. See Clarke & Mantini, 
supra, at 57 ("[T]he Vatican is reported to have said that 'a way of killing with no risk for the 
assassin has finally been found."'). 
188. The example suggests other ways in which monitoring costs affect norms. For exam­
ple, the fewer the sites for obtaining an abortion in a given area, the easier it is to monitor all 
abortions. Thus, an increase in the number of abortion clinics or the availability (including 
affordability) of abortions in general hospitals could also raise the costs of enforcing anti­
abortion norms. 
189. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 912; see also Posner, supra note 72, at 6-9 (discussing 
norm entrepreneurs and norm change). Note that Sunstein seems to imagine norms arising 
without a unanimously expressed view, as is required by Cooler's model. See supra text ac­
companying note 146. 
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occur only gradually, as criticism slowly loosens the emotional hold 
the norm has on those who have internalized it.190 Some other 
mechanism is needed to explain how norms rise and fall in response 
to criticism. 
The esteem model explains two ways that criticism can produce 
rapid norm change. Most simply, criticism may provide new infor­
mation that changes the underlying consensus. A person may es­
teem behavior X because she believes certain facts about X; 
perhaps she believes she benefits as a consequence of others engag­
ing in X If so, demonstrating the falsity of her factual beliefs will 
undermine the consensus and the norm.191 If the new information 
circulates quickly, it will lead to very sudden changes in esteem­
based norms. 
The distinction between abstract norms, which are often inter­
nalized, and concrete norms, which are often not internalized, fur­
ther illuminates the point. Individuals commonly understand and 
justify concrete norms by reference to abstract norms: "I keep my 
mouth shut because I am a 'loyal friend"'; "I piled sand bags on the 
flood wall because I wanted to do 'my share."' When that is the 
case, there is a built-in standard for evaluating the concrete norm: 
Does it genuinely serve the abstract norm? If the critic can show 
that it does not - that despite the concrete norm, recycling actually 
harms future generations, or that enabling friends to drive while 
intoxicated endangers the friend to whom one is loyal (and by en­
dangering others in the community, undermines a commitment to 
be a "good citizen") - then her criticism will change the norm. 
Here the "information" the critic supplies need not be factual data, 
190. People do not develop internal guilt-driven commitments overnight. The same is 
presumably true of disinternalization, the process by which people abandon their emotional 
commitment to a norm. Beliefs can change instantly, but guilt inclinations cannot. If so, 
norm criticism should not have any rapid effect on the willingness of those who have internal­
ized the norm to follow or enforce it • 
As previously stated, Cooter's internalization model can account for rapid norm change 
based on abrupt exogenous changes in enforcement costs. See supra note 185. He notes that 
among the costs of enforcing a norm is the fact that "[t]he person who spontaneously pun­
ishes someone • . .  usually runs some risk of confrontation or revenge." Cooter, supra note 
14, at 1670. The risk of confrontation depends on the number of people who have internal­
ized the norm; the risk "fall[s] as the proportion of people willing to act as punishers in­
creases." Id. But if the norm is enforced only by those who have internalized it, there is no 
obvious reason why criticism should affect the number of people enforcing the norm, and 
thus the costs of enforcement. At least, there is no reason for criticism to work quickly. 
191. This is not to say that criticism will easily change people's views even when they are 
false. When possible, people tend to interpret information in a manner that sustains their 
existing beliefs. See infra note 210. But if the contrary evidence is sufficiently powerful or 
dramatic, people cannot interpret it away, and the norm will change. 
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but may be a more powerful analysis of the relationship between 
concrete behavior and the abstract norm. 
Second, criticism can cause rapid norm change by revealing new 
information about what the consensus actually is. This point fol­
lows from the distinction between two norm conditions: the exist­
ence of a consensus and knowledge of the consensus. If there were 
perfect information about a consensus, then sudden norm change 
could occur only with a sudden change in the consensus. But given 
the possible disparity between the actual and the perceived consen­
sus, there can be rapid norm change even if the actual consensus 
remains constant. For example, suppose the consensus tolerates be­
havior X - most individuals neither approve nor disapprove X -
but most people falsely believe the consensus condemns X This 
norm is highly unstable, depending on continued misperception of 
the true consensus. Criticism may induce a new discussion of the 
behavior that provides that information, quickly revealing the true 
nature of the consensus. 
Of course, if criticism were always immediately forthcoming, the 
resultant norm change would not be very dramatic because there 
would never be a significant gap between the actual and perceived 
consensus. But criticism is not always readily provided. The prob­
lem is that a norm critic often incurs costs by challenging the pre­
vailing view. Hence, when individuals privately disagree with a 
norm, they often publicly pretend to support it.192 The norm may 
grow increasingly unstable, until criticism supplies the occasion for 
large numbers of people to admit their true beliefs and discover 
that the actual consensus is not what they had thought.193 
192. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 997-99; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2259; Posner, supra 
note 102, at 1718. 
193. This analysis is substantially clarified, however, by distinguishing between group and 
societal nonns. The too-little-criticism story fits best with group, not societal, nonns. Close­
knit groups enjoy various advantages over societies in enforcing nonns, see supra text accom­
panying notes 172-76, and are therefore more likely to be accompanied by powerful secon­
dary enforcement nonns. Under these circumstances, one who disagrees with her group's 
norm has a real reason to withhold her criticism. 
Societal nonns, however, tend to be weaker, allowing groups to sustain nonns contrary to 
societal nonns. See supra text accompanying notes 172-76. Accordingly, there is usually 
some group willing to criticize openly and vigorously any societal nonn. In this setting, "too 
much" criticism can produce the same nonn instability as "too little," creating the same po­
tential for rapid change. That nearly every nonn has critics makes it easy for individuals to 
discount criticism as that of a small, noisy, and radical group - the "extremist element." 
Nonn supporters often succeed at portraying critics as unrepresentative of the "mainstream," 
even when support for the nonn is genuinely eroding. Thus, individuals who oppose the 
nonn may continue to feign support for it. The disparity between the consensus and the 
perceived consensus may make the norm highly unstable, subject to significant change should 
the error in perception be corrected. 
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I defer discussing examples until later, when I address ways in 
which the law can exploit norm instability. For now, note how the 
analysis supports the liberal value of tolerance. The First Amend­
ment restricts the state's ability to punish dissent. To some degree, 
norms of tolerance similarly obligate private actors to withhold 
punishment from those who speak against, but do not violate, a 
norm.194 This tolerance is not only important in the political arena 
to facilitate an open debate about governmental decisions. Toler­
ance is also important to allow criticism to influence group and soci­
etal norms. First, criticism may point out new facts or perspectives 
that persuade individuals to change their evaluative assessments 
and thereby change the consensus underlying a norm. Second, criti­
cism may reveal that the perceived consensus differs from the ac­
tual consensus, thereby changing the norm to fit the consensus. 
Tolerance norms, both legal and social, make it possible for critics 
to challenge existing norms continuously; by putting subjects on the 
"public agenda," the consensus is measured and remeasured. Tol­
erating dissent thus increases the odds that any poorly informed or 
improperly perceived consensus will be detected and eliminated. 
In sum, esteem-based norms are less stable than internalized 
norms. Sunstein's claim that norm criticism can cause "norm cas­
cades" is not in tension with Cooter's claim that norms are internal­
ized: it is simply the nonintemalized esteem-based norms that 
criticism can change quickly. 
B. Facilitating Efficient Norms: The Expressive Function of Law 
By whatever normative criteria one uses, some group and socie­
tal norms are desirable and some are not. Sometimes norms are the 
cure; sometimes the disease. In the next sections I discuss how es­
teem competition produces inefficient norms and what the law can 
do to weaken such norms. For now, assume we identify a "good" 
norm. One important question is what the state might do to 
strengthen such a norm. The obvious answer is that the law can 
strengthen a norm by imposing sanctions on those who violate it. 
Less obviously, however, the law can strengthen a norm merely by 
194. A strong tolerance norm might permit individuals to criticize but not violate the 
norm. A weak tolerance norm might still permit an individual to question the norm without 
disapproval, as long as she relents and endorses the norm if her criticism fails to persuade 
others. Even this limited privilege of dissent would work to moderate norm enforcement if 
most people already secretly believed the norm was dysfunctional and if the criticism spread 
quickly enough. But sometimes secondary enforcement norms obligate intolerance of norm 
critics. Some groups will punish any criticism of their norms and virtually all groups have 
some norms - taboos - for which they tolerate no criticism. 
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"expressing" it, without providing any enforcement. In this section 
I follow other theorists in contending that law can strengthen es­
teem norms by expressing them and, further, that norms help to 
explain how the "expressive" function of law works. In particular, 
the esteem model of norm origin clarifies how legal expression 
matters. 
That law has an "expressive" or symbolic function is an old 
idea.195 This view resists the simple claim that law directs behavior 
only because the state inflicts a cost on violators. Of course, law 
alters behavior when the state threatens to enforce its rules, at least 
ultimately, by force. But law also expresses normative principles 
and symbolizes societal values, and these moralizing features may 
affect behavior. Under this view, for example, criminal punish­
ments do not merely state prices for prohibited behaviors. Rather, 
as sanctions, punishments express society's condemnation of the be­
havior.196 Demanding a price means that the behavior is deemed 
acceptable so long as the price is paid; imposing a sanction ex­
presses that a behavior is unacceptable even for one willing to incur 
the sanction. By expressive function of law, I mean that the distinc­
tion between prices and sanctions affects behavior: that imposing a 
given cost on behavior actually deters more if the law imposing the 
cost expresses condemnation of the behavior.191 
This claim, however, is vague. How exactly does legal condem­
nation affect behavior, other than by threat of sanctions? A good 
explanation mus� avoid two overly simple answers: (1) that people 
feel an internalized duty to obey the law, whatever its content; or 
(2) that people feel guilt violating a law that states an obligation 
they have already internalized. The first answer is undoubtedly 
true to some degree; some people feel guilt when violating any 
law.198 But if that were the only explanation for the law's expres­
sive function, it would imply that any law is as successful on that 
score as any other law, which is surely false because some people 
feel no guilt for failing to obey a law they think is unwise or unjust. 
The second answer superficially ties the expressive function to the 
195. See, e.g., Johs Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CruM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POI.ICE So. 176, 179-80 (1952); Nigel Walker & Michael Argyle, Does the 
Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 570, 570 (1963-64). 
196. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 593; see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibi­
tions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, 
in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & 
Christopher K Braun eds., 1995). 
197. Whether a legal sanction expresses condemnation is a complex matter, but criminal 
laws enforced by prison terms generally do. See Kahan, supra note 36, at ti21. 
198. See TYLER, supra note 114, at 37. 
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content of the law. But if law breaking invoked guilt only when the 
individual had already internalized the substantive obligation -
when she thought the behavior was "wrong" before it was illegal -
then legal condemnation would have no independent moralizing ef­
fect. The law would add nothing but the threat of punishment. 
Recently, several theorists have suggested that the expressive 
function of law works by affecting norms.199 If law expresses the 
community's adherence to a norm, law may affect behavior by 
strengthening the nonlegal enforcement of the norm. Perhaps the 
law's expression of a norm even induces some individuals to inter­
nalize the norm. Thus, these theorists contend, in effect, that legal 
expression influences behavior by influencing norms. Paul Robin­
son and John Darley make these claims about the criminal law: 
when a statute fits sufficiently with existing retributive norms defin­
ing who deserves punishment, it is perceived as "just" and then 
"nurtures'' those norms.200 Criminal legislation and enforcement 
influences "what the social group thinks" by sending "messages" 
about the existence and content of the norm.201 Further, when 
criminal law speaks with "moral credibility" or legitimacy about is­
sues of right and wrong, it influences "what its members 
internalize. "202 
Robinson and Darley provide what is, to date, the most compre­
hensive social science account of law as a norm-shaping tool.203 But 
they too fail to supply some important details about norm govern­
ance. Robinson and Darley are adamant that law cannot create 
new norms but only nurture existing ones.204 But if public support 
predates the criminal law, which is also generally required by our 
political system, then how does legislation add to the public support 
199. See Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 404 ("[T]he route by which laws create and 
maintain order is through the creation or alteration of social norms . . . .  [O]ur thesis is that 
decentralized order is accomplished by internalizing as social norms those laws that are just 
and perceived to be fair."); Lessig, supra note 11, at 1012-14; Robinson & Darley, supra note 
26, at 471 ("Criminal law in particular can influence the norms • . .  that are internalized by the 
individual. Criminal law's influence comes from being a societal mechanism . . .  by which the 
force of internal moral principles is strengthened."); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2031 (assert­
ing that the law's stand for or against a given behavior affects the strength of norms for or 
against that behavior, as the prohibition of public smoking and organ selling may strengthen 
norms restricting smoking and the uses of money). 
200. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 471-77. Their overall project is to supply a 
utilitarian justification for basing the criminal law on the principles of just deserts actually 
held by the public. 
201. See id. at 471-74. 
202. See id. at 471, 474-76. 
203. Their account is based on social psychology, not economics. 
204. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 473. 
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for the norm it embodies?2os Without a general theory of societal 
norms, it is difficult to say in detail how the law affects such norms. 
H the esteem theory is correct, it suggests two specific ways that 
statutes create and strengthen norms: (1) lawmaking publicizes a 
societal consensus, and (2) law provides the concrete norms that 
define compliance with internalized abstract norms. 
1. Overcoming the Publicity Barrier: How 
Law Signals a Consensus 
The esteem model predicts that many in society may remain ig­
norant of a consensus. Law can communicate to these individuals 
the esteem consequences of their behavior. 
The publicity barrier. The determinative obstacle to societal 
norm formation is frequently the fact that a consensus is not well 
known. Recall that one essential condition for an esteem-based 
norm is the publicity of the consensus regarding the esteem worthi­
ness of a behavior.206 Absent publicity, individuals will not per­
ceive the consensus and it will not create the expected costs or 
benefits to behavior necessary to produce a norm. When the group 
at issue is very large - for example, the population of an entire 
society - the publicity condition can be quite difficult to satisfy. 
Obviously most individuals cannot directly poll even a large frac­
tion of everyone else in society. Nor can one obtain through gossip 
the immense quantity of data such opinions represent. Sometimes 
people attempt to infer society's views from the relatively small 
group of people they know. H the actual consensus is very strong, 
then this technique will probably work. Suppose ninety-five per­
cent of society believes that letting one's dog run unleashed or play­
ing loud music in public is socially irresponsible behavior deserving 
disapproval. No matter what an individual is inclined to believe, 
with a consensus so strong, she is likely to realize that she en­
counters many people who think such behaviors merit disapproval 
for every individual who is indifferent or thinks they are worthy of 
esteem. 
H the consensus is weak, however, - say, only fifty-five percent 
- then casual observation is not likely to detect it. The relatively 
few people an individual knows will only rarely be statistically rep-
205. Robinson and Darley say that public debate "educates" the public and strengthens 
the "shared public understanding." See id. at 472, 476. But they remain vague about exactly 
how this occurs. One would not expect, for example, that losing the debate causes the oppo· 
nents to change their minds. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08. 
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resentative of the entire society.207 If people were no more likely to 
underestimate than to overestimate the consensus - if the error 
were randomly distributed - then the average belief would still 
match the actual consensus. But the error is not random. People 
tend to find reinforcement of their own views in the views of their 
peers because they associate disproportionately with like-minded 
individuals2os or they selectively interpret information to validate 
their existing views.209 The result, according to psychologists, is 
that people have an exaggerated sense of the typicality of their 
views, a bias aptly named the "false consensus" effect.210 Thus, for 
issues that closely divide society, it is entirely possible that those in 
a large minority can easily believe that they are in a small majority. 
When everyone in society can believe they are in the majority on an 
issue, the desire for esteem will frequently produce only a weak 
norm, if it produces any norm at all. 
For example, if fifty-five percent of the population believes re­
cycling is commendable and all of this group recycles, there may be 
a weak recycling norm. But the norm is not likely to evolve and 
strengthen in the ways described in Part II if those who oppose re­
cycling believe they are in the majority. This group perceives a 
lower esteem gain from recycling than actually exists and might 
207. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 
PsYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973). 
208. See BERNARD R. BEREISON ET AL., VOTING 83 (1954); R. ROBERT HUCKFELDT & 
JoHN SPRAGUE, CmZENS, PoLmcs, AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: INFORMATION AND IN­
FLUENCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 46-50 (1995). 
209. See THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF 
HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 49-72 (1991); DAVID PEARS, MOTIVATED IRRATIONAL­
ITY 41-66 (1984); JoHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MAss OPINION (1992). 
210. "The false consensus effect refers to the tendency for people's own beliefs, values, 
and habits to bias their estimates of how widely such views and habits are shared by others." 
GILOVICH, supra note 209, at 113. In one study, for example, university students were asked 
if "they would be willing to walk around campus wearing a large sandwich-board sign bearing 
the message 'REPENT."' Id. at 114 (describing L. Ross, et al., The False Consensus Effect: 
An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXP. Soc. PSYCH. 279 
(1977)). After stating their willingness or unwillingness, they were asked to estimate the 
percentage of students who would agree to do the same. On average, "[t]hose who agreed to 
wear the sign thought that 60% would do so," but "those who refused thought that only 27% 
would agree • . . .  " Id. 
Psychologists attribute the false consensus effect to both cognitive error and motivational 
bias. The cognitive error arises when one generalizes from personal experience, which is 
based primarily on one's acquaintances and friends - people who tend to be disproportion­
ately like oneself. See Steven J. Sherman et al., The False Consensus Effect in Estimates of 
Smoking Prevalence, 9 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. BULL. 197, 198 (1983). The motiva­
tional factor is that "[b]y distorting consensus in a way that makes one's own judgements and 
behaviors appear relatively more common, one can feel that one's choices are valid, appro­
priate, and reasonable." Id. See generally GILOVICH, supra note 209, at 112-22 (reviewing 
psychology literature); Gary Marks, Thinking One's Abilities Are Unique and One's Opinions 
Are Common, 10 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. BuLL. 203 (1984). 
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even perceive that no esteem gain exists because they believe that a 
sufficient number of their group regards recycling negatively - for 
being a foolish or trendy waste of time - rather than neutrally. 
Thus, the weak norm may remain in equilibrium. Even this out­
come is optimistic. Imagine that some of the fifty-five percent who 
believe recycling is commendable nonetheless fail to recycle - for 
them the costs of recycling still outweigh the esteem benefits. Quite 
possibly, then, there is no norm at all: most people do not recycle 
despite a narrow consensus that such behavior merits esteem. 
Given the relative values of esteem and costs of recycling, this re­
sult could hold even when a strong norm would have emerged if 
there were sufficient publicity of the existing consensus. In sum, 
lack of publicity will often be a determinative obstacle to societal 
norm formation. 
Signaling a Consensus. Law can overcome this barrier.211 In a 
democratic society, the process leading up to and including the en­
actment of legislation can publicize the existence of a societal con­
sensus. In the push for legislative action, an accurate counting of 
opinion matters. Legislators care what their constituents think 
about the conduct at issue. Their decision to enact or not to enact 
legislation, as reported through the media, declares to the public a 
winning side, usually consistent with what the electoral majority 
wanted.212 Legislative conduct may thus provide unmistakable evi­
dence of a consensus. Provided that the other two conditions for 
norm formation are present (inherent risk of detection and aware­
ness of that risk), publicizing that most people disapprove of a cer­
tain behavior will create a new expected cost to acting in violation 
of the (previously unknown) consensus.213 In short, legislation is a 
211. I do not mean to imply that only law can publicize a consensus. Even in a pluralistic 
or fragmented society, public education and mass media - including, at the simplest level, 
news reports of polling data - will sometimes work to publicize an underlying consensus. In 
a society with little or no written language, a ritualized song may provide the publicity neces­
sary to create or enforce norms. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Song of Deborah: A Legal­
Economic Analysis, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2293, 2294 (1996) (claiming that the biblical Song of 
Deborah was probably "an oral recordation, in a kind of intertribal account book, of how 
different groups complied with a norm of mutual support" in a loose military alliance, and 
that its poetic form aided memorization). My claim is only that all mechanisms are imperfect 
and that in some contexts, law can significantly and suddenly increase awareness of a societal 
consensus. 
212. Caveats are noted below. See infra text accompanying notes 214-16. 
213. There is evidence that any publicity has this effect. Educational campaigns work to 
change behavior even when the only information conveyed is social disapproval. For exam­
ple, one study found that an antilittering campaign that sought to evoke shame and embar­
rassment increased compliance with antilittering Jaws, though legal sanctions remained the 
same. See Harold G. Grasmick et al., Shame and Embarrassment as Deterrents to Noncom· 
pliance with the Law: The Case of an Antilittering Campaign, 23 ENVT. & BEHA v. 233 (1991 ). 
Another series of studies found that merely reminding an individual of an antilittering norm 
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signal of consensus. The signal may provide the missing ingredient 
for norm formation. 
Of course, legislation often fails to represent a consensus. In a 
representative democracy, majority electoral support is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for enacting legislation.214 Cer­
tainly the public perceives that "special interests" prevail all too 
often, particularly in Congress. Further, the public learns of legisla­
tive activity primarily through media; if the media does not suffi­
ciently cover an enactment, the law will not publicize a consensus. 
These complications and others mean that law only sometimes can 
create or strengthen a norm. But that is precisely the point. The 
expressive function of law does not always work, and the esteem 
theory identifies the conditions under which it will. When the me­
dia widely covers a legislative battle and the public perceives that 
the outcome is dictated largely by popularity,215 the resulting enact­
ment provides convincing evidence of a societal consensus.216 
When the condition of publicity is lacking, but the other norm con­
ditions are present, lawmaking provides the jolt necessary to create 
a new norm, or strengthen an old one. After signalling a consensus, 
significantly decreased the amount of littering. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory 
of Normative Conduct, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYCHOL. 201 (1991). In one of 
these studies, when flyers were placed on cars, subjects were significantly less likely to toss 
them on the ground when the flyer contained an antilittering message than when it contained 
a pro-museum message. See id. at 216-17. In another study, subjects who saw a person pick 
up a piece of refuse that was not her own and dispose of it properly were significantly less 
likely to litter than were members of the control group. See id. at 222-23. 
214. Given the number of nonvoters, majority electoral support need not represent a 
majority consensus of adult Americans. 
215. A majority opinion is not essential. See supra note 89. Intensity of preference also 
matters to esteem. If only 40% oppose certain conduct, that could produce an esteem norm 
ifthe 40% thought the conduct utterly abominable, while 55% were indifferent, and only 5% 
weakly approved it. For this reason, the existence of legislative logrolling - where legisla­
tors trade away votes on matters they care less about for votes on matters they care more 
about - does not work against the publicity theory of law proposed here. The Jaw's passage 
may represent a victory for a minority, but if the law demonstrates the preference intensities 
of the sort just described, it could still provide the publicity needed for a new norm. 
This point illustrates another reason why legislation serves as a powerful signal. Those in 
the minority may dismiss polls if the polls do not measure intensity of belief concerning a 
behavior. But when polls do report intensity along some scale, the complexity of the results 
makes it difficult to determine the net effect of the behavior on the esteem one would re­
ceive. Legislation is sensitive to intensity of opinion, but a legislative ban is not so difficult to 
interpret. Legislation translates the complex poll into a simple directive. 
216. Indeed, if "special interests" are associated with one side of a legislative struggle, a 
victory against them sends a more powerful signal of consensus. Thus, antismoking legisla­
tion may signal disapproval of smoking with particular clarity and intensity, because it is 
perceived that the tobacco industry would have prevailed absent a strong consensus against 
their interests. 
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esteem competition may produce a norm through the mechanisms 
described in Part n.211 
Consider, for example, antismoking ordinances.21s The esteem 
theory explains how these laws strengthened norms against public 
smoking. At one time, American society rewarded cigarette smok­
ing with a minor degree of status and tolerated smoking in virtually 
any setting. Because smoking was regarded either positively or 
neutrally by most Americans, few expressed objections to smoking 
in public, and those who did appeared to be rudely insisting on an 
idiosyncratic sensitivity. Over time, sentiment about public smok­
ing changed, as fewer people smoked219 and more people came to 
view smokers as unhappy addicts and to consider second-hand 
smoke dangerous.220 At some point, a majority of the population 
came to disapprove of smoking in certain public places.221 
For antismoking norms to arise, however, individuals had to rec­
ognize this shift in attitudes. Quite likely, because the shift was 
217. Where cases or statutes are not well suited to publicize a consensus, however, there 
is little weight to criticisms or defenses of the Jaw based on what it may mean to people. For 
this reason, some arguments about the symbolic effects of Jaw are overstated. The signal sent 
by state actors using peremptory challenges based on gender, for example, is more ambigu­
ous than claimed in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-142 (1994). In J.E.B., the majority 
of the Court, in holding such peremptories unconstitutional, said they would send a 
"message" "ratify[ing] and reinforc[ing]" gender stereotypes. Whatever the merits of the 
ruling, this particular claim is questionable given that most of the public is never aware of the 
details of jury selection and most courtroom observers probably cannot distinguish between 
the exercise of for-cause and peremptory challenges. Even if people recognize that a state 
lawyer is using a peremptory challenge in this manner, there is no reason to assume that they 
will view this individual's conduct as new evidence of a consensus approving gender stereo­
types. At least, the basis for such an inference is far weaker than when a legislature acts. 
There are arguments in response to each of these claims, and other arguments in support 
ofJ.E.B. My point is simply that not all symbolic arguments are equal and the esteem theory 
helps to distinguish weak from strong claims. Contrast, for example, the unambiguous sym­
bolism reviewed in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding unconstitutional 
state support of male-only military school), and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding unconstitutional state support of female-only nursing school). 
Excluding one gender from training for a role traditionally occupied by the other is very 
likely to publicize gender stereotypes and support related norms because the entry require­
ments for public schools are well known. 
218. Smoking norms are much discussed of late. See Bernstein, supra note 26, at 175-77; 
Cooter, supra note 14, at 1674-75; Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2034-35. 
219. The percentage of Americans who smoke fell from 42% in 1955 to 26% in 1991. See 
Smoked Out, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at 29, 29. 
220. See generally SMOKING PouCY: LAW, PoLmcs, AND CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin & 
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). 
221. According to a Bureau of National Affairs Study, the percentage of businesses ban­
ning indoor smoking on the job rose from 2% in 1986 to 34% in 1993. See Smoked Out, 
supra note 219, at 30. In February 1993, McDonald's began prohibiting smoking at all of its 
1400 wholly owned restaurants; by March, one-third of its 7700 franchises and several com­
petitors had followed suit. See id. at 29. The proportion of Americans supporting a total ban 
on smoking indoors doubled from 1983 to 1993, when the number reached 35%. See id. at 
29. 
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gradual, smokers did not detect the new consensus when it first 
arose. Particularly for those who began the habit when it was 
widely accepted, only compelling evidence of attitude change would 
convince them of the new consensus.222 Of course, if individuals in 
the new majority consistently confronted public smokers with their 
complaints, their large numbers would provide the necessary evi­
dence. But even nonsmokers who were part of the new consensus 
may have remained uncertain of how third parties would perceive 
their request that someone stop engaging in a still common, and 
commonly tolerated, behavior. Before the new consensus was pub­
licized, the first to speak out against the old consensus risked cen­
sure. Th.us, even after the consensus changed, absent publicity, 
smokers perceived no esteem loss from public smoking and third 
parties continued to interpret requests to stop as rude. 
With this background, we can understand how antismoking laws 
worked.223 Local and state legislative victories - especially against 
a well-financed tobacco lobby - signalled a new consensus: that 
cigarette smoke is annoying and dangerous, and exposing others to 
smoke is offensive and antisocial. Legislation provides the kind of 
compelling, if not jarring, evidence of attitude change that is diffi­
cult for the smoker to ignore. The next time a person in a public 
area asks a smoker to desist, the smoker is far more likely to infer 
that strangers around her will disapprove of her refusal and not of 
the nonsmoker's request. Conversely, because nonsmokers are 
likely to make the same assessment, they are more likely to make 
such requests. Over time, smokers will predict that smoking in pub­
lic is so likely to lead to an objection that they do not even test the 
issue. Initially, the effect might be limited, but as more smokers 
comply with requests to stop smoking and as more smokers comply 
without a request, those who persist in smoking receive a greater 
share of the disapproval, making it increasingly costly to hold out. 
To some degree - I would guess a substantial one - the law is 
self-enforcing.224 Or, more precisely, the law strengthens a norm to 
the point where most of the enforcement is informal. 
222. Smokers would likely interpret the evidence they encountered (complaints) as being 
consistent with their current beliefs that complainers are hypersensitive or rude, especially 
for those who disproportionately associated with other smokers or with nonsmokers of the 
same generation. 
223. They do work, largely without legal enforcement. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome 
H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY, 
supra note 220, at 69, 71-76. 
224. Kagan and Skolnick make this point, at least as applied to nonsmokers: 
[F]orrnal rules serve an important communication function, overcoming the familiar 
problem of pluralistic ignorance and inaction. Even if, in 1983, most nonsmokers (and 
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The esteem theory thus explains at least part of the expressive 
function of law. Not surprisingly perhaps, other norms scholars, in­
cluding Cooter, use the smoking example, also to suggest that antis­
moking laws work informally to deter public smoking even without 
state enforcement. Yet Cooter's theory does not really explain this 
result. He observes: 
Officials almost never enforce these rules [against smoking in public 
buildings.] The posting of the ordinances, however, apparently causes 
citizens to enforce the rules against violators. Knowing this, most 
smokers conform to the rules . . . .  [E]nactment of the anti-smoking 
ordinance lowered the perceived cost of confrontation in complaining 
to smokers, which . . .  caused the system to tip into a new equilibrium 
with a higher level of conformity.225 
Even as Cooter describes it, the role of internalization in this 
change is unclear or nonexistent. First, there was nothing like a 
unanimous consensus of opinion or expression of opinion about 
public smoking before or immediately after enactment of the laws 
he discusses, so the example does not easily fit within his theory of 
the internalization process.226 Even if there had been such consen­
sus, it remains unclear in his account why a change in the law is also 
necessary, or even helpful, to bring about internalization.227 Fi­
nally, Cooter does not answer the fundamental question of why 
complaining is a cost, or at least why it is sufficiently costly that, 
absent a statute, those who do not wish to be exposed to second­
hand smoke would not complain. 
many smokers) favored restrictions on smoking in the workplace . . .  individual non­
smokers may not have realized the extent of support for such rules, and hence may not 
have felt emboldened to complain directly to smokers. The enactment of ordinances 
and workplace rules told nonsmokers that they had a right to breath air that was free of 
smoke. 
Id. at 86. 
225. Cooter, supra note 14, at 1674-75. His other example concerns a "pooper-scooper" 
law requiring dog owners to clean up after their dogs. "Enactment of the law clarified vague 
social norms concerning courtesy. After the law's passage, people became more aggressive 
about enforcing what common courtesy demands. Apparently it is easier to say 'Obey the 
law' than to say 'Don't be so rude."' Id. at 1675. As explained in the text, however, the 
crucial change is not merely being able to say "obey the law," but that the change in law 
makes it easier to say "don't be so rude." 
226. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224 {claiming that internaliza­
tion follows "unanimous endorsement" of a particular bahavior). Perhaps he imagines a uni­
versal consensus just among nonsmokers: nonsmokers became more willing to bear costs to 
enforce the norm, and with more of them enforcing the norm, the per-person enforcement 
costs fell. But there was not a universal consensus even among nonsmokers before the non­
smoking ordinances became common. See Kagan & Skolnick, supra note 223, at 82 (report­
ing that in 1985, 85% of nonsmokers and 62% of smokers agreed that smokers should 
"refrain from smoking in the presence of nonsmokers"). 
227. Nor is it clear why some statutes seem more effective than others at producing non· 
legal enforcement. 
November 1997] Norms 407 
The esteem theory helps to explain Cooter's example. The cost 
of complaining is an esteem cost - one cares how the recipient of 
the complaint and third parties are likely to react. The lack of a 
universal consensus is precisely why the statute is helpful in produc­
ing the norm: without an ordinance, the consensus was sufficiently 
weak that people were in doubt as to its existence. The change in 
law did not immediately cause internalization, but it did immedi­
ately reveal the true nature of the consensus, signaling the negative 
esteem consequences of public smoking. Because the ordinance in­
forms those inclined to complain how most people view the matter, 
the esteem costs of complaining are lower. 
2. Using Law to Evoke Guilt: Tapping into Abstract Norms 
Publicizing a consensus will not, by itself, cause individuals to 
feel guilt from violating the law. Yet Robinson and Darley are 
surely right that criminal law sometimes causes people to feel guilt 
from violating obligations they had not internalized prior to enact­
ment of the law.228 Does the esteem theory explain how law can 
produce this motive for compliance? I believe so. If the law pub­
licizes a consensus that certain behavior is required in order to com­
ply with an abstract internalized norm, then violating the concrete 
(legal and esteem-based) obligation will produce guilt. 
As an example, consider legislation requiring parents to use 
child safety seats when transporting children in automobiles.229 
One may reasonably doubt that these laws induce private, informal 
enforcement as the smoking bans do. The persons who gain from 
parental compliance with the legislation - young children - are 
not likely to complain more because the state passes a law.230 The 
expressive function can still work, though in a different way. Recall 
my claim that violation of noninternalized norms may elicit guilt if 
those norms give substantive meaning to abstract, internalized obli­
gations.231 One social role many in our society internalize is that of 
228. They claim that criminal law, if morally credible, causes individuals to internalize the 
law ·•at the borderline of criminal activity, where there may be some ambiguity as to whether 
the conduct really is wrong." Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 475-76. They give exam­
ples such as insider trading, drunk driving, and exceeding the speed limit. See id. at 476. The 
claim is that individuals defer to law's judgment that these behaviors are immoral. 
229. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 27360 (Deering 1996), amended by Act of July 28, 1997, 
ch. 153, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 153 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.613 (West 1996); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 61-9-420 (1995), amendea by Act of April 29, 1997, ch. 431, 1997 Mont. Laws 
431. 
230. Moreover, whereas public smoking is observable to many third parties, most of 
whom also may be adversely affected by the smoke, a significantly fewer number of people 
will notice or care much about other parents' compliance with child safety seat legislation. 
231. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
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"parent"; many feel guilt if they believe they fail to be a "good" 
mother or father. Like most abstract norms, the vagueness of these 
obligations makes them easily internalized but provides little con­
crete behavioral guidance. Yet concrete esteem norms give many 
meanings to this obligation: in some communities, the consensus 
dictates that a "good parent" reads to his or her children, teaches 
them table manners, takes them to church, and provides them with 
a "safe environment." 
If this account is correct, then the expressive function of law can 
work to define further the roles that are enforced by guilt. A law 
obligating the use of child safety devices expresses a new consensus 
that the absence of such devices exposes a child to unacceptably 
high risks contrary to minimally acceptable parental behavior. The 
vagueness of the internalized obligation generally allows parents 
great flexibility to rationalize their behavior as consistent with their 
obligations. �ut when society announces its belief that a concrete 
behavior is required of parents, rationalization becomes more diffi­
cult.232 If one accepts that being a good parent requires something, 
then it is difficult to resist the (apparently) informed judgment of 
others about what child safety requires, at least when one is not 
independently knowledgeable of the precise risks involved. Thus, 
the law expresses a consensus and creates an esteem-based norm 
defining good parental behavior. For some parents, complying with 
the law is then necessary to avoid guilt.233 Even absent external, 
informal enforcement, the law can elicit internal enforcement.234 
232. Still, if one believes that the legislature frequently errs or that the manufacturers of 
child safety seats simply lobbied effectively against an apathetic and poorly informed major­
ity, then one might still rationalize noncompliance with parental obligation. Even so, the law 
then has made rationalization more complex and, for many parents, more difficult. 
233. Consider a thought experiment: An automobile kills a child who was not wearing a 
safety seat in circumstances where the device probably would have prevented death. You 
were the parent/driver. You were completely without fault in causing the accident. Would 
you not expect your sense of guilt over this event to be greater if a recent law had obligated 
you to use a safety seat? Tue enactment of such a Jaw may prompt some parents to consider 
the same morbid thought experiment on their own and to decide to comply so that if the 
worst of events should occur, they will have some peace of mind that they did what they 
could to prevent it. 
234. The examples in this section all involve the expressive effect of a new legislative 
prohibition or proscription. Legislative tinkering with existing statutes - enactments com­
mitting new resources to the investigation of violations, raising sanctions, or expanding the 
scope of the prohibition or proscription - may also regulate norms. These changes may 
signal that the consensus has strengthened, that the approval or disapproval of the regulated 
conduct is broader or deeper than when the legislature originally acted. Reforms of drunk 
driving Jaws, for example, might exploit the expressive function; even if higher maximum 
penalties do not raise the average prison sentence, they might signal stronger disapproval of 
the activity. See Grasmick et al., supra note 114, at 61-62. 
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C. Norm Efficiency and the Problem of Excessive Conformity 
Economic theorists explicitly debate the likely efficiency of 
norms.235 Robert Ellickson defends the thesis that group norms 
tend to maximize the welfare of the group in which they arise.236 
Similarly, Cooter claims that norms arise when there is a unani­
mous signal of consensus as to the appropriate behavior, which typ­
ically occurs only when a behavior benefits the group as a whole.237 
Both theorists note several qualifications to their claim - for ex­
ample, that group norms may benefit the group by harming those 
outside the group - but both are fairly optimistic about norms.238 
Other theorists are less sanguine. Russell Hardin, for example, 
claims that the most common and powerful group norms are norms 
of "exclusion," the very norms that benefit the group at the expense 
of those excluded.239 Eric Posner bases his skepticism about norm 
efficiency on the pervasive problems of information and strategic 
behavior that sometimes cause market failure.240 
235. See generally Posner, supra note 102. By efficiency, the literature sometimes means 
Pareto Optimality because the norm makes some or all in the group better off and no one 
worse off. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILUAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 966 (13th ed. 
1989). Even though everyone may prefer to be allowed to violate the norm while everyone 
else obeys it, no one prefers not having the norm and many prefer having it. But whenever 
the norm imposes net costs on some individuals, the efficiency claim is then - explicitly or 
implicitly - based on the more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criteria - that those who benefit 
from the norm gain sufficiently that they could, although they need not, compensate those 
who lose from it, when the benefits and losses are measured by willingness-to-pay. See 
Eorrn STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 279-80 (1978). 
Obviously, one can use other moral theories to evaluate particular norms. I use Kaldor­
Hicks efficiency criteria as a rough measure of utility maximization, but with the caveat that 
in some contexts, wealth disparities render willingness-to-pay an inaccurate guide to utility. 
236. "[M]embers of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves 
to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one 
another." ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 167. 
237. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224. 
238. James Coleman's thesis is similar. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 249-58. 
239. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 107. Exclusionary norms define the boundaries of the 
group. 
240. See Posner, supra note 102, at 1711-25. See also Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (using the concept of a 
network extemality to show how commercial norms may be suboptimal); Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
647 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SET­
TLE DISPUTES (1991)) (criticizing Ellickson's claim that norms tend to promote group wel­
fare). In addition, David Chamy observes that when norms arise from centralized processes 
within formal organizations - such as industry-wide trade associations - they are likely to 
be plagued by the inefficiencies that public choice theory attributes to legislative rulemaking. 
See Chamy, supra note 16, at 1848. In the end, however, Chamy says that he is 
skeptical that economic analysis can generate, through notions such as 'efficiency,' a 
useful set of social judgments about norms. There are simply too many unobservable 
variables, particularly those that bear on the 'noneconomic' motivations and preferences 
that must play a role in the start-up and the effectiveness of complex sanctioning 
systems. 
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Though the esteem model by no means resolves the debate over 
norm efficiency, it sheds some light on the subject, providing addi­
tional reasons for pessimism. In this section, I briefly summarize 
what existing· efficiency analysis predicts about esteem norms and 
then identify two reasons that the drive for esteem uniquely pro­
duces certain kinds of inefficient norms. At either a group or socie­
tal level, esteem competition can produce both unnecessary "nosy" 
norms and excessive levels of conformity. 
Initially, one might expect esteem norms to exist only when they 
benefit the population in which they arise. The first condition for 
an esteem-based norm is a consensus that some behavior merits es­
teem or disesteem. Section 11.A.2 identified reasons why individu­
als would tend to reach a consensus that served their own general 
ends: selfish esteem allocation, voice, and exit.241 Selfish esteem al­
location means individuals tend to esteem people for acts that bene­
fit them more than for acts that harm them. Thus, if a behavior has 
either beneficial or harmful externalities, and each individual recog­
nizes this fact, the resulting esteem allocation - rewarding behav­
ior with positive externalities and punishing behavior with negative 
externalities - will produce norms that benefit the whole.242 Voice 
merely adds the fact that individuals do not make esteem decisions 
in a vacuum but rather discuss the esteem worthiness of behavior 
with others. Thus, one individual's recognition of the relevant ex­
ternalities may be communicated to others. Finally, exit may favor 
efficient norms: if individuals can leave unsuccessful groups or soci­
eties, then evolutionary pressures will reward groups or societies 
with efficient norms.243 
Each of these mechanisms, however, is subject to significant lim­
itations. First, selfish esteem allocation will produce efficient norms 
only if individuals correctly perceive the external costs or benefits 
of a particular behavior. Others have observed that informational 
problems will sometimes prevent this understanding and produce 
inefficient norms.244 Second, though voice or discussion allows indi­
viduals to pool their information and insight, the result could be a 
Charny, supra note 16, at 1857-58. 
241. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96. 
242. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 249-58; Pettit, supra note 2, at 744. 
243. In evolutionary tenns, groups are hosts for competing nonns. The number of groups 
using a nonn and the size of those groups increase as long as the nonn provides the group a 
return that exceeds the average for nearby groups. Individuals in groups with below-average 
returns exit their group to join groups with above-average returns or to fonn new groups 
emulating those with above-average returns. See Axelrod, supra note 2, at 1097-98. 
244. See Posner, supra note 102, at 1711-13. Though people need not consciously per­
ceive the technical dynamics of a collective action problem, if they fail to recognize the ad-
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worse decision rather than a better one.245 When disagreement 
arises, there is no guarantee that the individual with the better 
grasp of the situation will be the one whom others find persua­
sive.246 Third, evolutionary pressures are subject to a host of 
problems, the most significant of which is that they work to achieve 
only local and not global maxima.247 
vantage of cooperation, they will not produce a norm that solves it. They also may perceive a 
problem where none exists and produce an unnecessary and inefficient norm. 
245. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GRoUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF PouCY DE­
CISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 (1983) (claiming that the desire for agreement within cohesive 
groups can override judgment and cause bad decisions); Posner, supra note 102, at 1713-19 
(discussing strategic problems that arise regarding norms when individuals in a group have 
different interests in the behavior at issue). 
246. There is a political model that addresses the question of whether groups make better 
or worse decisions than individuals. Condorcet's Jury Theorem predicts that "under certain 
conditions a majority of a group, with limited information about a pair of alternatives, is 
more likely to choose the 'better' alternative than any one member of the group." Krishna 
K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. Poi_ 
ScI. 617, 617 (1992). Condorcet meant the theorem as a defense of democratic decisionmak­
ing; recent work attempts to determine whether the conditions under which it holds apply to 
legislatures. One could ask the same question about the processes producing norms. 
The theorem's conditions are as follows: Assume that (1) a group is choosing between 
two alternatives; (2) one alternative is unambiguously better for every member of the group 
than the other; (3) no member knows with certainty which is the better alternative; ( 4) the 
probability of a member voting for the better alternative is statistically independent of the 
votes of other members; and (5) for each member, the probability of voting for the correct 
alternative is greater than 50%. Under these circumstances, the probability that the majority 
picks the correct alternative is larger than the probability that any one member picks the 
correct alternative and approaches certainty as the size of the majority gets large. The point 
is entirely statistical: If a weighted coin lands heads with a probability of 51 % and is flipped 
an odd number of times, then the probability that the majority outcome is heads is greater 
than 51 %. Similarly, if the probability that a given individual is correct is 51 %, and the 
majority exceeds the minority by 20 votes, the probability the majority is correct is 69%. See 
lain McLean & Fiona Hewitt, Introduction, in CONDORCET. FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND POUTICAL THEORY 3, 36 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds., 1994). 
Under an esteem theory, norms arise as the result of many individual decisions to favor a 
particular rule. In a sense, individuals (initially) "vote" for a norm. Thus, with imperfect 
information, if the average individual has a better-than-even chance of making the correct 
choice, the resulting norm is even more likely to be efficient. This result complicates the 
claim that imperfect information impedes the creation of efficient norms. Even so, the impli­
cations for efficiency are not genuinely optimistic. There are many restrictions on the theo­
rem, and these limits explain why norms might be inefficient. For example, the theorem 
assumes that the choice is between only two alternatives and that, with perfect knowledge, 
everyone would prefer the same alternative. The theorem also assumes that individual votes 
are statistically independent. If votes instead are correlated, so that one voter tends to be 
correct when the others are correct and wrong when the others are wrong, then the theo­
rem's conclusions do not hold. "Votes" regarding norms are likely to be highly correlated, 
especially within small groups. Because norm "votes" are public, the esteem theory suggests 
that once a particular outcome seems probable, people may vote that way to avoid disap­
proval from what they expect will be a majority. 
247. If the first steps toward the efficient norm (a "global maximum") cause a decline in 
group welfare, then the groups making such a change may be abandoned before they reach 
the point of increasing returns. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1687-88. Similarly, for some 
norms, efficiency will depend greatly on how many people in a group or society follow the 
norm rule; in such cases, there will be no advantage to incremental adoption of the efficient 
norm and no reason to suppose that a decentralized process will induce a sufficient number 
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Regardless of the outcome of this analysis, the esteem model 
predicts two new and specific ways in which norms will be ineffi­
cient. Esteem competition will sometimes produce norms that are 
entirely unnecessary and will sometimes produce a level of norm 
compliance that is excessive. One of the virtues of the esteem 
model of norms is that it predicts some of the inefficient norm­
based behaviors that are otherwise difficult to explain. 
1. Unnecessary Norms: The Problem of Needless Conformity 
Collective action problems arise because of a gap between the 
behavior that maximizes an individual's welfare and the behavior 
that maximizes the group's welfare.248 Norms engage rational 
choice theorists because they offer potential solutions to such 
problems. When the gap occurs, norms may add incentives that 
cause individual self interest to align with group interest. Given this 
framework, the efficiency debate tends to focus on two issues: (1) 
how often norms actually make this alignment occur, given infor­
mational and strategic problems, and (2) whether society wants the 
group to achieve the alignment, given that group welfare and social 
welfare may also not align. Largely omitted from this debate is the 
possibility that norms arise when there never was any gap - when 
there is no collective action problem to solve, either well or badly. 
The existing debate ignores the danger of simply unnecessary 
norms.249 
If esteem competition is the source of norms, norms will not 
arise only because a group "needs" them. People are opinionated. 
They tend to think well or badly of others for all sorts of reasons. 
All kinds of judgments can produce a norm. When the norm does 
not arise to solve a collective action problem, the norms are neces­
sarily inefficient because the costs incurred in obeying and enforc­
ing such norms produce no social benefit. Two examples will help 
make the point. 
to adopt the rule all at once. See Klausner, supra note 240, at 774-88; see also Kraus, supra 
note 27, at 392408 (explaining how evolutionary pressures create commercial nonns that are 
often better than individual learning but still suboptimal); Posner, supra note 102, at 1707-10, 
1723-24 (discussing reasons why evolutionary processes may not achieve efficiency). 
248. See supra note 25. 
249. Coleman's analysis seems to foreclose completely this possibility, because he de­
scribes nonns as arising only when "demanded" by the need to control externalities. Cole­
man says nonns arise when the positive or negati"'.e "externalities of an action . . .  cannot be 
overcome by simple transactions that would put control of the action in the hands of those 
experiencing the externalities." COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 251, 249-60 (discussing "The First 
Condition: Externalities of Actions and the Demand for a Nonn"). 
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First, an individual will frequently approve of those who obtain 
the sort of ends that she seeks. If people who seek material wealth 
grant esteem according to how much material wealth others accu­
mulate, the resulting norms may be inefficient.250 Imagine a world 
where the market works smoothly to supply individuals with opti­
mal incentives for behavior; material benefits induce individuals to 
work at the efficient level. A consensus that pecuniary success mer­
its esteem may produce norms obligating individuals to reach the 
prevailing standard of wealth; the group shames those who fail to 
achieve the standard and honors those who earn higher amounts. 
Because the market was previously efficient, this norm is needless 
and inefficient. To earn honor and avoid shame, individuals now 
work more. Their greater sacrifice of leisure is wasted because: (1) 
the material incentives had previously induced the efficient level of 
work, and (2) additional income only raises the average standard of 
living, thus ensuring that the esteem benefits for new pecuniary suc­
cesses are matched by esteem losses for new pecuniary failures.251 
A more general example involves other-regarding preferences. 
While a person's preference for her own consumption is self-regard­
ing, a preference is other-regarding when it is directed toward the 
consumption decisions of another.252 Though economic theorists 
frequently discuss only the self-regarding preferences at issue in a 
given context, nothing in the efficiency criteria requires discounting 
other-regarding preferences.253 Many believe, however, that the 
former preferences tend to be stronger than the latter. When this is 
250. See generally ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING TiiE RIGHT PoND (1985); THORSTEIN VEB­
LEN, THE THEORY OF TiiE LEISURE CLASS (1899). 
251. See McAdams, supra note 78, at 48-59. A crucial feature of this example is that the 
esteemed trait is valued only in relative terms. There is no esteem given to one who earns a 
$50,000 income except according to how that income compares to the average. 
252. Of course, another's consumption may interfere with one's own consumption, as 
when two children fight over the last cookie. A preference is not other-regarding unless it 
necessarily concerns the consumption of others. As I have commented elsewhere: 
A person's desire to dnve at high speeds and not to eat broccoli are self-regarding pref­
erences because the preference may be satisfied without any other individual engaging 
in an act of consumption. Conversely, the preference that others avoid reading Madame 
Bovary or that others eat sufficient food to live are necessarily not satisfied unless other 
people engage or refrain from engaging in certain consumptive activities. 
McAdams, supra note 78, at 7-8; cf. Robert A. Pollak, Interdependent Preferences, 66 AM. 
EcoN. REV. 309, 309 (1976) (asserting that "interdependent preferences" are "preferences 
which depend on other people's consumption"). 
253. For example, Calabresi and Melamed imagine that "moralisms" - their term for 
certain other-regarding preferences - could justify legal rules of inalienability, like a ban on 
selling human kidneys. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liabil­
ity Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra� 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1112 (1972); 
see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 931, 937-49, 959-65 (1985). 
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true, and when self- and other-regarding preferences are mutually 
exclusive, satisfying the latter would clearly be inefficient. For this 
reason, economists often object to state-enforced prohibitions that 
they perceive as nothing more than an electoral majority imposing 
its other-regarding preferences on an electoral minority. Examples 
include bans on interracial marriage or sodomy. The problem the 
esteem model identifies is that, even without state enforcement, ma­
jorities may impose their other-regarding preferences on minorities 
through norms, even when doing so is not efficient.254 
To illustrate, suppose that in a close-knit neighborhood com­
posed of 100 adults, each adult has some set of consistent self­
regarding and other-regarding preferences. By consistent I mean 
that, for some behavior, what they prefer for themselves, they pre­
fer for others.255 Thus, eighty neighbors prefer not to date mem­
bers of other races and also prefer that others not date members of 
a different race; eighty prefer that in their own marriage, or mar­
riage-to-be, the woman takes the man's surname and also believe 
that married women generally should do so; and eighty prefer not 
to eat meat and prefer that others not do so. In each case, the re­
maining twenty have contrary preferences: they desire interracial 
dates and prefer that others are so inclined; they prefer that the 
woman in their marriage keep her surname and that married 
women generally do so; they eat meat and prefer that others are 
carnivorous. Finally, assume that each person's preference con­
cerning her own consumption is so strong compared to her prefer­
ences for the consumption of others that the efficient outcome is for 
all individuals to "suit themselves." That would be the case, for 
example, with the following values:256 (1) each person would pay 
$100 to satisfy her self-regarding preference for dating, naming, or 
diet; (2) each person would pay one dollar to satisfy her other­
regarding preference on these matters, by inducing one neighbor to 
behave in accord with it. Thus, if transaction costs were zero, the 
254. The mere fact that a norm enforces other-regarding preferences does not mean it 
must be inefficient. It is possible that satisfying the majority's strong other-regarding prefer­
ences by deterring the minority from satisfying its weak self-regarding preferences produces 
an efficiency gain. 
255. The point made here does not depend upon everyone having such consistent prefer­
ences. Even if only some of the majority who prefer X for themselves also prefer X for 
others, they may impose their other-regarding preferences if their population is still larger 
than the minority and the other conditions exist. But I make the textual example numerically 
simpler with the consistency assumption. 
256. Here is a good point to note again that I use Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a rough 
guide to utility, which would probably be accurate in this context if these neighbors have 
more or less equal wealth. 
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most any person would be offered to refrain from satisfying her self­
regarding preference is eighty dollars - the amount the eighty in 
the majority would offer to one in the minority - too little to in­
duce any of the minority to forego interracial dating or meat, or to 
enter a marriage where the woman took the man's surname. 
In these situations, there is no need for a norm, yet norms can 
arise. Consider interracial dating. Given selfish esteem allocation 
and the majority's other-regarding preference, the majority will 
likely esteem those who date only their own race over those who 
date interracially. There is only a short step between most people 
preferring that others behave a certain way and a consensus that 
such behavior merits esteem.257 Assume that this consensus is 
made public through gossip and that everyone knows it is very 
probable that neighbors will, without bearing monitoring costs for 
that purpose, detect whether others date interracially. Even though 
the eighty-person majority is willing to pay no more than eighty 
dollars to change the behavior of any member of the twenty-person 
minority, the esteem comp�tition may give the majority greater lev­
erage. If each neighbor values the disesteem created by violating 
the other-regarding preferences of one neighbor at, say, $1.50, then 
losing the esteem of eighty neighbors is a $120 cost, more than 
enough to induce a neighbor to forgo satisfying a preference she 
values at $100, given a detection risk of over eighty-three percent. 
Even if the only sanction is disesteem, the norm may be sufficient 
to obligate neighbors to forego interracial dating. The minority 
then conforms to the majority's other-regarding preference, 
although the minority loses $2,000 and the majority gains only 
$1,600.258 Thus, the group is better off without this "nosy" norm 
than with it.259 
257. But there is a step, because it is possible that a group has norms of tolerance pre­
cisely to avoid turning other-regarding preferences into binding norms. See supra text ac­
companying note 194. 
258. Each of the 80 in the majority gains $20 from having each of the 20 in the minority 
comply, while each of the twenty loses $100 from compliance. Thus, the group would benefit 
if some obstacle blocked the conditions for creating this norm - including a contrary norm 
of tolerance, discussed infra text accompanying note 265. Of course, the minority receives a 
$2,400 esteem benefit by complying with the norm, but this comes entirely from avoiding a 
threat of disesteem that would not exist in the absence of the norm. 
259. Katz provides an entirely different reason to expect needless conformity. See Katz, 
supra note 97, at 1750-51. An individual may generally signal how constrained she is by 
social norms - in my terms, how much she values esteem - by visibly conforming with any 
particular norm. Thus, she may conform to a norm where compliance is highly visible in 
order to signal that she is also likely to conform to norms where compliance is less visible. At 
Katz puts it, individuals may obey a norm "they do not respect" in order to signal conformity 
with norms "they do [respect]." See id. at 1751. One might add that group norms may arise 
exactly for this reason, as a test for determining whether each individual sufficiently values 
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The same dynamic can also produce a nosy naming norm and a 
nosy diet norm in this neighborhood. In general, norms may im­
pose needless conformity when a majority turns its weak other­
regarding preferences into social obligations.260 The majority gains 
little from changing the minority behavior and not enough to offset 
the minority's loss, but selfish esteem allocation still produces the 
norm because esteem provides them a "free" resource for inducing 
conformity. The resulting norms are unnecessary and inefficient. 
Note that the majorities do not necessarily consist of the same 
individuals for each behavior. Thus, with a sufficient number of 
overlapping nosy norms, everyone may be in the minority on some 
issue and there may be no one in the neighborhood completely free 
from such constraints. Indeed, strictly speaking, a majority is not 
even necessary to create a norm because of the differing value 
placed on the esteem of different individuals.261 The opinion of 
those who are highly esteemed tends to be valued more than the 
opinion of those who receive low esteem. Thus, high-status individ­
uals will have relatively more influence on the creation of new 
norms. If wealth is generally respected, for example, the wealthy 
will have disproportionate power in creating norms, including nosy 
norms. This fact may help explain norms that apply to and burden 
women for the benefit of men. Though men do not constitute a 
numerical majority, they are a very large minority that possesses 
disproportionate wealth and other indicia of status.262 
The above examples of nosy norms are controversial ones in the 
1990s, but the analysis applies to behaviors that may seem rather 
trivial - whether one prefers bowling or chess, short hair or long, 
wood :floors or carpet, and so on. If the dynamic identified occurs 
over a wide range of behaviors, the accumulation of trivial con-
the esteem of fellow group members. See Laurence R. Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: 
Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 271, 274-
76 (1992). But it is not clear that this kind of conformity is inefficient. If a visible test reliably 
predicts compliance with a norm for which violations are more difficult to detect, and the 
latter norm benefits the $roup, then the group may be better off having the former norm. 
260. Note that the problem is entirely one of differing interests in the norm and not lack 
of information; the norm arises in the above examples even with perfect information. 
261. A majority consensus is not strictly necessary for a second reason: differing intensi­
ties of disapproval. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
262. Recall that the origin of these norms cannot be explained by Cooter's internalization 
model. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. Of course, the esteem theory does not 
explain how men initially acquired greater status. The historical explanation is beyond the 
scope of this article, though it undoubtedly includes historic restrictions that prevented 
women from acquiring wealth or political power. My point, however, is that once the dispar­
ity in status arises, disapproval from men is more costly (to men and women) than disap­
proval from women. At this point, selfish esteem allocation is sufficient to produce norms 
obligating women to behave in ways that benefit men. 
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straints could produce a very restrictive and seriously inefficient set 
of nosy norms. This implication explains the complaint that some 
societies are too "conformist."263 For example, John Stuart Mill, 
though remembered chiefly as a critic of governmental interference 
with liberty, recognized an equal threat to liberty from public opin­
ion and custom, in other words, from norms: 
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is 
still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of 
the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when so­
ciety is itself the tyrant - society collectively over the separate indi­
viduals who compose it - its means of tyrannizing are not restricted 
to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. 
Society can and does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong 
mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which 
it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable 
than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually up­
held by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, pene­
trating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the 
soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate 
is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the 
prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to im­
pose, by other mean� than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices 
as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . . . [That pro­
tection] is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as 
protection against political despotism.264 
It is not entirely clear what "protection" Mill had in mind, but 
he certainly meant to include norms of tolerance. In the United 
States, norms of individuality, among other things, advocate toler­
ance of individual differences. These norms may be understood as 
a check on the tendency of nosy norms to impose needless con-
263. As John Stuart Mill noted: 
In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, everyone lives as 
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others, 
but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask themselves, 
what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would 
allow the best and highest in me to have fair play and enable it to grow and thrive? They 
ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my 
station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of 
a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is 
customary in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to 
have any inclination except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the 
yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they 
like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done; peculiarity of 
taste, eccentricity of conduct are shunned equally with crimes, until by dint of not fol­
lowing their nature they have no nature to follow . • . .  
JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (Hacket Publishing 1978). 
264. Id. at 4-5. Thus, when Mill states his principle of liberty - that prevention of harm 
to others is the only legitimate reason to interfere with an individual's liberty - he explicitly 
includes as interference not only "physical force in the form of legal penalties" but also "the 
moral coercion of public opinion." Id. o 
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formity.265 Another form of protection is governmental self­
restraint. Given the power law has to strengthen norms by expres­
sing them through legislation, we can expect majorities to seek leg­
islation to bolster nosy norms.266 Even entirely symbolic legislation 
- laws with no material enforcement - may significantly affect the 
power of such norms. Constitutional restraints on purely symbolic 
legislation may be necessary to prevent majorities from using 
the state to strengthen nosy norms.267 One example is the "no­
endorsement" interpretation of the Establishment Clause.26s Be-
265. That tolerance nonns serve this function does not mean that they are necessarily 
efficient. As explained in the next section, a norm may encourage an initially useful activity 
beyond an optimal level; the harm from excessive amounts of the activity could exceed the 
harm from insufficient amounts that occur without the norm. A norm could encourage a 
form of tolerance to the point where a group or society would be better off without it. 
266. Although majorities can enforce nosy norms solely by the allocation of esteem, with­
out the need for state assistance, it can surely bind minorities more effectively with such aid. 
Joseph Gusfield observes: "Affirmation through law and governmental acts expresses the 
public worth of one subculture's norms relative to those of others, demonstrating which cul­
tures have legitimacy and public domination. Accordingly, it enhances the social status of 
groups carrying the affirmed culture and degrades groups carrying that which is condemned 
as deviant." Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designat­
ing Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REv. 54, 58 (1968). 
267. In other words, the problem of nosy norms means that it is not sufficient to restrain 
the state's tendency to overuse its powers of coercive regulation. If majorities can constrain 
minorities through norms, and the state can strengthen norms by the expressive power of 
law, then the democratic state will also tend to overuse its powers of expression. Lessig is 
correct, in my view, in claiming that government cannot avoid establishing orthodoxy. See 
Lessig, supra note 11, at 946-47, 1034-36. My point is simply that constitutional doctrines are 
and should be sensitive to majority misuse of this function. 
268. Some members of the Supreme Court hold that the Establishment Clause bars the 
government from action that "endorses" religion. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the 
Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2126-28 (1996) (discussing 
history of the endorsement test in Supreme Court Establishment Clause opinions in recent 
years). I express no opinion on the proper interpretation of the Establishment Clause or the 
particular formulation of "endorsement" the Court employs. For criticisms, see Michael W. 
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127-34 (1992); Steven 
D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No 
Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987). I only note that the theory presented here 
generally supports placing some limits on the expressive power of law and that religion is an 
area in which majorities might wish to use that power to create or strengthen nosy norms (as 
I define them). 
Equal protection law.may also be viewed as limiting the use of the expressive power of 
law to enforce nosy nonns regarding race or gender. Some gender cases explicitly ask 
whether the statute or governmental action signals approval or disapproval of existing gender 
stereotypes. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1994) ("When state actors 
exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce 
prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women . . • .  The message it sends • . .  is 
that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state 
actors to decide important questions . . . •  "); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 729-30 (1982) ("By assuring that Mississippi allots more openings in its state-supported 
nursing schools to women than it does to men, MUW's admissions policy lends credibility to 
the old view that women, not men, should become nurses . . • •  "). But see supra note 217 
(quibbling withJ.E.B.). Obviously, one can also view Brown v. Board of Education, 341 U.S. 
483 (1954), as condemning Jim Crow segregation because it expressed the superiority of 
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low, I argue for an additional "protection" from nosy norms -
legal entitlements to privacy. 
2. Zealous Norms: The Problem of Excessive Conformity 
Even when a norm arises in response to a collective action prob­
lem, the esteem theory predicts a second kind of inefficiency. The 
efficiency of a norm depends not only on whether it commands the 
efficient kind of behavior, but whether it commands the efficient 
level of that behavior.269 Esteem competition may produce too 
much individual effort to address a collective-action problem.270 
In general, once a norm arises that obligates individuals to en­
gage in some level of behavior X, esteem competition can raise the 
level of X beyond the optimal point. This point was implicit in sec­
tion H.B. In the recycling example, esteem competition raised the 
average contribution to recycling. When A, B, and C each knew 
that their esteem would depend, in part, on how much they contrib­
uted relative to the others, and when each could observe how much 
the others contributed, contributions to recycling escalated. There 
is no reason to suppose the equilibrium contribution matches the op-
Whites and thereby supported racial caste norms. See, e.g., Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawful­
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-26 (1960). 
269. Elster provides a simple example of a norm causing an inefficiently high level of an 
otherwise efficient behavior: "A group of friends who are cleaning up after a party might 
actually finish the job faster if some of them relax instead with a drink, but the norm against 
free riding might overwhelm considerations of efficiency." ELSTER, supra note 2, at 190. He 
concludes: "In situations that lack a coercive institution, the norm of fairness could drive 
cooperation beyond the optimal point." Id. at 191. Given Elster's view of norms as not 
being "outcome oriented," see id. at 98, he does not attribute the problem to esteem competi­
tion or any other individually rational motivation. 
270. James Coleman uses a motive like esteem to explain "zeal," that is, to explain why 
an individual sometimes contributes more to a group activity than she does to a comparable 
individual activity. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 273-76. Coleman's example is team 
sports, where he observes that despite the incentives for free riding - individuals bear all the 
costs of practice and exertion but share the benefits of victory - "team members often work 
harder than do participants in individual sports activities." Id. at 274. Coleman explains zeal 
as arising because team members offer each other "encouragement" or "gratitude," which 
provides a new incentive for working harder. See id. at 277. 
To some degree, this subsection uses Coleman's idea to explain Elster's observation, see 
supra note 269, about inefficient norms. Encouragement and gratitude are obviously expres­
sions of what I call esteem. But where Coleman begins by saying they cost the bestower 
"very little," id., I begin with the claim that these expressions - along with expressions and 
inferences of disapproval - are sometimes costless. In addition, though Coleman says zeal 
may produce an "excess" of contributions, see id. at 277, he does not link this point to his 
discussion of norm inefficiency. See id. at 260-64. Insteap, he thinks pure "conjoint" norms 
- in which each group member potentially benefits from and is obligated to follow the norm 
- are efficient. See id. at 247 (defining conjoint norm); id. at 260 (suggesting efficiency of all 
pure conjoint norms). To the contrary, however, my textual examples suggest that such 
norms can be inefficient. See infra text accompanying notes 274-84. 
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timal contribution.271 In the example, A, B, and C each contributed 
slightly less than four dollars to recycling; in equilibrium, anything 
less would cause them to lose four dollars in status. Yet this four 
dollars bears no relationship to the optimal contribution. It could 
be more or less. 
One may ask why individuals correctly perceive the optimal 
kind of behavior, but do not also correctly perceive and enforce the 
optimal level of that behavior? Ex ante, the answer is information 
costs. Although individuals may know enough to perceive that 
some behavior is efficient - a realization that eventually produces 
a norm - they could easily lack sufficient information to determine 
either how much behavior is optimal or how much behavior esteem 
allocation will ultimately produce. Given that the initial problem is 
too little of the activity, this ignorance can cause individuals to es­
teem others strictly according to their level of the activity - for 
example, the amount they clean up or the amount they recycle. In 
equilibrium, this esteem allocation may then produce excessive in­
vestment in the activity. 
Now an ex post question arises: Once the norm becomes harm­
ful, why do individuals not recognize as much and scale down the 
norm? Here, the problem is strategic. Once the norm exists, there 
is a price to norm criticism. For strong norms, secondary enforce­
ment norms will typically require punishing anyone who challenges 
the primary norm.272 Thus, esteem competition can make very 
costly any individual behavior designed to "brake" the escalation of 
norm enforcement.273 Inefficiently high norm activity levels may 
therefore be an equilibrium. 
Return to the recycling example. Suppose the optimal contribu­
tion is $3 per person. Not recognizing this fact or not knowing what 
271. See Posner, supra note 123, at 589. For the group, the optimal contribution to re· 
cycling is the point at which any further contributions create more total social costs than total 
social benefits. But escalation ends, and an equilibrium is achieved, only when the private 
cost of further recycling is greater than the private benefits of the esteem it would produce or 
the disesteem it would avoid. 
272. See supra notes 103, 192 and accompanying text. It might be possible for a group to 
avoid this problem by enforcing "tolerance" or free speech norms that permit some dissent. 
See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
273. Despite the potentfal for excess, norm enforcement frequently reaches equilibrium 
before the actual contribution equals the optimal contribution. In this case, the group is 
better off with the esteem competition than without it, though the group will be better off still 
if it can elicit further contributions. Even when the equilibrium standard exceeds the optimal 
standard, the norm may improve group welfare. The norm becomes harmful to the group 
only if the cost of excessive contributions - "overshooting" the optimum - is greater than 
the cost of insufficient contributions falling below the optimum. But the esteem model of 
norms predicts that this form of inefficiency will sometimes occur. 
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contribution aggregate esteem production will elicit, individuals al­
locate esteem in the manner described, and the average contribu­
tion to recycling rises to $3.50. At this point, some community 
members may first realize that this level is excessive. But this rec­
ognition will not necessarily correct the norm, nor even slow a fur­
ther rise in average contributions. Secondary enforcement norms 
may deter individuals from criticizing the excessiveness of the 
norm. Even if one individual recognizes that $3.50 is too high a 
contribution, she may be unwilling to say so because unless her crit­
icism is instantly persuasive, she will be sanctioned for failing to 
condemn - indeed for implicitly praising - those who contribute 
less than the present, average amount. Those who advocate· "mod­
eration" of escalating norm compliance sometimes succeed only in 
providing the norm's most zealous advocates further opportunity to 
raise the level of norm compliance by condemning those who advo­
cate moderation.274 Without effective criticism, everyone may con­
tinue to contribute the $3.50 even if the group would be better off 
without any recycling norm and even if many in the group recog­
nize as much.275 
Consider two further examples. One is a code of silence, such as 
the one forbidding police officers from disclosing the misdeeds of 
other officers.276 Obviously, some code of silence serves the inter-
274. Michael Klarman describes this phenomenon on a much larger scale. See Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 97-129 
(1994). He recounts how, in the wake of Brown, white Southern politicians condemned mod­
eration and "struggled against one another to occupy the most extreme position on the racial 
spectrum." Id. at 98. Yet this backlash, he claims, produced the federal civil rights legislation 
entirely contrary to the interests of those politicians' constituents. See id. at 129-49. 
275. There is a second way excessive conformity may be an equilibrium, though only in 
the weaker sense that the group would gain from less conformity but is still better off with the 
norm than without it. Discontinuities in the activity the norm governs may force the group to 
choose between too little and too much of the activity. Assume, for example, that people can 
recycle only in units of $2, the average cost for holding one collection container for the rele­
vant time and then properly disposing of its contents. If the optimal level is an average of $3 
per person per time period, it is unlikely that decentralized esteem decisions can produce the 
precise esteem differential between $2 contributors and $4 contributors to maintain an equal 
number of each. 
The most promising solution would be to "take turns," where everyone alternates be­
tween $2 and $4 contributions. But such norms only sometimes solve the problem. When 
the group switches to tum taking, the risk of detecting a norm violation falls because detec­
tion requires keeping track of another's behavior in the prior as well as the current time 
period. Especially in a large group, the difference will sometimes be decisive, as the expected 
sanction falls below the benefit of the violation. In these cases, the group must choose 
among norms requiring the same behavior of every person in every time period. But because 
of the discontinuity, there is no such behavior that leads to the optimal outcome. Thus, if the 
group gains more from above-optimal than below-optimal contributions, the inefficient norm 
will remain an equilibrium. In general, when the optimal norm is too complex to enforce 
effectively, under- or overinclusiveness is inevitable. 
276. See supra note 42 (discussing police and doctor codes of silence). 
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ests of the group. Up to a point, the members of a group will bene­
fit by secrecy norms that protect members from being sanctioned 
for harming nonmembers. But this is true only up to a point, be­
cause nonmembers may eventually respond to cooperative silence 
in ways that harm the group as a whole. For example, the Mollen 
Commission, which investigated police corruption in New York, re­
ported that "most honest cops will not report serious corruption" 
even though "they despise corrupt cops and silently hope that they 
will be removed from the ranks. "277 The Report continues: "It is 
not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off the job. 
The consequences of corruption for honest cops are grave: it taints 
their reputations, destroys their morale, and, most important, jeop­
ardizes their safety."278 In other words, serious corruption among 
police officers damages the reputation of all police officers; officers 
who have internalized societal or professional obligations to avoid 
serious criminality are demoralized by working alongside criminals; 
and citizens who are victimized by some police are more likely to be 
hostile and violent toward all police.219 
Esteem competition helps to explain how this excessive norm 
arises. Assume that, initially, most but not all individuals who join 
a police force have internalized norms against serious crime. Even 
a generally law-abiding police officer might forgive and expect 
others to forgive minor crimes by police officers: minor assaults 
that are not legally justified, for example, when an officer "loses" 
his temper and punches a suspect who ran away and caused the 
officer chasing him to injure himself; or when an officer accepts mi­
nor gifts intended to curry favor with the police, such as a single 
free beer at a neighborhood tavern. If the law-abiding officers es­
teem those who conceal information to protect officers in these 
cases, a silence norm will likely arise. Moreover, informing on fel­
low officers is a public activity; the consensus and risk of detection 
are likely to be well-known within a police precinct and because 
police interact intensely in sinall groups, they tend to value highly 
277. Mallen Commission Report, supra note 42, at 56-57 ("[T]he most devastating conse­
quence of the code of silence is that it prevents the vast majority of honest officers from 
doing what they inwardly want to do: help keep their Department corruption free."). 
278. Id. at 57. The report quotes one Internal Affairs report stating that the code "does 
not always reflect solely tolerance for corruption or a misplaced group loyalty. In many 
instances it is motivated purely by self-interest and self-protection: a fear of the consequence 
of breaking the norms of loyalty and silence." Id. at 56. 
279. See id. at 57 (quoting one officer's representative explanation that "I wouldn't want 
to run across a drug dealer who's been ripped off [by cops] one time too many."). 
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the esteem of fellow officers. Initially, the code of silence serves the 
group interest, though it is contrary to society's interests. 
One can easily imagine that police officers do not anticipate 
what the optimal level of silence is in advance, nor what level of 
silence the norm will produce. Thus, they allocate esteem accord­
ing to a simple rule: do not "rat" on fellow officers. Once some 
norm arises, esteem competition may require a code of silence for 
increasing levels of criminality.280 Once enforcement reaches an 
excessive level, it may be too late to correct the problem informally. 
Anyone who advocates informing risks being suspected as an in­
former and treated accordingly. In the end, the norm may prevent 
officers from revealing even the most serious wrongdoing by other 
officers - such as taking bribes, stealing from criminals, or seri­
ously assaulting suspects - even though the ultimate effect on the 
group from such corruption is negative. 
The once-common practice of dueling provides a second exam­
ple of how competitive norm compliance causes inefficiency. Other 
norms theorists note that, in Europe and the United States, dueling 
provided benefits to the aristocrats and upper classes in which the 
custom arose.281 Dueling resolved disputes in a way that preserved 
the honor of both parties. Given rules that minimized the risk of 
death, dueling frequently allowed parties to avoid either a more 
deadly fight or the acceptance of an insult that would undermine 
their social status. Most importantly, dueling ostentatiously distin­
guished the elite classes from the classes that did not and were not 
permitted to duel. Nonetheless, in the decades before dueling was 
abolished, in various places, the costs of dueling grew very high as 
the level of insult necessary to trigger a duel fell over time. Ulti­
mately, dueling reached a point where even the most trivial and 
unintentional slight could compel one to choose between unbear­
able social disgrace and potentially lethal combat. At that point, it 
appears that the costs of the dueling norm exceeded its benefits, 
that the incremental distinction the upper classes gained was no 
longer worth the mortal peril they suffered.2s2 
280. The code itself produces a rise in criminality, particularly by those who have not 
internalized norms against crime, by lowering the risk that corruption is punished. 
281. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 91-100; Elster, supra note 42, at 868; Lessig, supra note 
11, at 968-72; Posner, supra note 102, at 1736-40; Schwartz et al., supra note 20, at 321-25. 
282. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 93, 101-02 (discussing how dueling norms escalated so 
that frivolous affronts were sufficient to cause a duel); Posner, supra note 102, at 1737-39 
(claiming that the practice of dueling outlasted its usefulness, which ended when the state 
acquired a monopoly on the legitimate use of force). 
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As the esteem model explains, though the system initially 
benefitted the group, zealous competition for esteem produced ex­
cessive levels of sacrifice for the norm. The dueling norm arose 
because a certain level of insult among elite men required resolu­
tion. Esteem competition lowered the level of insult needed to trig­
ger the duel. If the optimal trigger for the upper class was t, A 
could credibly claim to have a greater sense of honor by challenging 
others to a duel for insults less than t, or by claiming that those who 
accepted insults less than t lacked honor. In a society that values 
esteem highly, the potential gain to an individual from this strategy 
may, for a time, be quite high, while to criticize escalation of the 
norm may be prohibitively costly.283 Thus, there was no reason for 
the equilibrium duel trigger to match the optimal trigger. Hence, 
the level of insult that triggered a duel fell so low that the group as 
a whole was made worse off because of the norm.284 
In sum, although esteem norms can be efficient, there is no rea­
son to think, on average, that they are. One must evaluate the effi­
ciency of particular norms. The remainder of this Part suggests one 
way that law can impede inefficient norms. 
D. Impeding Inefficient Norms with Privacy Rights 
Some group and societal norms are undesirable, judged by effi­
ciency, the morality of the behavior they compel or forbid, or some 
other normative criteria. When confronted with undesirable norms, 
the state might respond quite directly by prohibiting the behavior 
the norm requires or requiring behavior the norm prohibits.285 But 
the state may also attack norms in less obvious ways, one of which I 
283. As Lessig notes, once one is challenged to a duel, criticizing the nonn by refusing the 
challenge is obviously very costly. See id. at 970. Before one is challenged, the costs are less, 
but then so is the incentive to criticize. 
284. Adolescent behavior provides a final example of nonn escalation. Teens often have 
a very rigid sense of appropriate clothing, music, free-time activity, attitude, and so on. One 
may be tempted to say that the nonns that enforce these (broadly speaking) fashion choices 
are "needless" and for this reason inefficient. But that is not necessarily true. Teenagers may 
gain by having nonns that distinguish them from the adult culture that accords them a lower 
status. By working together in creating teen nonns, including music or clothing norms that 
ostentatiously reject adult standards, teenagers achieve more independence as a group than 
they could individually. Coleman makes exactly this point, see COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 
257-58, though he does not link it to his discussion of "zealotry," see id. at 490-95. Yet even 
though these norms might bring some benefit to the group in which they arise, the level at 
which they are enforced is probably inefficient. When social commentators decry the "peer 
pressure" that induces teenagers to take up smoking or refuse to work hard in school, they 
are identifying a norm that requires "excessive" conformity. The norms that reward these 
behaviors might have initially advanced the welfare of teenagers, but esteem competition 
leads to norms that "excessively" reject adult norms, to the net detriment of the group. 
285. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 10, at 1081-82 (suggesting this rational for Title VII). 
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will explore here. The state might attempt to deprive· individuals of 
the information necessary to norm enforcement - that is, informa­
tion that a consensus exists or that it has been violated in a particu­
lar case. In other words, the law might employ rights of privacy. 
1. The Economics of Privacy and Norms 
Economic theorists are generally skeptical of privacy claims.286 
Unlike protection against defamatory falsehoods, the right to con­
ceal true facts about oneself appears to facilitate fraud - broadly 
understood to include any economic or social deception. Judge 
Richard Posner's view is illustrative.287 He asserts that law should 
protect the privacy of "embarrassing" but not "discrediting" facts. 
Discrediting facts are those that impair reputation in a way that 
"reduces one's opportunities for favorable transactions;" embar­
rassing facts are those that are not discrediting but still "are not part 
of one's constructed public self."288 Because he means "transac­
tions" quite broadly, including all social as well as business transac­
tions, he ultimately favors only a very limited privacy right. For 
example, discrediting information includes the fact that an individ­
ual had a sex-change operation, is a bisexual, or was once a prosti­
tute, for these are "facts about a person that may cause others to 
shun him, whether rightly or wrongly."289 
The esteem theory of norms implies a more complex view of 
privacy. Whether enforced by law or norms, privacy directly affects 
two conditions of norm formation: (1) the publicity of the behav­
ioral consensus, and (2) the risk that violating such a consensus will 
be detected. If most people consider certain realms private, they 
may not discuss them sufficiently to determine whether any consen­
sus exists about what behavior within those realms deserves esteem. 
In other words, privacy may facilitate the false consensus effect290 
286. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978); 
George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
623, 640 (1980) (claiming that "support for the privacy laws remains opaque"). See generally 
Symposium, The Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980). But see Rich­
ard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 
84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2396-2402 (1996). 
287. Judge Posner has written extensively about privacy. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
The Economics of Privacy, AM. ECON. REv., May 1981, at 405; Posner, supra note 286; see 
also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229-35 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.). I 
focus on his most recent writings in RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 531-51 (1995). 
288. POSNER, supra note 287, at 539. 
289. Id. at 539 (stating the sex change and bisexuality examples); see also id. at541 (dis­
approving of Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. App. 1931), which allowed damages for re­
vealing, among other things, that a woman had previously been a prostitute). 
290. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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that impedes norm formation. More obviously, when a consensus is 
known, privacy reduces the risk that an offending act will be de­
tected and thereby makes norm enforcement against such acts more 
difficult. Thus, privacy is a means of norm regulation. When pri­
vacy rights impede an undesirable norm, this effect can provide an 
economic justification for those rights.291 If facts are discrediting in 
Posner's sense because they would cause others to "shun" one who 
violated an inefficient norm, their concealment would likely be 
efficient.292 
At a general level, the probable efficiency of privacy depends on 
the probable inefficiency of norms. The esteem model predicts the 
widespread existence of unnecessary nosy norms by which majori­
ties enforce their other-regarding preferences on minorities.293 Pri­
vacy rights cannot prevent many of these conformity pressures 
because privacy is impractical when the behavior at issue is inher­
ently public. One cannot expect to keep secret facts like one's hair 
style, the exterior of one's home in an urban area, or the nature of 
the clothes one wears when shopping.294 But privacy rights may 
prevent acquisition or dissemination of information that is not nec­
essarily public - as, for example, one's religion or sexuality. In 
these cases, norm formation and enforcement depends on the circu­
lation of information about a consensus and cooperative disclosure 
and gossip by those who acquire evidence of its violation. Privacy 
rights in such areas may impede both discovery of the consensus 
and of its violation, seriously impeding norm formation and en­
forcement. At a general level, then, a complete economic analysis 
of privacy rights must include the possibilities (1) that the area pro­
tected would, without privacy rights, be inefficiently regulated by 
nosy norms;295 and (2) that the area subject to privacy already is 
291. When such rights block an efficient norm, the costs of privacy are even higher than 
previous analyses suggest. 
292. As I indicate below, one would have to weigh the advantage from diminished norm 
enforcement against the disadvantage of losing information for other valuable purposes. 
293. Norms may impose such needless conformity on matters great (for example, reli­
gion), and small (for example, hair style). Conformity on even trivial matters may, by ac­
cumulation, still produce substantial rigidity in behavior, a conformity "penetrating much 
more deeply into the details of life" than can the state. MILL, supra note 263, at 4. 
294. One should therefore expect nosy norms to arise in such contexts. But norms them­
selves provide a possible solution to the problem of inefficient norms. Previously, I discussed 
norms for tolerating norm criticism. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. In some 
groups, a similar tolerance norm recognizes the right to be different in certain respects. 
Whenever someone says something like, "That's his business," they express a norm against 
enforcing one's other-regarding preferences. This norm curtails the problem of unnecessary 
norms, though it may also block desirable norms. 
295. See Murphy, supra note 286, at 2397-98 ("Given anonymity, people will do what they 
want."). 
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regulated by nosy norms, but that inefficient enforcement of the 
norms would increase absent privacy rights. 
There is, however, one other connection between privacy and 
norms, a substantial complication caused by the feedback effect dis­
cussed above.296 Once most individuals in a population believe a 
consensus exists, privacy conceals any changes in the consensus. 
This effect can be quite important. But I defer discussing it in detail 
until the next subsection, where I address all these points in the 
context of a particular example. 
2. An Illustration: Privacy, "Outing, " and Norms of 
Sexual Behavior 
One obvious set of privacy issues concerns sexuality.297 Many 
people harbor significant other-regarding preferences on the sub­
ject of sex - including but not limited to the sex of the partner one 
seeks. In Sex and Reason, Richard Posner characterizes many of 
the arguments for restricting sexual freedom, or at least much of the 
emotion behind such restrictions, as based on these other-regarding 
preferences.298 Expressing skepticism of government regulation 
based on such preferences, he advocates a libertarian approach to 
sexual matters, and rejects, for example, the criminal prohibition of 
prostitution, homosexual acts between consenting adults, and abor­
tion during the early months of pregnancy.299 At least for homo­
sexuality, he also explicitly rejects nonlegal forms of social 
intolerance - that is, societal and group norms against homosexu­
ality .3o0 These are controversial issues, but I will assume the valid­
ity of Posner's argument for sexual freedom in order to criticize his 
efficiency argument against privacy. Given the potential for nosy 
norms that restrict sexual freedom, it would appear that sexual pri­
vacy might undermine the very norms Posner thinks are inefficient. 
To understand my claim, consider Posner's privacy argument in 
more detail. Posner recognizes that many people argue for privacy, 
including sexual privacy, by assuming that those who acquire secret 
information will use it unfairly or unwisely. Thus, he concludes that 
the judges in Melvin v. Reid30l - a case in which the defendants 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18. 
297. Sexual behavior is not inherently public, so nosy sexual norms cannot be enforced 
without cooperative disclosure and gossip. 
298. See RICHARD A. PosNER, SEX AND REASON 201-04 (1992) (stating that disgust is 
often the only basis for sex regulation). 
299. Id. at 441. 
300. Id. at 307-09 (advocating social tolerance of homosexuality). 
301. 297 P. 91 (Cal. App. 1931). 
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had publicized; among other things, that the plaintiff had once been 
a prostitute - "may have felt that people would give too much 
weight to the plaintiff's past in predicting her future behavior."302 
But he rejects this point as "just the kind of paternalistic, and in the 
circumstances none too plausible, attitude toward market behavior 
. . .  that the economist generally thinks an inappropriate basis for 
government regulation."303 In other words, Posner and others have 
confidence that, in equilibrium, the market will "count" past prosti­
tution, and other information, efficiently. If, for example, an em­
ployer wishes to use past prostitution as a proxy to predict the 
future productivity of potential employees, then the market will re­
ward those who weigh the evidence rationally and punish those who 
give it more or less weight than it deserves.304 As for private shun­
ning, Posner implies that if most people treat the information as 
irrelevant, then the "market" in "personal relationships" will pun­
ish an idiosyncratic neighbor or friend who decides to shun the for­
mer prostitute. On the other hand, if most people do shun her, 
Posner condemns as paternalistic a governmental decision to sec­
ond guess this reaction. 
Judge Posner's privacy argument either completely ignores the 
existence of norms or assumes an implausibly strong claim about 
their efficiency.305 In either case, it overlooks the problem of nosy 
norms identified in section IV.C. The shunning he identifies is a 
visible manifestation of denying someone esteem, an enforcement 
mechanism of esteem-based norms. If the norm produced is ineffi­
cient, if it is nosy, there is a straightforward economic argument for 
protecting the privacy of information necessary for norm enforce­
ment. Indeed, individuals are most willing and able to enforce their 
other-regarding preferences precisely within what Posner calls the 
personal relationship "market" - between friends, neighbors, and 
other social acquaintances. This fact is hardly a basis for assuming 
that the use of discrediting information in such markets is efficient. 
302. POSNER, supra note 287, at 541. Another fact the defendant revealed was that the 
plaintiff had been charged with murder but acquitted. I read Posner's rejection of the argu­
ment to apply to both the murder charge and the prostitution. 
303. Id. at 541-42. 
304. As Richard Murphy observes, this analysis is exactly parallel to the economic claim 
that the market will punish employers who discriminate irrationally on the basis of race. See 
Murphy, supra note 286, at 2400; see also GARY s. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMI· 
NATION {1957); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST DISCRIM· 
!NATION LAws (1992). 
305. Not that Judge Posner has actually ignored norms. See Posner, supra note 29. In 
that recent article he specifically notes that privacy impedes norm enforcement, though he 
does not discuss how that may bear on his prior writings on privacy. See id. at 368. 
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Much of Posner's Sex and Reason argues, for example, that soci­
ety would be better off if people did not shun gays and lesbians.306 
Under this analysis, norms obligating heterosexuality are nosy, and 
people use information about other people's sexual orientation in­
efficiently. If Sex and Reason is correct, the same is true of prostitu­
tion and abortion - the economic argument for allowing parties to 
choose these activities implicitly criticizes norms that deter them. 
Posner may be wrong in his defense of prostitution and abortion, 
but if he is right, and if some communities shun prostitutes, their 
customers, abortion providers, and women who obtain abortions, 
then the resulting nosy norms deter efficient conduct. Government 
might respond to these norms by forbidding discrimination (in em­
ployment, housing, etc.) against those involved in these unpopular 
activities. Posner expresses skepticism of this approach as a means 
of protecting gays and lesbians from discriminatory norms.307 But 
he does not consider that expanded legal rights to privacy might 
serve as a legal substitute. Tue ability of gays and lesbians to con­
trol discrediting information, information that leads t.o shunning, 
would substantially undermine the nosy norms they face. Tue same 
holds true for those involved in prostitution or abortion. 
A thorough efficiency analysis must also consider the cost of pri­
vacy: Secrecy means that information necessary to satisfy sel/­
regarding preferences does not freely circulate. Thus, as Posner 
points out, secrecy makes it more difficult for gay men and lesbians 
to find suitable partners. For abortion, secrecy means women do 
not fully share information about abortion providers, a fact that un­
doubtedly diminishes the competitive pressures that typically bene­
fit customers.308 One must weigh the benefits of denying 
information to those who might use it to enforce a nosy norm 
against the costs of denying information to those who would use it 
to satisfy their self-regarding preferences in violation of the norm. 
There are, however, several reasons to think that the benefits of 
privacy predominate. First, the reason for suspecting that a norm 
based on other-regarding preferences is inefficient is the intuition 
306. See POSNER, supra note 298, at 307. He does not attribute all this intolerance to 
state action. Although (largely unenforced) laws against homosexual acts express and 
strengthen norms of heterosexuality, Posner does not think they are necessary to sustain 
them. He notes, for example, that in the Netherlands, a nation much more tolerant of homo­
sexuality than the United States, "decades of official tolerance have not eliminated social 
intolerance." Id. at 307. 
307. See id. at 323. 
308. The same would be true if prostitution were legal: secrecy would deny men informa­
tion about places of prostitution. 
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that self-regarding preferences are much stronger. If so, gays and 
lesbians should bear more search costs to satisfy their self-regarding 
preferences than their adversaries will bear to satisfy their other­
regarding preferences and enforce the prohibitory norm. A small 
increment of additional information costs may severely damage the 
norm while only marginally affecting the market for sexual part­
ners. Second, privacy rights may be waived. Thus, if an individual 
decides the costs of privacy exceed the benefits in a particular con­
text, she can forgo privacy and disclose the information necessary 
to satisfy her self-regarding preference.309 In sum, the case for pri­
vacy rights remains quite plausible.310 
There is, however, a final and important wrinkle, one that un­
derlies the debate over "outing" of gays and lesbians.311 The es­
teem model suggests one circumstance in which the effect of privacy 
could strengthen a norm. Privacy rights may preserve a norm by 
concealing from public view a rising number of norm violations 
that, if known, would weaken the norm . .  This point follows from 
the feedback effect discussed in Part II.312 Because esteem is de­
sired in a relative sense, the disapproval one feels as one of the two 
percent who acts against the consensus is stronger than what one 
feels as one of the twenty percent who acts against the consensus, 
all else being equal. Thus, information about a consensus creates 
feedback: when more conform, the esteem cost for violators in­
creases, potentially causing cycles where still more comply and the 
cost rises further. When compliance drops, the disesteem a violator 
receives is less intense, potentially causing cycles in which fewer 
comply and the cost of violation decreases further. Privacy rights 
may influence this feedback effect by depriving the public of inf or­
mation about the extent of norm violations.313 It is not possible to 
309. The reverse is not true: If infonnation about gays and lesbians circulates freely, they 
cannot erase the infonnation from public awareness. 
310. If one thinks legal privacy protections are nonetheless inefficient, one must explain 
why privacy norms are not also inefficient, though I doubt that many people would want to 
live without them. Although unevenly enforced, group and societal nonns discourage (1) 
asking strangers, casual acquaintances, and even friends about their sexual preferences, 
predilections, and experiences; (2) eavesdropping or "spying" to learn such facts; and (3) 
publicizing intimate facts - or photographs - acquired through sexual encounters with an 
individual. The question whether a privacy right is efficient is similar to asking whether such 
privacy norms are efficient. The legal right may be viewed as strengthening privacy nonns. 
311. See, e.g., LARRY GROSS, CoNTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND Ennes OF OUT· 
ING (1993); WARREN JoHANSSON, OUTING: SHATIERING THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE 
(1994); John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747 
(1992). 
312. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18. 
313. Similarly, imagine that the number of violations remains constant but that privacy 
requires the public to guess at the number of violations. If the public underestimates nonn 
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say in the abstract how this would affect a particular norm. When 
the number of violators is growing and privacy prevents the public 
from recognizing that the consensus is weakening, privacy rights 
work to preserve the norm. Conversely, when violations are falling 
and privacy prevents the public from recognizing that the consensus 
is growing, privacy rights prevent the norm from strengthening. 
Thus, if one believes that heterosexuals who enforce norms 
against gays and lesbians ("homophobes") tend to underestimate 
the prevalence of homosexuality, one strategy for attacking the 
norm is to reveal how frequently it is violated. The call to come 
"out of the closet" is one means of revealing the higher frequency 
of violations; involuntarily "outing" gays and lesbians is another. 
Both strategies arguably serve to disprove common stereotypes 
about gays and lesbians. Many homophobes are able to preserve 
their distorted and negative images of gays and lesbians by the fact 
that they rarely or never encounter a contradicting image: someone 
they know is homosexual but who does not conform to the stereo­
type. Some hope that outing will provide evidence that forces the 
homophobe to abandon the stereotype, and with it, abandon the 
disapproval of homosexuality. This line of thinking strikes me as 
optimistic; certainly many people are able to hold negative stereo­
types of women and African Americans despite their never having 
been in the closet. But there is a second point about stereotypes: 
even if outing only causes homophobes to replace extreme stereo­
types with more subtle ones, falsifying the extreme stereotype 
forces the homophobe to realize that there may be far more gays 
and lesbians than was previously thought possible - because stran­
gers who do not manifest the extreme stereotype could still be gay 
or lesbian. The changed stereotype thus may create a feedback ef­
fect, in which the increased frequency of perceived violations weak­
ens the norm. 
Outing and privacy are always two possible alternative strate­
gies for attacking an existing norm.314 Privacy tries to drive down 
the risk of detection to the point where the norm is unenforceable. 
Outing tries to raise the risk of detection to the point where the 
consensus is revealed to be far weaker than previously believed.315 
violations - assuming, for example, that most or all norm violators are detected when very 
few actually are - then abandoning privacy will reveal more violations and lower the inten­
sity of disapproval for each violator. But if the public overestimates norm violations, aban­
doning privacy will reveal more norm compliance and strengthen the norm. 
314. Privacy is also a strategy to prevent a norm from arising. 
315. A person who exits the closet both implicitly criticizes the norm and proclaims it to 
be weak. 
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Viewed in this way, the effectiveness of a strategy depends greatly 
on how strong the consensus really is. If the consensus is suffi­
ciently strong, the revelation of violators will produce a flood of 
new sanctioning, and while each individual may be punished less, 
the norm may still reach a new equilibrium at a high level of pun­
ishment. Moreover, outing is risky because it may provide the 
norm enforcers with new information that raises the risk of detec­
tion for those who did not leave the closet.316 Whatever one thinks 
of outing as a strategy for gays and lesbians in the 1990s, I assume 
few would or did advocate the strategy in the 1950s, when the con­
sensus was probably strong enough to withstand such an attack. 
Greater tolerance in the 1990s makes the strategy now plausible. 
On the other hand, while privacy is the superior strategy when the 
nosy consensus is strong - or before it arises or is well known -
privacy may perpetuate a norm long after the consensus starts to 
dissipate. A noisy minority may continue to enforce the norm 
against the occasional individual whose privacy is accidentally lost 
and give the appearance of a consensus. A low probability of pun­
ishment combined with privacy rights may keep most violators in 
the closet at a time when mass exit would destroy the norm. 
* * 
In sum, the existence of esteem-based norms matters greatly to 
privacy regulation. A complete analysis of privacy must ask 
whether the information restrained might otherwise be used to cre­
ate or enforce a norm and, if so, whether the norm is efficient. 
When inefficient, the benefits of privacy - weakening a norm that 
impedes satisfaction of self-regarding preferences - may exceed its 
costs - the increase in search costs necessary to satisfy those pref­
erences. Finally, the privacy strategy should be compared to a pos­
sible outing strategy: if individuals are willing to use the latter and 
if the norm is already weak, privacy may only perpetuate the norm. 
But where the norm is genuinely powerful, or where private outing 
behavior is unlikely, privacy may be the superior means of weaken­
ing the norm. 
316. Judge Posner says, for example, that the extreme stereotypes make homosexuals 
invisible to homophobes, when additional tolerance may make detection easier. See PosNER, 
supra note 298, at 292. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has two goals. One is to clarify and unify the dispa­
rate scholarship on norms: group and societal norms, broad and 
narrow norms, externally and internally enforced norms. The sec­
ond is to identify new connections between law and norms, particu­
larly the use of law to regulate norms. For each goal, my strategy 
has been to identify a particular theory of norm origin. Given the 
assumption that people seek esteem as an end, I argue that norms 
are inevitable. Sometimes many people grant esteem or withhold 
esteem from the same behavior, while there is a risk that acts con­
trary to this consensus will be detected, and the consensus and risk 
are well known. When these conditions hold, even a weak concern 
for esteem from any one individual can create significant costs to 
acting against the consensus. When the private costs exceed the 
private benefits of violating the consensus, a norm emerges. Over 
time, competition for relative esteem may strengthen the norm, 
produce secondary enforcement norms - sometimes backed by 
material sanctions - and even cause the norm to be internalized. 
The esteem theory is not the only plausible theory of norm ori­
gin. But it serves the two goals of this article. First, the esteem 
model resolves certain ambiguities and contradictions in the litera­
ture. It explains the origin of both group and societal norms, as 
well as the occasional conflict between them, and identifies a crucial 
relationship between narrow and broad norms: concrete esteem­
based norms often define the meaning of abstract internalized 
norms. While preserving a place for internalization, the esteem 
model can explain phenomena internalization models cannot: the 
existence of norms that arose without unanimous consensus and the 
ability of criticism to produce rapid norm change. Thus, by provid­
ing a common theory of origin, the esteem model helps to unify the 
disparate parts of the new norms literature. 
Second, the esteem model has immediate implications for norm 
regulation. The desire for esteem predicts certain kinds of ineffi­
cient norms - unnecessary and excessive - omitted from the ex­
isting debate. The model also identifies several ways in which 
information is crucial to norm origin. Thus, law can manipulate 
norms by manipulating information, as when law creates or 
strengthens a norm by publicizing the existence of a consensus or 
when law blocks or weakens a norm by facilitating the concealment 
of information necessary to norm enforcement. Privacy turns out to 
be highly relevant to regulating norms; in some situations, the use 
of privacy rights may usefully restrict norm enforcement. 
